UNDERSTANDING SUICIDE TERRORISM



Radhika Halder

UNDERSTANDING SUICIDE TERRORISM

Understanding Suicide Terrorism aims to explore the different aspects involved in suicide terrorism for a better understanding of the tactic which has become a global phenomenon and threat today. The book aims to help inform holistic policy making by tracing the evolution of the use of suicide as a weapon in conflict and the emergence of modern-day suicide terrorism. The book uses case studies of prominent terror outfits to have used the tactic rather confidently and consistently and suggests that suicide terrorism must be understood as the interplay of three vital components—the individual committing the act, the organization employing the tactic and, the state environment contributing to the culture of suicide terrorism. Subsequently, a purely weapons-based approach to counter terrorism cannot be relied upon to solve a threat such as suicide terrorism which is so deeply ingrained in ideology and symbolism. The book comes at a time when suicide terrorism has been one of the most potent and effective tools for individuals and entities to achieve what they perceive as goals and shall inevitably remain a challenge for policy makers and security establishments to deal with.

Ms. **Radhika Halder** is a researcher of International Relations, and her areas of interest include global terrorism, radicalization and violent extremism as well as regional security and politics in South Asia. At present, she is based in Kathmandu, Nepal where she works with *Niti Foundation*, a public-policy driven organisation responsible for supporting analysis, guidance, and recommendations widely available to policy-makers implementing federalism in Nepal.

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

UNDERSTANDING SUICIDE TERRORISM

Radhika Halder

Introduction by

Air Marshal **Vinod Patney** SYSM PVSM AVSM VrC (Retd)

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

KNOWLEDGE WORLD
KW Publishers Pvt Ltd
New Delhi

in association with

Centre for Air Power Studies
New Delhi

First published 2020
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2020 Radhika Halder and KW Publishers Pvt Ltd

The right of Radhika Halder to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

Print edition not for sale in South Asia (India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh, Pakistan or Bhutan)

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN: 978-0-367-43838-8 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-00611-4 (ebk)

Typeset in Adobe Caslon Pro
by KW Publishers

CENTRE FOR AIR POWER STUDIES

VISION

To be an independent centre of excellence on national security contributing informed and considered research and analyses on relevant issues.

MISSION

To encourage independent and informed research and analyses on issues of relevance to national security and to create a pool of domain experts to provide considered inputs to decision-makers. Also, to foster informed public debate and opinion on relevant issues and to engage with other think-tanks and stakeholders within India and abroad to provide an Indian perspective.

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

Contents

Acknowledgements xi

Preface xiii

Introduction xix

1. Understanding Definitions 1

2. The Origins of Suicide Terrorism: A Historical Overview 23

3. Dimensions of the Phenomenon 55

4. Analysing Suicide Terrorism through Case Studies: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Al Qaeda 85

5. Analysing Suicide Terrorism Through Anti-India Terror Groups: Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad 117

6. Evaluating the Vulnerabilities of States Dealing with Suicide Terrorism 151

7. Conclusion 191

Index 227

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

I would like to dedicate this book to my father, who is, and shall forever remain, a major inspiration in my life.

This one's for you, Papa!

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

Acknowledgements

It gives me immense pleasure to have completed this book and to acknowledge the support and guidance that I have received whilst working on it. More than a process, it has been a life-learning journey for me, and it has been possible due to the collective effort of each individual I mention below in shaping my passion for research, which has translated into this book.

First of all, I would like to thank Air Marshal Vinod Patney SYSM PVSM AVSM VrC (Retd), former Director General of the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS), for having more confidence in me than I ever did myself and inspiring me every day during my time at CAPS. It would be fair to say that this book would not even have been thought of if it wasn't for him. I am also thankful to Air Marshal KK Nohwar PVSM VM (Retd), Director General, CAPS, for his thorough feedback and ability to always push me to do better.

Suicide terrorism, as a subject, has not been the easiest to work on however, I am thankful to the supervision extended to me throughout by Dr. Shalini Chawla, who patiently guided me at every step, with her constructive criticism and scholarly inputs. I would also like to thank Professor Shane Brighton, who taught Global Security and Terrorism at the University of Sussex, and sparked my curiosity to study suicide terrorism.

As mentioned already, this has been a beautiful journey and has groomed me into the person I am today. None of this would have been possible without the support of the wonderful staff at CAPS. I am equally obliged and give a special shout-out to my fellow terrorism scholars, who were pillars of support and indulged in all kinds of 'terrorism debates' with me, teaching me more than a textbook ever could.

While researching suicide terrorism may not necessarily be something that everyone understands, I was always given a pat on

the back by my family and close friends for the same. They have been extremely supportive and patient throughout the entire process. My parents deserve special mention for encouraging me to make unconventional professional choices and do what I enjoy doing. Both my grandparents have been equally instrumental in encouraging me and always being proud of whatever I do. I lost my maternal grandfather, late Air Marshal DN Rathore VrC VSM, within the first few months after I started writing this book. I would have wanted nothing more than for him to have read it, however, I believe he will be happy and proud regardless.

Last, but not the least, I would like to thank KW Publishers for publishing this book and bringing my hard work to fruition.

I will also be immensely grateful to the readers of my research and hope it will be relevant to their interest.

Sincerely,

Radhika Halder

Preface

Hatred is the most accessible and comprehensive of all unifying agents. Mass movements can rise and spread without belief in a God, but never without belief in a devil.

— Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements*

The power of fear is immense. It is no wonder then that fear is often used as a tool for coercion, particularly the fear of death, the ultimate fear of mankind. Terrorism is one such coercive tool that works on the same concept. It is the use or threat of use of fear as a tool for coercion for an objective that is, above all, political. Terrorism is, most definitely psychological warfare, as it is asymmetric in nature, with its perpetrators almost never expecting to "win" militarily against their opponents. The aim of terrorism is to instil fear in the minds of the opponent. Thus, terrorists strive for as much attention as they can gather through media coverage and propaganda in order to generate widespread sensation and fear. While the menace of terrorism dates back to several centuries, it has gained a lot more attention in the 21st century post the attacks of 9/11. Not only was 9/11 an eye-opener to terrorism for the entire world, but further, an eye-opener to the intensified scope of the threat of terror, where the perpetrators are willing to die in the act. Suicide terrorism is an extreme form of terrorism and while it intends to use fear as a tool for coercion, it also involves the death of the perpetrator, along with its targets. This not only magnifies the scope of the terrorist attack but also the psychological impact of the attack manifold.

Suicide terrorism is one of the fastest growing threats in the world. While it was once a subset of terrorism wherein a few units within a terrorist organisation would be dedicated to suicide attacks, today, the

situation has changed completely. "Terrorism" as a term is predominantly being used interchangeably with "suicide terrorism", blurring the fine line between the two. Thus, terrorism is becoming an increasingly altruistic phenomenon wherein individuals (are made to) believe that they are working towards a "greater good" and, thus, even if they have to give up their lives for the same, it is the most honourable thing to do. While not all terrorists think in this manner, the number of such altruistic suicide attacks is only increasing, as evident from the increased frequency of lone wolf attacks and suicide bombings witnessed by the world today. In the words of Robert Pape and John Feldman, "Suicide terrorism is the ultimate smart bomb". It gives terrorist organisations a strategic leverage over other forms of terrorism, not only to assure the destruction of targets but further also to create a psychological fear and demonstrate the enhanced commitment and dedication of its followers to its cause. It is, today, the most easily acquired weapon in the hands of terror entities and individuals who strive to show their devotion to the cause and to the organisation, further legitimising self-sacrifice.

While terrorist organisations strive to employ suicide terrorism as a tactic for its strategic effectiveness, this does not mean that individuals committing the act are completely brainwashed or delusional about their actions. It is often believed that terrorists are either mentally ill or suicidal individuals who are brainwashed into committing the act of self-sacrifice. Bruce Hoffman helps explain the relationship between the individual and the act of suicide terrorism by saying that suicide terrorism has become "the ultimate expression of selflessness and altruism". While indoctrination and radicalisation play a great role in convincing an individual to give up his/her life for a particular cause, the final decision is always that of the individual. Thus, terrorists, especially suicide terrorists, must be considered rational actors or individuals fully aware of their actions, rather than irrational or delusional actors. Mistaking terrorists for irrational beings runs the risk of underestimating them and their capabilities. Boaz Ganor is of the opinion that all terrorists carry out cost-benefit analysis of their actions before indulging in a suicide attack. The assumption that terrorists are

rational individuals is perhaps the only assumption one can make about all terrorists, if there has to be a generalisation. Apart from this, there is no single characteristic or particular profile of a terrorist that applies to all. Terrorists are individuals who are part of the same society that we all live in, and must be dealt with in the same manner.

What is pertinent to question, then, is: why do they do it? This requires a far more open and liberal understanding. A purely military or weapons-based approach to counter terrorism will never solve the problem, as has been proved after the attacks of 9/11 and the launching of the Global War on Terror. Terrorism has managed to persist, thrive and expand today, because of its ideological penetration and its deep-rooted and widespread appeal that has still not been countered or given enough attention to. This calls for an understanding of aspects such as psychology, symbolism and ideology, as well as the socio-economic and political conditions of the world, with specific focus on areas where suicide terrorism is more prevalent. The book aims to understand suicide terrorism and its various dimensions in order to be better equipped ourselves to address the threat.

Chapter 1 discusses how the definition of terrorism has evolved over the years, indicative of the changing global understanding of the concept of terrorism, followed by that of suicide terrorism, in the same manner. This began in the 1700s when the term "terrorism" was used to describe the Reign of Terror during the French Revolution and then the Marxist led movements in the 19th century. This far, terrorism had resonated with revolutionary acts that used violence in order to bring about a "better and freer" society in the 18th and 19th centuries. This definition changed by the end of World War I with Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia wherein terrorism was now used to describe authoritarian and dictatorial regimes. By the end of World War II, terrorism was once again used to describe revolutionary acts of terrorism in the fight for self-determination and the freedom struggles in Asia and Africa. It was in the 1980s that the era of "modern terrorism" began, with organisations such as Hezbollah and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

employing terrorism, including suicide terrorism, on a large scale to achieve their goals.

Chapter 2 traces the evolution of the use of suicide as a weapon in conflict, from *Narodnaya Volya* in Imperial Russia, the Japanese *Kamikaze* during World War II, the Provisional Irish Republican Army in the 1960s, the Workers' Party of Kurdistan or PKK in Turkey in the late 1970s, the events in West Asia in the year 1979, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the LTTE in Sri Lanka in the 1980s.

Chapter 3 discusses the shift within the nature of suicide terrorism from the struggle for a "homeland" (1980-2000) to the transnational nature of suicide terrorism based on a collective ideology (2000-present). As this shift has taken place over the last four decades, a closer look at the functioning of the two main actors—the organisation and the indivudal—involved in suicide terrorism is imperative. From the organisation's point of view, suicide terrorism makes strategic sense, especially in comparison to other forms of terrorism, while, from an individual's point of view, there is usually a high level of symbolism attached to the act of suicide, championing the act of suicide terrorism.

Chapters 4 and 5 focus on case studies of organisations that have employed suicide terrorism extensively. Chapter 4 contains case studies of the LTTE and Al Qaeda. While the former was based on an ethno-nationalist/separatist movement and was a classic example of how suicide terrorism was used to protect the 'homeland', the latter portrays the ways in which ideology rooted in religion can bring about the same urge or willingness to become a 'martyr'.

Chapter 5 looks at terror organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) that pose a threat to India through a very different kind of suicide terrorism in the form of *fidayeen* attacks. These groups are known to be directed by a state sponsor, i.e. Pakistan, that strategically uses proxy groups in pursuing its national interest and larger agenda with India. *Fidayeen* attacks remain a serious challenge and play on the vulnerabilities of the Indian state, which need to be addressed.

Chapter 6 deals with the vulnerabilities of the states that deal with suicide terrorism. The chapter looks at Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan

and Pakistan to investigate the state's contribution—intentionally or unintentionally—in providing an environment conducive to campaigns of suicide terrorism to flourish. While some of the factors enabling such an environment in these countries have been identified, some of the counter-terror measures have also been discussed.

The concluding chapter makes an attempt towards understanding the root causes and factors behind different campaigns of suicide terrorism throughout the evolution of the phenomenon. Essentially, suicide terrorism is the interplay of three main components—the individual committing the act, the organisation employing the tactic, and the environment conducive to campaigns of suicide terrorism. A further shift is seen in the equation between the employer organisation and its individual members. Most terror outfits had a mass following due to their leadership with a cult-like popularity that managed to destroy all aspects of their members' lives by promoting alienation from the broader society. However, this seems to be changing with the creation of organisations such as the Islamic State (IS) in the recent past wherein the ideology seems to have overpowered the leadership, making terrorism a fairly decentralised concept, thereby giving rise to the lone wolf phenomenon. Counter-terror efforts, especially in the field of suicide terrorism, need to, thus, keep all these aspects in mind and take actions accordingly.

While there have been numerous studies on counter-terrorism, one must also make an attempt at understanding terrorism, and suicide terrorism in particular, as it involves willing participants in pursuit of the 'greater good'. Since it is the ideology that is so deeply rooted in the minds and systems of such beliefs, one must not take terrorists (suicide terrorists, especially) as disillusioned actors, but rational actors, fully aware of what they are doing, and further, willing to do so. It is, therefore, the ideology that must be fully understood first, and then countered. Moreover, a transnational threat such as suicide terrorism must have a transnational solution or an effort in the same direction at a global scale. Finally, terrorism cannot be eradicated but it can be coped with in a better manner. While the 9/11 attacks exposed the grave threat posed by a well-planned act of suicide terrorism, organisations

such as the IS have exposed the unique threat that the phenomenon of lone wolf terrorism poses, without any direct instruction from the terror organisation. It is, thus, time for counter-terror efforts to shift focus and accommodate the changing dynamics of the threat today.

Introduction

Terrorism is an age-old and worldwide phenomenon. All along, the one common denominator has been that it was intended to, and did, incite fear. Those who indulged in merciless killings often became the stuff of legends even in times long gone by. In recent times, terrorism has become more prevalent and its salience has increased. There have been numerous debates, discussions and discourses that aim to understand the phenomenon and to find ways to contain the menace. Unfortunately, there is no recognised authority that can boast of a cure. As it is a global phenomenon, it stands to reason that global efforts are needed. Efforts in this direction have been belied, and not for want of good intentions. As early as 1996, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) authorised an ad hoc committee to iron out a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT). The efforts have not yet yielded results. The CCIT is deadlocked on issues like the definition of terrorism and other legal *legerdemains*. A concerted effort to rid the world of the scourge of terrorism remains elusive. Again, there are countries like Pakistan that are state sponsors of terrorism and will find it difficult to accede to a convention banning and punishing such activities. If the rule of international law prevails, a country should not harbour and support the funding and training of terrorists. Furthermore, countries that are frequent victims of terrorist attacks, are keen to have a strong convention to address the problem at the earliest but the issue is not so urgent for countries not immediately affected. The adage that 'your terrorist is your terrorist and not my terrorist' is, unfortunately, all too true. Seen from the point of view of the fraternity of universal brotherhood, it is also sad.

The word terrorism means different things to different people. For instance, a terrorist organisation can be conveniently viewed as part of a liberation struggle. Again, all nefarious activities like money

laundering, murder and manslaughter, causing grievous bodily harm, etc. do not necessarily fall under the category of terrorism. Therefore, there is a need to define terrorism. As mentioned earlier, the CCIT is deadlocked on the issue of a definition. One definition that should meet the approval of the majority is that "terrorism is the violence or threat of violence directed against civilians for the purpose of creating intense fear, which the terrorist hopes to exploit to attain political or ideological goals. Terrorism can be perpetrated by individuals, groups or governments." Terrorism comprises premeditated and well planned attack(s). There is no deniability attached; in fact, the organisation goes out of its way to take credit for it. Three aspects of the definition merit particular attention. Firstly, terrorism could also imply, mere 'threat of violence'. The threat itself can incite fear, particularly if the terrorist organisation has shown its dreaded merciless character. The psychological impact of the fear could be greater than the actual violence. Even after a violent attack, the threat of more violence is to instil even greater fear. Secondly, the violence or threat of it is directed against civilians. This should be viewed as cowardly as the attack is against the defenceless, but it is aimed at creating mayhem that impinges on normal everyday life. However, terror attacks against security agencies also fall within the rubric of terrorism. Thirdly, the object is to attain political or ideological goals. This is an important consideration. The violence is perpetrated with a clear objective in mind; it is not violence for the sake of violence.

In earlier years, terrorist attacks were carried out unobtrusively, under the cloak of deniability. The object was to surreptitiously kill or maim in order to spread fear and uncertainty. History also records the exploits of Timur, Chenghis Khan and the like who wantonly killed, looted and even subjugated a population into submission. A better understanding of the phenomenon was obtained with the Reign of Terror unleashed during the French Revolution in the ten years from 1789. That terrorism supports revolutionary acts was again shown during the Marxist movement in the 19th century and later with the happenings in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. In all these

cases, oppressive measures against its own citizenry were mounted by the ruling state or organisation wanting to usurp power. Post World War II, terrorism was used to seek independence from foreign powers in Asia and Africa. In the 1980s, organisations like Hezbollah and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) redefined the concept of terrorism, and introduced, in compelling fashion, the concept of suicide terrorism. The world was witness to a far more aggressive and radical form of suicide terrorism when the World Trade Centre was struck and brought down by aircraft actually aiming for, and hitting, the two towers on September 11, 2001. The entire operation cost some $ 500,000 only but the damage was of more than $ 3 billion, apart from the upheaval the attack created worldwide. The global perception about terrorism altered, but not enough has been done to arrest the scourge.

Suicide terrorism is not divorced from terrorism *per se*, but it is a more impactful form of it. Terrorist organisations have used it to great advantage but the *Kamikazi* attacks against the allied shipping during World War II orchestrated by Japan probably rank foremost in the use of such attacks by a nation. Nations send soldiers to fight and win, and not to undertake one-way missions. Yet Japan did do so, and many pilots opted to be sent on such single journey missions where the fuel on board was insufficient for them to return even if they had a change of heart once over target. In modern times also, we can find examples where state sponsors of terrorism convince the hapless to commit suicide for a purpose.

For the lay person, it is difficult to understand the psychology behind volunteers willing to kill themselves albeit for a cause. The concept goes against the grain of 'self-preservation' that most recognise as an attribute of humankind and, indeed, other species as well. Many doctoral theses can be written on the subject and probably have been. However, it is generally recognised that inducements and ideology can be the motivating factors. The indoctrination and brainwashing has to be of a high order. Suicide terrorism is based on the presumption that human life is cheap and the system achieves results that are far more meaningful than the effort expended. Even then, there is always the

danger that the terrorists may be apprehended before they reach the target. In such cases, there is a fear that the apprehenders will torture them to elicit more information of the organisation and its future plans. For the suicide terrorist, getting tortured may be a fate worse than death. Hence, their mentors arm them with poison pills or train them to set off detonators or to use other means available to kill themselves before they are questioned. The mentors must belong to a different breed if they able to treat fellow human beings in such a manner. A detailed analysis is needed as to the nature, character and lack of conscience of those who select and train the unfortunate ignorants and then send them to their death. Even when states use suicide terrorists, they are no less inhumane in the selection and exploitation of those they task to die for them.

Apart from it being materially and monetarily less expensive, suicide terrorism has the added advantage of an enhanced success rate, particularly in the case of lone wolf attacks. The news-worthiness of the attacks also draws attention to the cause and could entice others to sacrifice themselves.

How does one combat suicide terrorism? Normally, defences are based on the premise that the attacker will be caught or killed before reaching the target. That is the deterring factor. This concept has little meaning in the case of terrorists who are more than willing to die for a cause. Probably one has to take a step or two back and try and find answers to the issues troubling the terrorists. Care should also be taken to avoid appeasement of the terrorists as that would be playing into their hands. However, it behoves the state to do what is needed, within reason, to assuage the alienation factors. Needless to add, if the purpose of the terrorists is to overthrow the government, harsh measures may have to be adopted.

Indeed, there are no easy answers but it behoves us to at least try and understand the phenomenon, its causes and the means we could adopt to find solutions. In this respect, Radhika Halder has done well to address the issue comprehensively in this book. The historical references described by her cover much ground and give us more than

a flavour of the nature of terrorism, particularly suicide terrorism, and its impact. She shows how religion has come to play a major role and assays what can be done to contain the problem. The case studies about the LTTE, Al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) merit attention. Her conclusions are sound and well formulated.

Radhika is a young researcher and this is her first book. The book would do credit even to someone who has had far more years of scholarship. It is compulsive reading and gives a clear picture of a knotty problem that we should all be more than aware of. It is intended not only for those dealing with national security issues but also for those who have a passing acquaintance with the subject whose importance can only increase with time, at least in the near and mid-term.

Well done, Radhika.

February 28, 2018

Air Marshal **Vinod Patney**
SYSM PVSM AVSM VrC (Retd)

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

1. Understanding Definitions

Almost no single country today is free of the threat of terror, owing to the transnational nature of terrorism and the heightened role of modern communication platforms in our daily lives. Terrorism has also affected different parts of the world in varying degrees and in different ways. While it has become a fairly common phenomenon today, terrorism has evolved in various phases, and so has the very definition of what constitutes "terrorism". The term itself is so broad that it encompasses a vast ambit of activities and has been contextualised to a great extent. This is one of the main reasons why there is no globally accepted definition of terrorism even today. It is also the nature of the phenomenon that plays a part in this. David Rapoport, a prominent terrorism scholar, has established that terrorism has evolved in four waves,[1] and further, that each of these waves has been a reflection on the social, political and technological circumstances of the time. These waves are not distinctly unique but build upon the lessons learnt from their preceding waves, in the form of operational knowledge and techniques developed, which then go on to begin a new wave altogether.[2] As terrorism has evolved as a concept, the way we understand it has also evolved manifold.

The first instance of the popular use of the term "terrorism" was in reference to the Reign of Terror during the French Revolution, wherein it referred to revolutionary acts that were undertaken with an anti-government spirit. However, at the time, Maximilien Robespierre, a revolutionary leader, had faith in the use of terror as a legitimate state policy in order to overthrow the existing regime which was repressive in nature. The use of terror in the form of bloodshed and violence was seen as legitimate and liberating, in order to let democracy triumph. The basic characteristics of terrorism present in this era are not too different from terrorism today. It was seen as a systematic attempt by

a group of people in an attempt to overthrow the existing regime for a better or a new one, as perceived by those involved in such acts.[3]

In the 1700s, the idea of terrorism resonated with that of revolution, when nationalist aspirations led to the common identity of people willing to collectively adhere to notions of statehood and citizenship. This translated into the creation of various nation-states. Soon, another revolutionary movement began to take shape in the wake of the Industrial Revolution, i.e. the movement based on Communism or Marxism. This is also the time when Carlo Pisacane, an Italian republican extremist, advocated his concept of "propaganda by deed",[4] proposing the concept of violence as a necessary step to be taken by individuals who wish to generate awareness towards a particular cause in order to draw attention and inform the public, in an attempt to "awaken" them and gain their support in the revolution. This concept holds true for most revolutionary movements that took place throughout the 19th century. Marxism, thus, took root in the 19th century owing to the alienating and exploitative conditions arising out of capitalism, resulting in a change in the perception of terrorism.[5]

It was in the 1800s, in Imperial Russia, that the first terrorist organisation, *Narodnaya Volya* (People's Will/Freedom) was formed in order to overthrow the Czarist regime. The group used "propaganda by deed" as its central policy and indulged in targeted killings in order to challenge the oppression of the autocratic state.[6] This revolutionary notion of terrorism continued throughout World War I, however, it changed once again by the 1930s. With the establishment of authoritarian regimes in Italy, Germany and Russia under Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin respectively, the term "terrorism" was no longer used just for anti-state actors but for state authorities that were seen to have "terrorised" their own citizens. Such dictatorial regimes led to a major shift in the concept of terrorism as well as the employer of the tactic from a non-state to a state actor. By World War II, however, once again "terrorism" was associated with revolutionary movements in reference to the struggle for decolonisation of states in Asia and Africa. These were freedom movements led by groups that were fighting to end

the suppression of their land and countrymen from the clutches of the colonial rulers from the 1940s onwards. Thus, anti-colonial and nationalist movements came under the garb of "terrorism" and since the 1960s, this also included ethnic separatist (or minorities) groups.[7]

This was the time when groups such as the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), Hezbollah, and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) emerged on the scene, expanding the concept of terrorism further. In the wake of the Iranian Revolution and the creation of Hezbollah, the nature of Islamist revolutionary movements changed and drew attention all over the world—both positive and negative. This was also the time when religion was used as a catalyst to mobilise people and indulge in acts of terror. It was, therefore, from the 1980s, that the era of "modern terrorism" is said to have begun. While a lot of our understanding of terrorism today comes from the events that unfolded in the 1980s, there has been a further change in the concept of "terrorism" with the 9/11 attacks orchestrated by Al Qaeda.

Definitions of Terrorism

While the concept of terrorism has evolved over the years, affecting our understanding of the term, its definition has also simultaneously changed. After World War I, ethnic separatist violence in the 1930s prompted the League of Nations to define terrorism for the first time, in order to encourage world stability and peace, as: "All criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public".[8] This never came into force as it was not ratified by all the member countries. This was perhaps the first attempt at defining terrorism at the global stage, however, to very little effect. Till date, there has not been a widely accepted definition of terrorism, owing mostly to the fact that the concept of terrorism is inherently political. It uses violence or even the threat of using violence in order to wield or challenge power, in the process, drawing attention to its cause and calling upon others for support. This is one of the most common characteristics seen in the phenomenon of terrorism throughout its

evolution. Thus, different countries and institutions have different notions of what actually constitutes "terrorism", making it extremely difficult to bring about a consensus regarding the same despite the fact that almost every country of the world today has come to be a victim of the phenomenon.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the USA defines terrorism in elaborate terms, however, it has essentially been described as the "unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives".[9] The US Department of Defence uses a different definition, as follows: "The unlawful use of violence, or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs, to instil fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political."[10] Further, the US State Department uses a more simplified definition terming terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents".[11]

The United Kingdom's Terrorism Act 2000, defines terrorism as "actions involving serious violence against a person, damage to property, a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or is designed seriously to disrupt an electronic system. The use of threat is designed to influence the government (including international governmental organisations) or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and the use or threat of action is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause".[12]

The Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism was adopted by the Council of Arab Ministers of the Interior and the Council of Arab Ministers of Justice in Cairo, in 1998, according to which terrorism was defined as "any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes, that occurs in the advancement of an individual or collective criminal agenda and seeking to sow panic among people, causing fear by harming them, or placing their lives, liberty or security in danger, or seeking to cause damage to the environment or to public

or private installations or property or occupying or seizing them, or seeking to jeopardize a national resource."[13]

In India, the first law which attempted a definition of terrorism was the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) 1987, which states: "Whoever, with intent to overawe the Government as by law established or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people or to alienate any section of the people or to adversely affect the harmony amongst different sections of the people, does any act or thing by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances or inflammable substances or lethal weapons or poisons or noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other substances (whether biological or otherwise) of a hazardous nature in such a manner as to cause, or as is likely to cause, death of, or injuries to, any person or persons or loss of, or damage to, or destruction of property or disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the community, or detains any person and threatens to kill or injure such person in order to compel the Government or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act, commits a terrorist act."[14] However, the definition of terrorism in India has also evolved over the years. The Prevention of Terrorist Activities (POTA) in 2001 was an Act adopted in response to the Parliament attack in 2001, and in 2012, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of 1967 was amended to further broaden the scope of "terrorist activities". However, this Act has also been extremely controversial.[15]

Defining Terrorism

While countries and security institutions had different ways of defining terrorism, the basis of such definition was essentially the manner in which they perceived the threat subject to their national interest and integrity. There is, thus, no single all-encompassing universal definition of terrorism till date. The United Nations (UN) and various nation-states have been striving for decades to find an expression for terrorism, which narrows down to a specific profile of condemnable violence regardless of the cause which triggers it. The absence of an agreed

definition leaves it to individual countries and international agencies to define terrorism (quite often) subjectively.

Bruce Hoffman, in perhaps the most descriptive and encompassing manner, describes terrorism as:

> … the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. All terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of violence. Terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack. It is meant to instil fear within, and thereby intimidate a wider target audience that might include a rival ethnic or religious group, an entire country, a national government or political party, or public opinion in general. Terrorism is designed to create power where there is very little. Through the publicity generated by their violence, terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence, and power they otherwise lack to effect political change on either a local or an international scale.[16]

Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman define terrorism as,

> … an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators.[17]

From the various definitions of terrorism, as given above, it can then be agreed that terrorism has certain common characteristics regardless of the varied definitions. Terrorism is not just a phenomenon but a strategy which involves the use of terror as a tool for coercion in the form of fear, intimidation, and/or despair. Thus, terror can either be used or can be threatened to be used for the purpose of coercion, in order to achieve certain political, religious and/or ideological objectives.

Moreover, terrorism has certain target audiences, namely, those who are killed; those who are made to witness; and those who are drawn towards the cause. Carefully thought out plans of terrorist violence are used by terror outfits in order to draw the attention of all three target audiences. Terrorists work on intimidation and fear directed towards these audiences and the creation of this fear can involve killing innocent civilians, political assassinations, or even blowing oneself up in order to make the attack more lethal. This, then, helps in drawing attention towards the cause of the terrorist organisation, one of the fundamental objectives that its perpetrators strive for.

One can, thus arrive, at the following definition of terrorism which aims to accommodate each of these characteristics:

> Terrorism is the use or threat of use of violence in order to instil fear in a specified target, which includes innocent civilians.

The purpose of defining terrorism is to help tackle the threat and identify the targets easily. Why, then, is a universally and widely agreed upon definition of terrorism so difficult to arrive at? This is where the debate around the definition of terrorism arises. Terrorism is an extremely subjective and politically charged concept and, hence, the perception of its definition varies widely. Going by the definition mentioned above, both state and non-state actors would be guilty of having indulged in "terrorism", particularly in areas of conflict and/or warfare. The inclusion of state actors in the definition of terrorism would then defeat the purpose of a definition for state actors to work with. This is hugely part of the reason why a universal definition of terrorism has not been able to come about. However, for the purpose of this study on suicide terrorism, it is pertinent to distinguish terrorism as a phenomenon carried out by non-state actors only. Thus, the definition of terrorism that shall be applicable throughout this book is the following:

Terrorism is the use or threat of use of violence *by non-state actors* in order to instil fear in a specified target, which includes innocent civilians.

Suicide Terrorism

What has really caught global attention in recent times is the phenomenon of suicide terrorism, the worst and most brutal form of terrorism known today. It pursues coercion at the expense of not only angering the target community but neutral audiences as well. Suicide terrorism has mostly been referred to as a subset of terrorism; however, today, suicide terrorism can be seen to have replaced terrorism altogether. Although terrorism has long been part of international politics, there is yet to come about a convincing explanation for the growing phenomenon of suicide terrorism. Traditional studies of terrorism tend to treat suicide attack as one of the many tactics that terrorists resort to and, therefore, fall short of shedding much light on the recent rise of this form of attack.[18]

Suicide terrorism is a form of terrorism which uses the act of suicide or self-sacrifice in pursuit of its agenda. Today, suicide terrorism is on the rise and has led to several casualties the world over. It is unique as compared to other forms of terrorism as it involves a symbolic and psychological value owing to the act of self-sacrifice. However, the use of suicide as a weapon in conflict is not an entirely new phenomenon. In order to understand this better, it is essential to realise what constitutes "suicide" and how it has been used in a "conflict". Suicide is "the act or instance of taking one's own life voluntarily and intentionally"[19] and a conflict is "an active disagreement (usually protracted) between people with opposing opinions or principles".[20] Suicide is known to be used, especially in situations of protracted conflict wherein desperation leads to the act of self-sacrifice in an attempt to help improve the conditions around the conflict and send a clear message across to the opponent. The terms 'suicide bombing' and 'suicide terrorism' are often used interchangeably, however, as terrorist tactics have evolved far more than merely 'bombing', it would be most appropriate to use the term 'suicide terrorism'.

Emile Durkheim's comprehensive study towards the end of the 19th century on the typology of suicide types gives a more holistic approach to the kinds of suicide that are linked to terrorism as

well. Durkheim describes suicide as four different types: egoistic, fatalistic, anomic and altruistic. Egoistic suicide is also known as individualistic suicide, wherein the motives are personal. Fatalistic suicide is associated with an environment in which the individual's social category has been subject to persistent oppression and suicide is committed due to the lack of any hopeful future prospects. Anomic suicide takes place in a society where regulations are so low that the lack of norms causes disillusionment and disappointment, leading to suicide. Lastly, altruistic suicide intends to serve the will of the collective and is the product of situations in which a person undergoes a highly compelling process of integration into a social group which champions the act of suicide. In this case, the interest and motives of the individual become secondary to those of the group and the individual is prepared to take any step for the advancement of its (the group's) goals.[21] The principal difference between the altruistic and fatalistic types lies in the social interpretation of the act as perceived by the environment or community surrounding the individual.

Altruistic suicide is of utmost concern. Altruism comes from the belief that there is a "greater good" to be achieved at the end of this self-sacrifice, and has been used as a weapon in conflict to coerce, and be used against, an adversary. Similarly, altruistic suicide has been used by terror outfits, making suicide terrorism the most lethal challenge faced by the world today. Altruism becomes the hardest form of suicide to deter because of the very limited scope that exists in dissuading someone who actually believes that killing oneself is part of a "greater good". However, fatalistic suicide is equally as big a threat as it can be manipulated and used by terror outfits who recruit individuals from impoverished or oppressed environments. Such individuals are likely to be attracted to the "championed" act of suicide, as presented to them by the terror outfit.

Suicide terrorism, thus, involves the killing of one's own self as well as other targets in the process. It is not necessary that a suicide attack will lead to collateral damage. More often than not, the attack has

been indicative of the devotion of the group to a particular cause and the extent to which they can go to secure their interest. The purpose of suicide terrorism is to instil fear and pursue coercion and does not necessarily need to be carried out at the expense of mass casualties. The principal goal of suicide terrorism, thus, is physical injury/death/damage while the death of the person committing the act is a means to achieve this goal.

Extensive research has been carried out in the field of suicide terrorism by various scholars proposing a more holistic picture of the phenomenon.

Suicide terrorism has become one of the most lethal forms of terrorism, according to Robert Pape, a professor of political science at the University of Chicago, who has created a database of all suicide attacks from 1980-2003. According to him, suicide attacks have become the most deadly form of terrorism as they account for 73 percent of all fatalities (including 9/11), making the average suicide terrorist attack twelve times more deadly than other forms of terrorism.[22]

Professor Pape categorises terrorism into three kinds:

- **Demonstrative Terrorism:** This aims at gaining publicity and recognition for recruitment of more activists, gaining attention to grievances from soft-liners on the opposite side, and gaining attention from third parties who might exert pressure on the other side.
- **Destructive Terrorism:** This is more aggressive and seeks to coerce opponents, at the cost of losing sympathy for the cause, with the threat of real harm or death as well as to mobilise support for the cause.
- **Suicide Terrorism:** This is known to pursue coercion even at the expense of angering not only the audience or community targeted, but neutral ones as well and, therefore, is one of the most aggressive forms of terrorism. In such an attack, the attacker kills himself/herself and does not expect to survive the mission, killing others (mostly civilians or a particular target and/or both) in the process. Pape's database leads him to conclude findings on suicide terrorism,

> keeping in mind the strategic and symbolic aspects of suicide terrorism which mutually complement each other, enabling the perpetrator to carry out such an attack.[23]

Yoram Schweitzer, a senior research fellow at Israel's Institute for National Security Studies, defines suicide terrorism as a politically motivated violent attack perpetrated by a self-aware individual(s) who actively and purposely causes his own death by blowing himself (*sic*) up along with his chosen target. The perpetrator's ensured death is a precondition for the success of his mission.[24]

K.M. Fierke, professor of international relations at the University of St. Andrews, goes on to describe what distinguishes suicide terror attacks from any other terrorist attack. According to her, this distinction is significant because the language of 'martyrdom' politicises the act of the human bomb, while that of 'suicide' depoliticises it. In politicising, 'martyrdom' constitutes the human bomb as an agent in pursuit of justice, who is empowered vis-à-vis an earthly and divine community. In depoliticising, 'suicide terrorism' constitutes the agency of states vis-à-vis a moral deviant and an abject other who is outside politics and is, thus, the object of legitimate violence.[25]

The basic relationship—the use of human beings by other human beings—is the defining characteristic of suicide terrorism. Suicide terrorists have typically been understood within their communities and their sponsoring organisations to be martyrs in the traditional sense of the word—that is, individuals who willingly sacrifice their lives on behalf of a cause. The willingness of such individuals to give their lives, in turn, has the strategic effect of validating the cause and the organisations that fight for it. Although, at the same time, suicide bombing differs from martyrdom as conventionally understood, because martyrs historically accepted suffering for themselves without inflicting harm upon others. The power of martyrdom lies in the willingness of the individual to suffer, even unto death, which stems from the martyr's certainty in his or her beliefs and a sense that to compromise those beliefs would be a worse alternative than death.[26] It is, thus, important to not confuse

terrorism with martyrdom for our understanding but acknowledge the fact that suicide terrorism is sold to its followers as martyrdom.

Suicide Terrorism Today

The most important element in the new age of terrorism is the fact that suicide terrorism has become the very face of terrorism worldwide. Moreover, in contemporary times, suicide terrorism has evolved in its own way. After Lebanon in the 1980s having made a major impact on suicide terrorism worldwide, it seems that the 9/11 attacks in New York marked a completely new era of terrorism as a whole. It becomes extremely crucial to understand the way in which suicide terrorism has evolved today and the kinds of challenges that it poses for security establishments globally. Suicide terrorism has become a transnational threat and various landmark incidents have symbolised its evolution in recent times.

9/11 Attacks: September 11, 2001

On September 11, 2001, a series of four coordinated attacks took the city of New York by storm. Two hijacked aircraft were flown into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in New York City, a third aircraft hit the Pentagon and a fourth crashed outside Pennsylvania. The number of casualties incurred by this incident was estimated at approximately 3,000.[27] The 9/11 attacks were an indication of a "declaration of war"[28] on the United States of America (USA) in the words of the then US President, George W. Bush. For most American intelligence and law enforcement officials, until 9/11, Islam-centred terrorism was something that happened in distant lands and was of no concern to the US. The 9/11 attacks not only shattered this myth but also the American nation and spectators across the globe, changing their perception of terrorism, with this event becoming the worst case of suicide terrorism in human history. The ease with which the hijackers managed to thwart screening processes to smuggle sharp blades into the aircraft, circumventing intelligence and security monitoring, led to a strong reaction from the US security establishment, causing one of

the most dramatic overhauls in the US security bureaucracy in history. A series of revolutionary security norms were put in place after the attack at various levels in the US and across the world, along with the launch of the US-led international military campaign, "Global War on Terror" (GWOT). Ironically enough, it is for this reason that the 9/11 terror attacks not only reduced the capability of terror entities to undertake such large scale operations but also discouraged suicide bombers from carrying out such attacks. The attacks were carried out by Al Qaeda and the mastermind behind the entire plan was eventually identified as Osama bin Laden, who went on to become the most wanted man in the world. Al Qaeda's basic ideology is based on the concept of "No God but Allah" which draws on the perspective that the concept of God is synonymous with authority, and monotheism demands that Islam should, therefore, be the sole authority. Further, any political system or authority that defies or disobeys God's will effectively creates a form of polytheism and, thus, creates the need for a rebellion against any human-made system. Adherents of this concept, thus, reject governance systems based on democracy, socialism, or any ideology that is based on human-made laws and wish to struggle against all such systems that are viewed as polytheistic. In practice, Al Qaeda deals with the polytheism of both the Muslim world and the West through its battle strategy. It was this very ideology that drove the organisation to carry out the 9/11 attacks under the guidance and leadership of Osama Bin Laden.[29]

7/7 London Bombings: July 7, 2005

The 9/11 attacks marked the beginning of a trend of modern suicide terrorism gaining popularity among terror groups globally, driven by ideologies such as that of Al Qaeda. There were three simultaneous suicide bombings in London in quick succession on July 7, 2005, in one of the city's buses and underground stations, killing 52 people, injuring 700 and bringing the transport system of one of the world's biggest cities to a standstill. Such an attack was being anticipated by the United Kingdom (UK) for a while before the actual attack,

bringing the country face to face with the most complex terror threat in its history. Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for these attacks which inspired many Islamist extremists to plot similar attacks which are more difficult to detect. The bombings were said to have been carried out due to the perpetrators' discontent towards the British involvement in the invasion of Iraq, as part of the coalition forces, along with the USA. These bombings were carried out by homegrown terrorists from within the UK but who lived outside the capital city of London, and aimed at targeting the capital in order to voice their message.[30]

26/11 Mumbai Attacks: November 26, 2008

The Mumbai attacks were not exactly suicide attacks like the ones discussed in the previous sections, mainly because the terrorists did not have explosives strapped to themselves, neither were they in a vehicle or aircraft laden with explosives. However, this is exactly how the phenomenon of suicide terrorism has changed in contemporary times. On November 26, 2008, ten terrorists belonging to an anti-India Islamic militant organisation, the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) that is based in Pakistan, carried out a series of 12 coordinated shooting and bombing attacks which lasted four days across Mumbai. The terrorists involved in the attack brazenly used AK-47s and hand grenades in targeting innocent civilians in Mumbai's most frequently visited and iconic spots. Given the circumstances of the operational spread, it was clear that the terrorists had very little hope of survival. For them, survival was an afterthought and no escape plan had been put in place. It was subsequently learnt that the gunmen had used Google Earth imagery to mark targets and even identify the entrance and exit points of target locations. Further, this imagery was also used to programme their Global Positioning System (GPS) devices according to particular geographical coordinates and allowed for better infiltration through the sea. The attack was conducted with the help of handlers instructing the gunmen through Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) enabled phones and satellite phones.[31] Significantly, the handlers kept track

of all the latest updates through social networking sites and TV news channels, giving them a positive edge in guiding the operatives on the ground to take the right decisions for the next step, with the aim of causing more deaths and destruction. The purpose of the attacks was to send a message to India's financial capital and attract media attention through the prolonged attack.

Pathankot and Uri, 2016

The Indian air base at Pathankot is a strategically crucial forward base, located at the tri-junction of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), Punjab and Himachal Pradesh. It is also approximately 40 km away from the Indian border with Pakistan. This made Pathankot an extremely symbolic target for the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), an anti-India terrorist organisation operating out of Pakistan and led by Masood Azhar. The air base hosts strategic air assets such as the MiG-21 fighter aircraft and the Mi-25 and Mi-35 attack helicopters. The Pathankot attack is considered a daring and well executed operation by six heavily armed JeM cadres who had not only managed to successfully enter the secure air base but had managed to position themselves at vantage locations within the base from where they could launch attacks on the aviation assets at the base. The attack took place in the early hours of January 2, 2016, when the hiding cadres launched an attack on the air assets in pitch darkness, but were deterred by the security forces, leading to the death of four infiltrators initially, besides three security personnel. Subsequently, three more security personnel succumbed to their injuries. The incident came to an end when, on January 4, 2016, the remaining two attackers were killed by the security forces after they managed to explode Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and use grenades against the security forces. The incident led to seven casualties among the security force personnel, with no damage caused to the air assets due to extensive deployment of special forces personnel at the action site.[32]

The Pathankot attack was a classic case of a *fidayeen* attack (from the Arab word *fidai* meaning one who is ready to sacrifice his life for

the cause), wherein the perpetrator expects to die in the attack, not necessarily by strapping a bomb to his/her vehicle or body, but by infiltrating a high-security area where death is inevitable by virtue of a reactive attack from the security forces. The concept is slightly different from the kind of suicide attacks witnessed in the rest of the world; however, it remains a form of suicide terrorism that India faces.

In another *fidayeen* attack, the Indian Army Brigade Headquarters in Uri was ambushed in the early hours of September 18, 2016, when four JeM militants "struck the camp close to the headquarter of the 12th Brigade at Uri in Baramulla District"[33] killing 17 soldiers of the Indian Army, injuring 19 and also killing themselves in the process. The militants were well armed with grenades and automatic rifles. Uri is a town in Baramullah district of the Indian state of J&K, and is located 10 km east of the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan. The Uri attack was dubbed the deadliest attack on a security establishment in India.[34] Both Pathankot and Uri marked a significant point in the history of Indo-Pak relations. Security establishments were always a primary target for anti-India militant entities, especially in the state of J&K. However, the increasing number of *fidayeen* attacks has posed a grave challenge to India's national security and integrity.

Paris and Brussels Attacks, 2015-16

On Friday, November 13, 2015, the Western world witnessed one of the deadliest terrorist attacks since 9/11 when gunmen and suicide bombers attacked multiple places in Paris, finally detonating their suicide belts. Some 130 people were killed and more than 350 were known to have been injured in these attacks.[35] Several months later, on March 22, 2016, Brussels faced twin suicide blasts at Zavantem airport and Maelbeek metro station, near the European Union (EU) Headquarters, which is a symbol of peace and unity among the European nations. The Brussels attacks are known to have killed 32 people, including three perpetrators, leaving 320 people injured.[36] The Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for both the Paris and Brussels attacks. These terrorists operated from within Europe and, in most

cases, were European nationals who had grown up in Muslim ghetto colonies of cities like Paris and Brussels. It is believed that they either indulged in criminal activities or were targeted by complex networks of operatives who identify and motivate such marginalised and relatively aimless or unemployed youth to join *jihadist* organisations like the IS. The ideological base of the IS centres on the idea of a global Caliphate, which is essentially the establishment of a single one-world government led by a caliph. Through extensive use of information technology—including social media and communication systems—this ideology has gained widespread support throughout the world not only among Muslims, but also among non-Muslims who have converted to the religion to join the cause. Thus, the IS consists of an enormous number of European fighters who are so inspired by what the IS has to offer that they leave the comfort of their homes and countries in Europe and travel to war-torn and remote areas to join the "noble" cause.[37]

Lone Wolf Terrorism: The New Major Threat

The more recent and serious challenge that suicide terrorism has to offer is the phenomenon of homegrown terrorism, more commonly referred to as lone wolf terrorism. According to Daniel Byman, "A lone wolf is traditionally described as someone who operates on his/her own and is not part of a group, network, or directed by an outside organization."[38] They are mostly individuals operating alone or with a close group of people who have been radicalised in their home country either through the internet or through physical terror networks. The phenomenon has spread more rapidly ever since the IS gained prominence and its ideology proliferated across the world through virtual platforms. Terror incidents such as the attack in the shooting in Orlando at a gay club, the attack on an Ankara nightclub on New Year's Eve, attacks in London at Westminster Abbey and at a stadium in Manchester are all examples of self-indoctrinated individuals who get radicalised in their own capacities while accessing IS propaganda online, without any formal allegiance or instruction from the organisation, and carry out attacks on civilians. Thus, the IS has been successful in displaying its vast global

network with terror incidents like this taking place globally. Traditional terror groups are known to conceal their identity or involvement in a particular attack, although it would appear that times have definitely changed. However, the IS does not leave the slightest opportunity to claim responsibility for an act of terror/violence against civilians the world over. Thus, the group has indeed blurred the line between: (1) operations that have been orchestrated by the group and carried out by the pledged soldiers of the IS; and (2) attacks carried out by sympathisers who are inspired through propaganda widely available at their homes, with no formal allegiance to the group. This has only gone to show that sympathisers of groups such as the IS need not necessarily be radical and religiously motivated or actively engaged in terrorist activities and related communication.

Suicide terrorism, today, has completely changed in its nature, form and intensity from the time it was first conceptualised. In most cases, suicide terror incidents have proven to be the most lethal in the world, marking a global threat of terror. One of the most striking features of terrorist outfits today is the ideological base upon which they lay their foundations. Such ideologies are formed by leaders of various organisations who are constantly abreast with the strategic shifts and changes taking place across the world and are able to propagate their views through the use of technology and presence in cyber space. The internet has become one of the most widely used tools in the hands of terror groups who utilise the information and resources available online to not only conduct their missions but also enhance their publicity and propaganda efforts.

The recruitment of IS fighters from all around the world has only been possible with the extensive use of social networking and video hosting sites which are useful in identifying and profiling potential candidates and their further mobilisation and recruitment. Thus, social media platforms further enable organisations to exaggerate their abilities to a huge audience, maintaining anonymity and using the interactive platform to shape the coverage and perception about themselves. Further, it enables the existence of a wide community

of support online, heightening the lethal capacity of its activities. In addition to this, not only has technology been an effective tool to conduct terrorist activities like in the case of 26/11, it has also enabled terror elements to propagate and expand.

It is not incorrect to say that today's terrorists are so driven by ideology that they surrender themselves completely in order to achieve a 'greater good'. Once an individual has been indoctrinated enough to not care about his/her own life, what negotiations can one make with him/her? This becomes problematic to tackle because it goes against the basic concept of self-preservation, rendering governments across the world in a state of helplessness and despair while tackling such individuals. Technological advancement and social networking make it far more challenging to counter the new face of terrorism based on ideology, making its campaign borderless and indoctrination effortless.

Over the years, there has been a distinct shift in the nature and type of suicide terrorism that we have witnessed. From the typically committed, highly motivated and ideologically influenced terrorists who replicated well trained soldiers, today, we find that those involved in suicide terrorism represent a cross-section of people who have found it challenging and difficult to adjust to the complex socio-economic undercurrents prevalent in a modern society. At the same time, the traditional diehard foot soldier continues to exist in various fighting zones across the world, and remains dedicated to the cause, both ideologically and through physical commitment. Today, a combination of easy availability of propaganda material and access to sophisticated arms and explosives makes the situation all the more challenging. While large scale systematically planned attacks like 9/11 may be difficult to perceive today owing to the highly effective monitoring and surveillance mechanisms in place, no one can take away the unique advantage enjoyed by a self-taught and radicalised suicide attacker with an otherwise clean and unsuspicious background. Thus, it is extremely important to understand this shift in the nature of suicide terrorism over the years in order to better cope with the threat today.

Notes

1. David C. Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism", PDF: http://international.ucla.edu/media/files/Rapoport-Four-Waves-of-Modern-Terrorism.pdf. Last accessed on April 29, 2018.
2. David Wright Neville, *Dictionary of Terrorism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), p. xi.
3. Stephen Spector, "The Meaning of 'Terrorism'", *Oxford University Press Blog*, November 18, 2015. Available at: https://blog.oup.com/2015/11/meaning-of-terrorism/ Last accessed on April 26, 2018.
4. Robert Graham, "Carlo Pisacane: Propaganda by the Deed (1857)", in *Anarchism: A Documentary History of Libertarian Ideas*, https://robertgraham.wordpress.com/2011/09/22/carlo-pisacane-propaganda-by-the-deed-1857/
5. Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism: Third Edition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), pp. 1-44.
6. Joanne Lawrence, "*Narodnaya Volya* and the Development of Modern Terrorism", James Cook University, November 4, 2013. Available at: http://www.academia.edu/5016901/Narodnaya_Volya_and_the_Devleopment_of_Modern_Terrorism. Last accessed on April 26, 2018.
7. Hoffman, n. 5, pp. 1-44.
8. League of Nations, "Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism", *World Digital Library,* May 24, 2017. Available at: https://www.wdl.org/en/item/11579/ Last accessed on April 26, 2018.
9. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) website: https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism-definition. Last accessed on June 21, 2016.
10. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, "Terrorism", http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. Last accessed on June 21, 2016.
11. Report corresponding to Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (the "Act"), p. 9, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65464.pdf. Last accessed on June 21, 2016.
12. UK Terrorism Act 2000 Official Document, available at: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/pdfs/ukpga_20000011_en.pdf. Last accessed on May 5, 2018.
13. 1998 Cairo Arab Convention, UNODC Official Document available at: http://www.unodc.org/images/tldb-f/conv_arab_terrorism.en.pdf. Last accessed on May 2, 2018.
14. Brig V.P. Malhotra (Retd), "Terrorism and Counter Terrorism in South Asia and India", p. 7-8.
15. Srijoni Sen, Rukmini Das, Raadhika Gupta, and Vrinda Bhandari, *Anti-Terror Law in India: A Study of Statutes and Judgments, 2001-2014* (Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy, 2015), PDF available at: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/551ea026e4b0adba21a8f9df/t/5575b428e4b08898ef56bc60/1433777192655/150531_Vidhi+Terrorism+Report_Final.pdf. Last accessed on May 1, 2018.
16. Hoffman, n. 5, pp. 1-44.
17. Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature* (Amsterdam: Transaction Books, 1988) p. 28.
18. Robert A. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism", *American Political Science Review,* Vol. 97, No. 3, August 2003.
19. Definition of "suicide" on Merriam Webster Dictionary, available at: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/suicide
20. Definition of "conflict" on Merriam Webster Dictionary, available at: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/conflict
21. Ami Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), pp. 6-7.

22. Robert A. Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House Trade Paperback Edition, 2006), p. 6.
23. Ibid., pp. 9-10.
24. Bakken W. Nicholas, "The Anatomy of Suicide Terrorism: A Durkheimian Analysis", International Foundation for Protection Officers, p. 1 http://www.ifpo.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Bakken_Suicide_Terrorism.pdf. Last accessed on June 21, 2016.
25. K. M. Fierke, "Agents of Death: The Structural Logic of Suicide Terrorism and Martyrdom", *International Theory*, Vol. 1, Issue 1, pp. 168-169.
26. Jeffrey William Lewis, *The Business of Martyrdom: A History of Suicide Bombing* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2012), p. 3.
27. 9/11 facts on History.com. Available at: https://www.history.com/topics/9-11-attacks Last accessed on July 20, 2018.
28. Special Report: Terrorism in the US, "Text of George Bush's Speech", *The Guardian*, September 21, 2001. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/september11.usa13 Last accessed on May 5, 2018.
29. n. 27.
30. Ian Cobain, "London Bombings: The Day Anti-Terrorism Rules Changed", *The Guardian*, July 7, 2010. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/jul/07/london-bombings-anti-terrorism Last accessed on April 26, 2018.
31. E. Dilipraj, *Defence and Diplomacy Journal,* Vol 4, No 3, (April-June 2015), pp. 69-70.
32. Rohan Dua and Yudhvir Rana, "Attack on Punjab Airbase Foiled, Five Jaish Men killed in 17-Hour Gunfight", *The Times of India*, January 3, 2016. Available at: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Attack-on-Punjab-airbase-foiled-five-Jaish-men-killed-in-17-hour-gunfight/articleshow/50422972.cms. Last accessed on April 24, 2018.
33. TNN and Agencies, "Uri Terror Attack: 17 Soldiers Killed, 19 Injured in Strike on Army Camp", *The Times of India*, September 30, 2016. Available at: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Uri-terror-attack-Indian-Army-camp-attacked-in-Jammu-and-Kashmir-17-killed-19-injured/articleshow/54389451.cms. Last accessed on April 21, 2018.
34. APF, "17 Soldiers Killed as Suspected Militants Attack Army Base in India-held Kashmir", *Dawn*, September 18, 2016. Available at: https://www.dawn.com/news/1284540. Last accessed on April 25, 2018.
35. Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/event/Paris-attacks-of-2015. Last accessed on August 1, 2018.
36. Charlotte McDonald-Gibson, "Fear and Frustration Continue One Year After Belgium's Worst Terror Attack", *Time*, March 22, 2017. Available at: https://www.google.co.in/amp/amp.timeinc.net/time/4707414/belgium-airport-terror-attack. Last accessed on August 1, 2018.
37. Radhika Halder, "Brussels Bombings: Identifying Potential Causes", *In Focus* (opinion piece) published by the Centre for Air Power Studies. Available at: http://capsindia.org/files/documents/CAPS_Infocus_RH_00.pdf. Last accessed on May 2, 2018.
38. Daniel L. Byman, "Can Lone Wolves be Stopped?", *Brookings*, March 15, 2017. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/03/15/can-lone-wolves-be-stopped/ Last accessed on May 7, 2018.

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

2. The Origins of Suicide Terrorism: A Historical Overview

The use of suicide as a weapon in conflict is not a new phenomenon. The act of suicide has a profound psychological impact, which has been used effectively and strategically in conflicts. The effectiveness of suicide has also evolved over the years from merely a practical tool to one used to wage psychological warfare. According to Jeffrey William Lewis, suicide or 'martyrdom' as perceived by those committing the act, must be seen as a kind of technology that has been invented, reinvented, diffused, and transformed at the hands of its users. Further, he says,

> The spread of technologies is never uniform or homogenous; instead, societies embrace or reject specific technologies depending on how a technology allows them to solve problems consistent with their values and norms.[1]

It would, thus, be worthwhile to study how and when the use of suicide originated and evolved over the years both in conflict and eventually, in terrorism.

Imperial Russia

Suicide bombing was a tactic first deployed by the revolutionary group, *Narodnaya Volya* or People's Will in Imperial Russia. On March 1, 1881, the Tsar of Russia Alexander II was assassinated after the rebels had condemned him to death on August 25, 1879. The conspirators planned to target the tsar during the course of his movement to the palace. The tsar traditionally took a particular route to return to his palace in St. Petersburg, but on the day he was to be targeted, he took

an alternative route. In order not to take any chances, the People's Will planted bombs along all the routes he could possibly take but were in a dilemma when the tsar decided to make a detour and visit his cousin on the way. However, the group members seemed determined to carry out the assassination that very day and hurriedly revised their plans in order to replant the bomb. This attempt also failed as the explosive damaged the carriage and injured a young boy besides a Cossack guard deputed with the tsar.[2]

The inability to strike the target in spite of all their efforts not only made the conspirators feel dejected but a sense of desperation and anxiety prevailed among them. Alexander II was meanwhile keen on inspecting the scene where the carriage was bombed, which is when People's Will member Ignaty Grinevitsky took advantage of the situation. He moved closer to Alexander II and threw the bomb at his feet, severely injuring and eventually causing Alexander II to succumb to his injuries. Grinevitsky also died in the process. His spontaneous decision was facilitated by his will to control the blast of the bomb by keeping himself and the weapon as close as possible until its detonation. Thus, the perceived need and the possibility of the tactic drove Ginevitsky's mental innovation to commit the act. He had not planned on sacrificing his life for such a cause, but given his options, it seemed the most viable one. The culture within the People's Will was one of absolute faith and devotion. Their cause was mainly to oppose the tsar, due to which they knew their actions would inevitably lead to death. The revolutionary group originated out of an earlier organisation called *Zemlya Volya* (Land and Liberty), a secret revolutionary group organised to encourage revolutionary impulses among Russian peasants. In the late 18th and 19th centuries, a revolutionary impulse swept across Europe and these revolutionary stirrings lasted a century. At that time, Russia was a feudal society where peasants, called serfs, worked on the land of wealthy nobles. Serfs were semi-slaves, with no resources or rights of their own, and were subjected to the despotic rule of the wealthy nobles for their livelihood.[3]

An executive committee was responsible for planting the revolutionary seeds among the peasants, students and workers through propaganda and targeted violence against government officials and their family members. The People's Will was run by this committee and its members favoured a policy of terrorism. The committee consisted of 20 individuals, and its functional membership consisted of approximately 500 people, besides a large number of sympathisers who were not officially part of the organisation. Hence, even though it was not an orchestrated suicide attack, Grinevitsky knew that he may have to give up his life, as did the other members involved in the operation. Later on, Grinevitsky's words written the night before the attack were found and idolised. He wrote:

> It is my lot to die young, I shall not see our victory, I shall not live one day, one hour in the bright season of our triumph, but I believe that with my death I shall do all that it is my duty to do, and no one in the world can demand more of me.[4]

Evidently, his mental preparation before the attack itself had enabled him to improvise and take such a decision that would lead to his death. Thus, in this unanticipated manner, the technology of suicide bombing first emerged in Imperial Russia.

It is important to note that People's Will was the first terrorist organisation to have embraced the anarchist cult of the use of dynamite for symbolic purposes as simpler weapons such as pistols would not have made a powerful enough impact. Michael Frolenko, a People's Will member involved in the March 1, 1881 plot, went on to say that a pistol "would not have created such an impression. It would have been seen as an ordinary murder, and, thus, would not have expressed a new stage in the revolutionary movement."[5]

After Alexander II was condemned to death by the group, numerous elaborate plots were planned and embarked upon by the group, utilising dynamite to kill the tsar. However, all efforts failed until Grinevitsky's suicidal attack. This reflected on the fundamental challenge that terrorist

groups face even today—no matter how good your bomb makers are, how well you plan out your plots, there will always be far more ways for such plans to fail. This was mainly because of the lack of control that the groups could exercise in order to improve the accuracy of the attack and reduce uncertainty. There are two ways to improve control over such aspects: one, the use of the most reliable weapons to reduce uncertainty (which was the bomb in the 20th century); and, two, improved control, like the People's Will demonstrated in order to enable the flexibility necessary to adjust the mission. As an organisation, People's Will never enforced suicide attacks and it was a decision inevitably taken by the bomber at his own discretion. However, the terrorists who got close enough to risk their own lives were the most successful.[6]

Thus, suicide bombing, as a tactic, was created owing to the limitations of implanted bombs, leading to the invention of portable bombs. This, in turn, raised the need for a more accurate guidance and control system, which, given the technological capabilities of the time, was best achieved by exploiting the desire for martyrdom already prevalent among some individuals. The heroic essence and social connotation attached with martyrs has been aggressively exaggerated for suicide bombing and the cult of martyrdom first began to emerge in Russia in the 1860s. This was a time when any form of political protest, including peaceful expression, was considered a criminal offence, rendering the educated youth and the intelligentsia of Russia extremely helpless and frustrated. Opposing the state, thus, involved the risk of being caught and further executed, thereby leading to a polarising 'kill or be killed' mindset taking root. There was widespread fascination for suicide in educated Russian society which coincided with the dedication towards a violent social revolution, with an impression that suicide was on the rise in Russia in the 1870s-1880s. This attraction towards suicide by Russian thinkers and writers made the tactic an important aspect of the revolutionary tradition of Imperial Russia. One of the critics of the revolutionary subculture in Russia was Dostoevsky, who went on to say that suicide was the expression of the revolutionaries' nihilistic obsession with individual freedom and empowerment.[7]

For Alexander II's assassination, suicide bombing was not employed as a tactic and there was no organisational apparatus dedicated to promoting attacks of such nature. However, the idea persisted until the end of Alexander III's reign and a broader wave of terrorist violence gripped Russia, during which the use of suicide bombers became a recurring element of escalating violence between the revolutionaries and the state.[8]

The Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (PSR) was a political party in the early 20th century Russia and one of the key players in the Russian Revolution. The PSR was responsible for a majority of the instances of dynamite attacks in Russia between 1902 and 1906. The party members saw themselves as ideological heirs to the People's Will and within the PSR, the Terrorist Brigade, also called the Combat Organisation, became an independent unit. The brigade included self-selected adherents of a culture of martyrdom which differed from the ideology of the group as a whole. These aspiring 'martyrs' began to take pride in their self-proclaimed willingness to die for the cause, sometimes even viewing their comrades with disdain, as they were not as fanatical and perhaps even prone to compromise.[9]

The plot to assassinate Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich, governor general of Moscow was planned by the Terrorist Brigade in early 1905. The designated lead bomber in the plot, Kaliayev was one who had previously discussed self-sacrifice in a tactical manner with other members and, finally, on February 4, 1905, got the opportunity to carry out the act in the form of an improvised attack. His readiness to martyr himself gave him the ability to improvise in such a manner and he managed to kill the Grand Duke by throwing his bomb from approximately four paces away while running full speed towards the duke's carriage. Astonishingly, Kaliayev managed to survive the attack and demonstrated through his actions the practical utility of a bomber who is willing to sacrifice his life for the cause or mission. He was aware of both the strategic and tactical usefulness of suicide for the Terrorist Brigade. Having achieved strategic success through this attack , he then went on to use his incarceration and trial to complete his martyrdom in order to legitimise his group and the struggle.[10]

Kaliayev's attack was, thus, a major landmark in the history of the tactical use of martyrdom by a terrorist organisation. It demonstrates that the purpose of integrating the bomb and the bomber not only guarantees maximum damage but, further, allows for more control, ensuring that the actual outcome corresponds with the desired result of the attack. Subsequently, many assassinations were carried out by the Terrorist Brigade in the following years, as well as other revolutionary groups in Russia such as the Maximalists, who had attempted to kill Prime Minister Peter Stolypin in his villa in August 1906. They detonated 16-pound bombs while yelling slogans of freedom and anarchy, killing themselves and 27 other people. In this manner, the use of human bombs remained unique to the Russian context for years after the decline of the Socialist Revolutionaries in the area.[11]

Imperial Japan

During World War II, it was Imperial Japan that made the most thorough and systematic use of suicide attackers, deploying thousands of human bombs in the last year of the war. These attackers were known as *Kamikaze*, or *Tokkotai*, short for *Tokubetsu Kogekitai*, meaning special units. Attacks such as the *Kamikaze* were extremely rare in the world, from its inception until the 1980s. Even till date, Imperial Japan is known to have used suicide bombing most extensively, measured in sheer numbers.[12]

The *Kamikaze* were primarily aircraft laden with explosives piloted by humans on one-way missions to inflict as much damage as possible to US naval vessels. An estimated 3,000 pilots are known to have killed themselves in suicide missions during the war, thus, creating a powerful psychological impact on the US forces, projecting an image of fanaticism and militarism. It is known, however, that the *Kamikaze* were not as successful as their inventors had envisioned them to be. This was mainly because of the disparity in forces on both sides fighting the war. The Japanese Empire was in full retreat and the civilian population under a state of siege by mid-1944. Thus, the Japanese leadership hoped that the relatively small numbers of *Kamikaze* would be able to combat the US forces effectively.[13]

As the number of such attacks increased, cheaper aircraft that were of little military value and easily disposable were also used. Further, the training period for pilots was shortened as cost was a major factor. Besides, a variety of social and cultural factors was smartly exploited by the Japanese leaders in order to encourage increasing numbers of young men to join the army for suicide missions. They often linked the suicide attacks to the tradition of ritual suicide and elements of Buddhism and Shinto as a means to secure honour in the Japanese military. This did not always work as most young men in Japan at the time came from free thinking institutions and universities, with a liberal mindset, not easily convinced by such fanaticism or militarism. The government also began resorting to shame and coercion in order to gain control over these men and to direct their actions in the desired manner. Therefore, the irony is that the *Tokkotai* are remembered even today as brave soldiers or protectors of the nation but were essentially fatalistic young men who saw no other better alternative to their deaths and hoped that their sacrifice would ensure the safety of their loved ones.[14]

Despite the Japanese government's portrayal of the *Kamikaze* as a noble cause, the entire phenomenon was nowhere near successful as the attacks were not large enough to make any significant impact. However, their use of suicide attackers was very different from that of the Russian revolutionaries. With the Japanese method of suicide attack, the individual's decision to die during the attack was subordinated to organisational decision-making to ensure that the creation of human bombs was more reliable. They were also completely integrated to the bomb, with no chance of survival. Where death was anticipated and probable for the Russians, it was anticipated and necessary for the Japanese *Tokkotai*. The latter used individuals as a last-ditch effort to salvage a cause and, thereby, for perhaps the first time in the world, exhibited the mechanisation of human beings in this manner. In the words of Hayashi Tadao, a *Kamikaze* pilot who died at the age of 24:

> I do not avoid sacrifice. I do not refuse the sacrifice of myself. However, I cannot tolerate the reduction of the self to nothingness in the process. I cannot approve it. Martyrdom or sacrifice must be done at the height of self-realization. Sacrifice at the end of self-annihilation, the dissolving of the self to nothingness, has no meaning whatsoever.[15]

Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA)

The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) was an organisation that stood for the reunification of Ireland and the end of British rule in Northern Ireland. The Provisional IRA was an offshoot of the IRA which fought an insurgency from 1916-21 with the British. As a result of the insurgency, an Irish Free State was created which was independent and also marked the success of the insurgency. However, six of Ireland's northern counties were to remain under British rule, to be known as Northern Ireland. While most members of the IRA were not in favour of this partition, the Irish forces that were supportive of this arrangement ultimately won the civil war launched by the IRA. Although the relations between the Irish Free State and Britain were not always the best, it was in the 1960s that relations started deteriorating, with discrimination against Catholics in the Free State. Within the IRA, there was a split between the "officials" and the "provisionals", wherein the former believed in using peaceful means to attain a united socialist Ireland, while the latter saw violence as a catalyst for unification.[16]

The Provisional IRA gained momentum in the late 1960s when the Catholic civil rights movement was met with opposition and adversity. This resulted in large-scale civil disturbances, arson and murder, and further, in 1969, British troops were deployed in Northern Ireland to restore order, thereby further alienating the Catholic population. This gave the Provisional IRA an environment conducive to steady recruitment and support among the Catholics. The IRA, after a leadership change in 1976-77, reorganised itself and restrained from targetting civilians, solely focussing on military targets.[17] The

organisation devised a strategy in order to achieve its goals, as stated in the Green Book, the training manual of the organisation entailing a five-part guerilla strategy. The first part of the strategy spoke of a war of attrition against the British military and the Northern Irish forces, in order to cause as many casualties and deaths as possible. This was aimed at creating a demand from the affected people for their withdrawal. The second part stated that a bombing campaign must be launched to financially hamper the United Kingdom, by ensuring unprofitability in the six Irish counties under its rule. The third part stated that the counties under British rule must be "ungovernable except by colonial military rule". The fourth aspect of the strategy talked of sustaining the war through propaganda and publicity campaigns enabling widespread support on national and international platforms. The last point of the strategy aimed at punishing "criminals, collaborators or informers" who came in the way of the war of liberation.[18]

Explosives or bombs were an essential part of the IRA's campaign in accordance with the first three parts of its strategy. Bomb explosions were carried out by the IRA in 1972, however, the organisation would not claim responsibility for these attacks. On March 4, a bomb explosion at a restaurant in Belfast killed two women and injured 136 other people. Several similar attacks took place at restaurants and crowded places, killing and injuring many civilians, with the IRA still refusing to claim responsibility for the attacks. In 1974, explosions took place in two pubs in Surrey and two pubs in Birmingham, leading to five casualties in the former and 19 in the latter, which also injured 182 people. These attacks gained widespread condemnation from the Irish community, especially the Catholics. Further, the IRA attempted to carry out suicide car bombings; however, the suicide bombers were captured individuals forced to commit such an act.[19]

While bombing incidents are known to have taken the lives of a lot of IRA volunteers, it is worth noting that their resolve to cause maximum deaths with ruthlessness was strong and undeterred. What the IRA perhaps also realised was that such force was to be used with control and restraint as well so as to gain and maintain support for

the IRA and its stance. Thus, within the IRA, there was an inherent willingness to kill as it was the primary strategy it adopted, however, the willingness to die required a lot more. The members of the IRA believed that they were fighting for a sacred cause and during the Troubles, it was secular nationalism with a vaguely socialist bent that replaced Catholicism, making it an ethnic nationalist conflict. The need for self-sacrifice and of volunteers willing to fight was understood as necessary for the movement, but the IRA never employed suicide terrorism on a large scale. Suicide, however, still played a significant role in the IRA movement.

In order for an organisation to employ suicide terrorism, many factors need to be considered. To begin with, the need for such a tactic must be appropriately contemplated by the terror organisation, and its effectiveness must be weighed. In the case of Ireland, while bombing failures surely called for alternative methods of targeting, that did not seem to be enough. According to Jeffrey William Lewis, "The conditions in Northern Ireland during the Troubles were not conducive to the production of willing suicide attackers".[20] This essentially means that a culture of martyrdom was absent, making it hard to win support among the community for suicide terrorism, simultaneously failing to legitimise the act of self-sacrifice. In other words, the threat that the Catholics faced from the British was not extreme enough for self-sacrifice and, thus, IRA volunteers were unwilling to adopt it.

This did not mean that the IRA never witnessed acts of self-sacrifice. Hunger strikes were carried out by republican prisoners in 1981 as a result of confrontation between the prisoners and authorities. In 1976, the British began to de-escalate and criminalise the conflict, rendering republican prisoners who were usually kept under house arrest in far worse circumstances now. They were treated like regular criminals, expected to wear a uniform and live in individual cells. The first spark of retaliation began with a prisoner who refused to wear the uniform and wore a blanket instead. Many other prisoners followed suit and these were known as the "blanketmen" or those who were "on the blanket". They refused to do everything that was required of them

in prison, but by 1979, nothing seemed to be working and the prisoners grew desperate. They had placed five demands to the British but could not get them to agree to them. This was when the first hunger strike by seven prisoners began in October 1980. Of the seven prisoners, there was one each representing the counties of Northern Ireland and one representing Belfast. While the hunger strikes did have a psychological impact, no concession was made on the part of the British, despite one of the prisoners having slipped into coma due to acute hunger. The second hunger strike was led by Bobby Sands on March 1, 1981, who died 66 days after he started the protest. A few more prisoners died soon after in a series of hunger strikes that followed. The IRA was not supportive of this form of protest as it feared losing support for its cause.[21]

The hunger strikes were a failure on technical grounds as they did not make Britain adhere to any of the republican concessions. However, they had a tremendous psychological impact and stunned people all over the world. The hunger strikes had been equated to "tactical martyrdom" due to the manner in which people were responding to them. It seemed as though self-sacrifice was employed by the group in order to meet certain goals and show the resolve of the individual to die rather than negotiate or cow down to the British. While the strikes did make use of the dedication of individuals towards the cause, they were not successful in achieving what they set out to. While the strikes garnered sympathy from the national and international audience, family members and volunteers of the IRA did not support the strikes or the act of self-sacrifice at all. The deaths of the strikers seemed counter-productive within the community, diminishing the power of self-sacrifice entirely. In addition to this, the British Army did not seem brutal enough for the IRA to strike in such a manner, thus, denying the IRA the use of a tool as powerful as suicide in the conflict. The desperation of most campaigns of suicide terror comes from a sense of overwhelming force imposed on them, which was absent in the case of the IRA. A war never really commenced between the British government and its Catholic population and, thus, self-sacrifice was not accepted and could not receive legitimacy.[22]

Worker's Party of Kurdistan (PKK)

The people of the Kurdish ethnic group are spread across Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq, approximately numbering over 16 million. Numerous organisations in this region have claimed to represent the Kurds, one of them being the PKK in Turkey. In each of these countries , the Kurds comprise a minority which has made them vulnerable to abuse, as illustrated in the late 1980s by the attempted genocide by Iraq under Saddam Hussein. This led to the belief among many Kurds that the creation of an independent Kurdish state would put an end to all the atrocities faced by the ethnic group. The PKK was established in November 1978 and started out as a radical left-wing organisation. It was in 1984 that the PKK got involved in violent action against Turkey, with assistance from the Syrian authorities. Abdullah Ocalan was the leader of the PKK which had as its central objective an integration of Marxist revolution and the Kurdish struggle for independence. While Turkey is predominantly a Muslim country, it was the spirit of nationalism and the will for self-determination on ethnic grounds that drove the ideology of the PKK rather than religious fundamentalism.[23]

Ocalan had managed to establish a "political cult"[24] that ensured that PKK members remain in the organisation for their entire life, pledging allegiance to him, and by extension to the PKK and the idea of a Kurdish state.[25] The group was involved in sporadic acts of terrorism while the biggest problem it faced was gaining acceptance among the Kurdish population. The PKK struggled to convince the Kurds of the sincerity of the organisation. Ocalan, thus, organised the group into guerilla units in order to form a people's army and portray the PKK's cause as genuine and focussed. The PKK ended up killing a large number of Kurds in its effort to demonstrate its power to the community it was supposed to be representing. While the PKK also aimed at deterring the Kurds from collaborating with the Turkish authorities, it struggled to gain acceptance among its own people and, in fact, even alienated them.[26]

Suicide terrorism was taken up by Ocalan when the PKK was at a weak point. The first campaign was launched in 1996, withdrawn soon

after that, and the second campaign began in 1998 and stopped in 1999. Each time the PKK resorted to suicide terrorism was during its moments of weakness, in an attempt to also convince its own population and boost the morale of the rank and file within the organisation. While Ocalan had his own reasons on the need for the use of suicide bombing, his poor use of it did not let the tactic sustain the organisation. The most probable reason for this could be the use of female bombers on suicide missions, who were known to not necessarily volunteer for the task. Eleven of the 15 PKK suicide attacks were carried out by women, and there was a general notion in Turkey that these girls "did not know what they were doing", further projecting the PKK in a bad light.[27] Moreover, the PKK was not known to commemorate its 'martyrs' as it lacked group identity and the promise of religious or secular immortality.[28] Thus, the PKK struggled constantly between trying to be a representative organisation for the Kurdish population, and using force against its own people to project their capability, thereby losing support and legitimacy.

The PKK was unsuccessful in making the Turkish government concede to its demands, and became extremely weak in the mid to late 1990s. With inadequate public support, and smoother government policies in the 1980s, the Kurds saw the chance to peacefully express their grievances. The decline of the PKK began with Ocalan's arrest in 1999, which led to violent clashes and suicide attacks by PKK supporters, in an attempt to prevent the Turkish authorities from executing Ocalan, and gather support. It is also known that while on trial, Ocalan denied responsibility for the suicide attacks, and in August 1999, announced a "peace initiative" which included the denouncement of violence as well as a request for dialogue with the Turkish authorities. However, Ocalan and the PKK comprised not just a terrorist organisation but were symbolic of the ideal that still resonates among the Kurds to a great extent.[29]

West Asia

In the 1980s, a lot of developments took place in West Asia, especially revolutionary Iran and war-torn Lebanon. The Iran-Iraq War had

gradually developed into an existential struggle for the Islamic Republic of Iran, a country which was taken aback by the Iraqi invasion and, hence, performed poorly in the initial stages of the war. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran's supreme leader resorted to the use of an instrument which would help him assert control and consolidation over the region. This instrument was the use of religion in order to articulate and interpret the crisis in religious terms, thereby mobilising the Iranian citizenry in the name of God. The Shiite branch of Islam is known to be founded by Hussein, grandson of Prophet Mohammad, who opposed the transfer of the office of the caliph from the Prophet's immediate family and, thus, challenged the authority of the Umayyad Caliph Yazid. As a result, Hussein, supported by his followers, was an adherent of self-sacrifice unto death, rather than submission to tyranny, and his martyrdom is celebrated as a holy day each year. Hussein's martyrdom at Karbala is known to be one of the most powerful and symbolic sources of ritual in the Shiite tradition, which was used by Khomeini to glorify martyrdom and make it an inspiring tale for the Shias.[30]

The propensity of self-sacrificial violence was first demonstrated by members of the People's Mujahideen Organisation of Iran (*Sazeman-e Mujahideen-e Khalq-e Iran*) in the 1970s with a Marxist agenda, willingly going to their deaths in order to oppose the shah. They believed and openly professed that "examples of heroism, self-sacrifice, and martyrdom" were necessary for the liberation of the Iranian population. The group carried out at least five assassinations in 1981-82, killing themselves along with their victims, using hand grenades. It was eventually suppressed brutally but the self-sacrificial mindset was an individual phenomenon which existed within the group, rather than an organisational one.[31]

The Iraqi invasion of Iran was immediately declared a *jihad* or holy war by Khomeini and other Iranian religious leaders, referring to Saddam Hussein, the leader of Iraq, as a tyrant whose threat to Iran and further to Islam was ominous and looming large for the Shiite community. In this holy war, there was a special place for martyrs and Khomeini gave them a distinct status from the rest. These were known as protectors

of the religion who were willing to shed their own blood in order to defend Islam. He further called upon the Iranian population to emulate Hussein, encouraging them to follow in his footsteps. The population was incentivised by being made to believe that self-sacrifice was the noblest form of Islamic observance possible and would guarantee prospective martyrs a place in paradise. The Iranian state struggled to organise a competent military force like the Revolutionary Guards, on the one hand, and, on the other, older men and fairly young boys took matters into their own hands, and accompanied the Iranian regular forces in a defensive battle, where they were massacred by the Iraqi military. This group of men were known as the "Basij" or the "mobilised".[32]

The passion and fervour which drove these irregulars were exploited by Khomeini to institutionalise the *Basij* as auxiliaries to the Iranian Army. He professed that the kind of martyrdom demonstrated by Hussein had now become an obligation of the Iranian people and, thus, even those who did not believe in the same ideology, were made to believe that self-sacrifice was their non-negotiable duty towards the religion and the Shiite community. As a result, many young boys were recruited for service, although they seldom had any real sense of martyrdom and what it meant. One former child who survived and was captured by the Iraqis as a Prisoner of War (POW), recalled

> We didn't understand the words 'patriotism' or 'martyrdom', or at least I didn't. It was just as an exciting game and a chance to prove to your friends that you'd grown up and were no longer a child.[33]

Thus, the Basij were sent in vast numbers to the front to be slaughtered by the Iraqis, wearing headbands and keys around their necks, displaying their purity and allegiance to Khomeini. The exact number of casualties is not known but an Iraqi source has testified that at least 23,000 men were sent as part of the Basij and killed in a single "human wave attack" in 1983. The Basij did not necessarily kill themselves but death was an anticipated event that they were well prepared for. Further, their deployment by Khomeini was a landmark

event in the field of suicide terrorism as it was a clear case of a leadership group using religious symbolism deliberately to prepare its followers for self-sacrifice. This tactic was unique and had not been seen anywhere else in the world until then.[34]

Martyrdom was further glorified and made a much more deadly tool when the leaders began to use it as a narrative, especially with the martyrdom of the young boy Mohammad Hosein Fahmideh. He was one of the Basij volunteers who grabbed a hand grenade and threw himself under an Iraqi tank, detonating the explosive and thereby destroying the tank as well as taking his own life. This act of Fahmideh's was used by Khomeini as an example for the rest, and glorify the 12-year-old boy who was willing to so selflessly give up his life in the name of the cause.[35] His death was not only a cause for celebration for Khomeini and his supporters; it further caused fear in the minds of the enemy, making them withdraw their tanks into their own territory. Thus, Fahmideh's spontaneous act created an aura of heroism and its effectiveness suggested that this accidental act could serve as the template for a much more systematic form of violence.

Lebanon

Lebanon in the early 1980s saw the use of suicide bombing in an extraordinary manner, never seen anywhere before. It was different from the previous era's use of suicide tactics as it eventually led to the formation of Hezbollah, after which several terrorist organisations began asserting themselves and emulating it. Suicide terrorism, as we understand it today, took root in Hezbollah's use of the phenomenon in the 1980s after which it spread to various parts of the world and has become the very face of terrorism today.

Lebanon is a country with multiple faiths and religions, subject to French colonisation after which the political system in the country marginalised one of the larger confessional groups of the country, the Shiite Muslims. The beneficiaries of the Constitution were the Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims and continued to be so even in the 1970s when the Shiite Muslims became the largest single confessional group

in the country due to differential population growth over the years. The Constitution was never amended and the marginalisation of the Shiite Muslims continued politically and economically despite their numbers. This was also the time that the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) became a major actor in Lebanese politics, following a state-within-a-state approach and using Lebanon to secure its own interests with Israel. The PLO stood for the representation of the Palestinian people and has not officially been affiliated to any religious cause or purpose. It started carrying out military operations against Israel from the southern part of Lebanon, and by 1975, many other key actors began advancing their own agendas in Lebanon, causing its government to collapse and a multi-front civil war to emerge.[36]

It all began with the political mobilisation of the Shiite Muslims in Lebanon in the 1970s. The most important figure in this regard was the cleric Musa al-Sadr, a respected reformist scholar who recognised that Lebanon's Shiites had been encouraged by their leadership to adopt an attitude of political submissiveness. He tried to change this attitude by taking up various elements of Shiite history and tradition in order to mobilise the people and, in the process, reinterpreted many concepts. One such concept was the martyrdom of Hussein which he hoped to convey as one of political choice, rather than fanaticism and recklessness. Thus, he stripped Hussein's martyrdom of sorrow and reinterpreted it as a tale of courage and bravery for his followers. He worked at the grassroots level and helped create a political identity for Lebanese Shiites, initiating a small network of schools and clinics to provide them with services that the state failed to provide. As much as he tried to refrain from using violent methods, he realised in 1975, the need for a militia, which came to be known as Amal, meaning "hope" and also an acronym for Battalions of the Lebanese Resistance.[37]

Musa al-Sadr, however, disappeared mysteriously on a visit to Libya, then under the leadership of Muammar al-Qaddafi. Till date, his disappearance remains a mystery while there have been speculations that he was killed by the Libyan government. His disappearance came at a time when the civil war and the Iranian Revolution were also

building up, rendering the Shiites of Lebanon trapped in between these complex developments. This not only revealed deep fissures within the Lebanese Shiite society but also brought to the fore a number of clerics with long-standing personal and ideological connections to revolutionary Iran. Further, there was ambivalence in the relations between Iran and Amal as the latter was reluctant to any form of rule under Khomeini, and, instead, turned to Syria. Syria was seen by al-Sadr as a last-ditch ally and as part of compatibility, it suited both sides, as Syria was seeking to keep the PLO in check in Lebanon and, thus, found the relationship with Amal useful. Finally, as Amal-Syrian relations strengthened, Amal-Palestinian relations worsened to the point of bitter hostilities.[38]

In the summer of 1982, Israel launched a full-scale attack in the southern part of Lebanon in order to wipe the PLO out. Initially, Israel successfully destroyed the conventional weapons of the PLO, routed the Syrian Air Force and even reached the outskirts of Beirut. This resulted in the siege of Beirut, though at significant human cost. Thousands of Lebanese non-combatants were also killed in the siege and by the end of the summer, Southern Lebanon and East Beirut were under Israeli military occupation. This invasion further invoked the Iranian role in Lebanon, even though Iran had so far been cautiously away from the region. The Khomeini government now began to assert itself aggressively in the region, encouraging radical Shiite militias to coalesce as an anti-Israel force. This aggregation of groups eventually led to the formation of numerous entities a few years down the line, such as Hezbollah which developed a national leadership structure and formally announced its existence in an open letter in 1985. The organisation served as an integrating force among local groups and leaders, proving to be an alternative for Shiites who were discontent with Amal. The organisation was based on two broad goals: first, to create a new authentic entity for Shiite identity within the context of Khomeini's Islamic revolution; and second, to combat the Israeli occupation. Suicide bombing proved to be effective for promoting both agendas.[39]

There were six major suicide attacks between 1981 and 1983 by Shiite groups in Lebanon (see Table 2.1). The first attack in 1981 was most likely carried out by the remnants of the Iraqi al-Dawa, an Islamic alternative to the secular Baath Party formed in 1958. Within the al-Dawa, there were growing connections among the Iraqi, Lebanese and Iranian Shiites, united in opposition to Saddam Hussein's government. The group became more aggressive when Iraqi forces attacked pilgrims on their way to Karbala and the Iranian Revolution further inspired its militancy. Musa al-Sadr's relative Mohammad Bakr al-Sadr, who was at the time the most respected, representing the Shiite community, also joined the opposition to Hussein's government, eventually proceeding to guide and direct the anti-Hussein narrative. The Iraqi al-Dawa was outlawed in March 1980 by the Iraqi government following which it planned to assassinate Tariq Aziz (a close aide to Hussein) the following month in response to the retaliation. Saddam Hussein's government retaliated by executing Al-Sadr and his sister after which much of the organisation's leadership fled to Tehran and Lebanon, with the remaining deciding to stay behind in Iraq and carry out several attempts on Hussein's life in the 1980s. The remnants of the al-Dawa that fled to Lebanon were subsumed into Hezbollah and it is likely that Iran had some role in the first Lebanese suicide attack as well as the integration of al-Dawa members into Hezbollah, suggested by the continuity seen in the next few attacks.[40]

Thus, the revival of Hussein's martyrdom by Musa al-Sadr and the militarisation of the concept by Ayatollah Khomeini created a certain culture of death and self-sacrifice, similar to the trend that existed in Revolutionary Russia and the Japanese military. The creation of Hezbollah brought about this culture of martyrdom and its members set themselves apart from other religious denominations as well as other parts of the Shiite community. *Jihad* and martyrdom became an integral part of these individuals' identity and further testified to the authenticity of their identity and faith. While the encouragement and establishment of such a culture of martyrdom was brought about by Iran, the Israeli invasion accelerated and helped provide a common enemy for the Shiite community to unite against, and feel strong enough

to resort to self-sacrifice. Furthermore, the disparity in power between the Iranians and Israelis, coupled with Israeli indifference towards mass civilian casualties only made suicide bombing all the more practical.[41]

Table 2.1: Major Suicide Attacks in Lebanon from 1981–1983[42]

S. No.	Date of Attack	Type and Place of Attack	Casualties (approx)	Impact
1	Sept 15 – 17, 1981 (3-day massacre)	Massacre of Sabra and Shatila refugee camps by Phalanga militia members	800 – 1,000 Palestinian civilians	International condemnation for Israel and attention on the brutality that terrorist groups are willing to use
2	Nov 11, 1982	Vehicle-borne suicide attack at Israeli Defence Force (IDF) headquarters in Tyre by a 17-year-old	75 Israelis and smaller number of Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners	Intensity of attack so high that Israelis themselves maintained that it was a natural gas leak until the bomber's identity was disclosed by Hezbollah in 1985, who later went on to become a hero
3	April 18, 1983	Vehicle-borne suicide attack at US Embassy in Beirut	63 casualties and more than 100 injured. Attack took place during a high profile meeting between the CIA station chief in Lebanon and top officials	Indicated Hezbollah's access to high-level intelligence and crippled US human intelligence capability in the region for years

4	Oct 23, 1983	Twin vehicle-borne suicide attacks at Lebanese Army Checkpoint Headquarters of the First Parachute Chasseur Regiment (French)	241 US Service personnel 58 elite French paratroopers	Revealed the high-level planning and intelligence capacity of the Islamic Jihad Organisation
5	Nov, 1983	Explosive-laden truck driven into the Israeli military headquarters in Tyre	60 people, including 28 Israeli troops	Demonstrated the importance of having a human guidance system for vehicular bombs
6	Dec, 1983	Bomb explosion at US Embassy in Kuwait	5 casualties	May not have been a suicide attack as the assailant fled the vehicle, suggesting remote or timed detonation

The major suicide attacks during 1981-83 (as shown in Table 2.1) owe their credibility to Hezbollah, the organisation which encouraged enforcement of such a brutal tactic. There were many other suicide bombings that took place hereafter, however, they all successfully devastated the forces of three states, claimed significant human casualties and defied all efforts at prevention of such actions and the retaliation that followed. This wave of attacks held a powerful symbolic value and contributed towards the withdrawal of Hezbollah's adversaries in Lebanon in the next two years. In this manner, Hezbollah established itself as a major player in the Lebanese conflict and managed to seek a distinct identity for itself, different from other forces such as Amal.[43]

In the years following these major attacks, suicide bombings became a very common tactic and gained a lot of attention throughout the world. While most of the world was reeling under the brutality of the acts and condemning them, terrorist organisations were gaining inspiration from the success story of Hezbollah and other groups in West Asia.

Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka

The largest employer of suicide terrorism, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam or LTTE of Sri Lanka, were organised into an army-like structure in order to protect and defend their 'homeland' for over three decades from 1976 till 2009. Religion was never really a part of their mandate and Tamilian nationalism was the sole driving force of the organisation. The LTTE was unique in its tactful deployment of suicide terrorism as it functioned like a thorough military institution comprising specialised units with a range of operational capabilities. One of these units was the "suicide" unit, which also happened to be the most prestigious of all. It comprised dedicated individuals trained and willing to sacrifice their lives towards the cause of their homeland. The LTTE had mastered the effective use of suicide terrorism during the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. It carried out major political assassinations involving people of high ranks and security protection through its suicide attacks, thereby furthering its agenda in the conflict. Prabhakaran, the leader of the LTTE was responsible for this and there are strong pieces of evidence suggesting that he was directly influenced by Hezbollah's use of suicide bombing. In its ultimate attempt, the LTTE even replicated the *Kamikaze* form of suicide when two of its pilots crashed two separate single engine aircraft on Sri Lankan government targets with the aim of causing maximum damage. The LTTE is one of the case studies that will be discussed in great detail in the subsequent chapters owing to its successful and orchestrated employment of suicide terrorism to further its mandate.

Palestinian Suicide Bombing

First Intifada (1987-93)

In the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, the state of Israel was created and further the Gaza Strip was administered under Egypt while the West Bank came under Jordan. However, during what came to be known as the "Six Day War" in 1967, Israel took over "the remaining Palestinian territories of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza Strip, as

well as the Syrian Golan Heights, and the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula, in a matter of six days".[44] The PLO was a representative body for all Palestinians who lived in the territory prior to the creation of the state of Israel. It acted as an umbrella organisation upon formation in 1964 to bring together all Palestinian resistance groups under one unit, though it gained prominence only after the war in 1967.[45]

In 1982, when Israel invaded Lebanon, it was successful in ousting the PLO from Southern Lebanon which also led to the rise of Hezbollah. Most of the upper ranks of the PLO settled in Tunisia, and the rest of the Palestinians were left to live in the occupied territories. With heightened frustration among the youth and disappointment in the PLO for its inability to put an end to the occupation, tensions broke out in the form of a civil disobedience campaign, with strikes and demonstrations within the occupied territories in December 1987. This marked the beginning of the first *intifada* or uprising which was triggered by the killing of four young Palestinians by Israeli soldiers and the shooting of a teenage boy during an unarmed protest.[46] The *intifada* came as an opportunity for the Palestinian leadership to take revenge for the humiliation and oppression faced by them at the hands of the Israelis, and further demanded the creation of Palestinian statehood. A National Unified Command was formed by the local leaders of the factions of the PLO who instructed the Palestinians on how to oppose the occupation, coordinate the strikes and protests, etc. Further, there were various Palestinian resistance groups that had come up in the occupied territories, united in their dissatisfaction towards the PLO. A vague organisational framework was formed by these resistance groups that were never in a position to openly defy the PLO. With the *intifada*, most of the world paid attention to the Palestinian cause, including the US, Israel and, of course, the PLO leadership in Tunisia that was taken by surprise and realised the need to take charge of the situation for any actual political gains to be made.[47]

In the meantime, during the 1980s, two prominent Palestinian organisations were formed: Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Hamas was made up of the Gaza branch of the Muslim

Brotherhood, and wished to present itself independent of the National Unified Command during the *intifada*, posing as "an Islamic alternative for leadership towards Palestinian statehood". Hamas started out as a non-violent group that recognised the PLO as a "father, brother, relative, and a friend";[48] however, it differentiated itself from the PLO owing to the secular nature of the PLO. The PIJ, on the other hand, was even more ideological than Hamas and far less prone to pragmatic accommodation of any sort. It also comprised the Gaza branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and was inspired by the 1979 Iranian Revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini. While Hamas fought for the creation of the Islamic state of Palestine, the PIJ was interested in creating a revolutionary movement across the Arab world.[49]

In 1990, skirmishes between the Palestinians and Israelis became common. In October 1990, the Jewish group Temple Mount Faithful planned to lay the foundation stone for the Third Jewish Temple on the Mount, symbolising the recapture of the site for the Jewish community. This seemed as a threat to the leaders of Hamas who resorted to stone pelting at Israeli security personnel as well as the worshipping Jews at the site. The police retaliated by opening fire which wounded nearly 100 and killed 21 Palestinians. This was when Hamas announced its own *jihad* against the Israelis and its military wing was formed, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, whose cadres indulged in several knife attacks on Israelis. In 1992, Hamas members, on two separate occasions, killed six Israeli soldiers and kidnapped a seventh, who was eventually murdered when negotiations between the Government of Israel and Hamas broke down.

The 1992 attacks were a significant escalation from the level of traditional Palestinian violence that was prevalent before that. In the meantime, the Unified Command was advocating civil disobedience and non-violent methods during the *intifada*. Another development that took place was the struggle within the Palestinian community wherein militant groups began competing with each other post the withdrawal of Israeli security forces from many parts of the occupied territories. However, Hamas did not formally participate in the

leadership of the *intifada*, in an effort to distinguish and legitimise itself in the eyes of the Palestinian community. In an effort to do so, Hamas took a hard stance towards its own community before doing the same towards Israel.

A few years into the *intifada*, the Chairman of the PLO, Yasser Arafat, arrived in Palestine from exile in Tunisia and initiated a formal dialogue with Israel. The first of these was the Madrid Conference in 1991, followed by the Declaration of Principles in 1993 which formally accepted the secret negotiations between Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin, prime minister of Israel. According to the declaration, parts of the Gaza Strip and West Bank would be administered by the Palestinian Authority (PA) ensuring self-governance in those territories. Arafat served as the president of the PA and continued to assume the role of chairman and leader of Fatah. This agreement came to be known as the Oslo-Cairo process, but it did not address the issue of an independent Palestinian state.[50]

The Declaration of Principles was not welcomed by Hamas and the PIJ, that escalated their pitch of violence. On the eve of the signing of the declaration, there was serious violence, with Hamas guerillas having ambushed and killed three Israelis. Further, in 1994, Dr. Baruch Goldstein, a Jew, shot 29 worshippers at a mosque in the West Bank, after which the crowd beat him to death. This further strengthened Hamas' narrative, which orchestrated the first Palestinian suicide attack, killing eight Israelis and injuring 44. The suicide bomber in this incident drove an explosive laden vehicle to a bus stop in Northern Israel. This was followed by another suicide attack a few days later, killing five Israelis and injuring 30. Both attacks were claimed by Hamas in retaliation for the Goldstein massacre. These attacks were extremely important in determining Hamas' role as a prominent actor in the Palestinian struggle and, at the same time, put Arafat in an awkward situation. He publicly expressed regret for the loss of Israeli lives in the attacks, which, to his own people, was a signalling of Israeli appeasement, making him appear less empathetic towards them. The escalation of violence and use of suicide attacks pressurised Arafat, as his authority was being

challenged. Several attempts by him to control the Palestinian violence only led to greater protest and violence, including suicide attacks.[51]

The Palestinian suicide attacks were not fully supported by the people, especially those who had faith in the peace process. Further, the intensification of violence on the part of Hamas placed the Palestinians at a disadvantage, with the increased Israeli security. There was peace during the period of truce between Hamas and the PA from August 1995 to February 1996, however, there was a resurgence in the suicide attacks post 1996 due to the assassination of significant PIJ and Hamas members by Israel. The trajectory of suicide attacks continued in 1997 (five attacks) and 1998 (three attacks), after which suicide attacks of the first *intifada* or first wave ended in Palestine.

Thus, the first *intifada* saw the beginning of the employment of suicide attacks by Hamas and the PIJ to showcase their own credibility among the Palestinians as well as to challenge the authority of the PA, besides targeting the Israelis. While the attacks hampered the peace process between Israel and Palestine, in 1999, the peace process resumed with the election of Ehud Barak as prime minister of Israel, which was supported by a majority of Palestinians at the time.[52] This declining support was accompanied by the PA and Israeli government's decimation of Hamas' al-Qassam Brigades as well as a reduction of their funds, thereby, restricting their operations and charitable work. This was how the first wave of suicide attacks came to an end, due to the lack of support from the community, resulting in no suicide attacks in the years 1999 and 2000, until the second *intifada*.

Second Intifada

While there was optimism regarding the peace process in 1999, by 2000, it became clear that the peace process was a distant reality and harder to achieve. While Ehud Barak was willing to arrive at a final solution along with Arafat, the construction of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip continued, thereby increasing the number of Israeli settlers in these territories. This was not welcomed by the Palestinians, of course, and what further added to their woes was the functioning of the PA under

Arafat, marred by rampant corruption, with autocracy taking precedence. In such a situation, the Palestinians started losing faith in the peace process. Further, when the United States under President Clinton wished to mediate in talks between Arafat and Barak in 2000, it seemed clear that a final solution for peace was nowhere in sight as both parties did not have enough political capital to make a compromise. On the one hand, Arafat was losing the support of his own people and, on the other, Barak was equally isolated. The US tried to mediate once again and advocate a framework for peace which was rejected by Arafat ultimately, thus, marking the beginning of the acrimonious Israeli-Palestinian relationship once again, characterised by violence and a larger spate of suicide attacks.[53]

The violence resorted to in 2000 was a lot more lethal, as most Palestinians were losing out on patience and Arafat began to support the use of deadly violence as well. Further, at the time, Hezbollah was gaining prominence in the region and the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Southern Lebanon was attributed to the organisation's guerilla warfare strategy, along with its employment of suicide terrorism. This gave groups like Hamas and the PIJ, along with several other Palestinian resistance groups, the incentive to employ violence in a similar manner to take charge of the situation. Thus, violence became decentralised and made it hard for the Palestinian leadership to control or contain it effectively.

The first suicide bombing in the second *intifada* was orchestrated by the PIJ when an Israeli Defence Force (IDF) post in Gaza was targeted, injuring one Israeli soldier and killing the perpetrator as well. In a few months' time, it was widely felt that suicide terrorism was the most effective means of striking Israeli targets—mainly soldiers—and by the end of 2001, there were over 30 suicide attacks conducted by Hamas and the PIJ. By 2002, resistance groups that had not previously indulged in suicide attacks also started employing the tactic as it had widely become the last resort for resistance groups to target the Israeli armed forces or society. The number of such attacks exceeded the total number of suicide attacks employed during the first *intifada*, which was above 50.[54] While suicide terrorism was at its peak in 2002 in the

Palestinian territories, the number of attacks started declining soon after that, ending altogether in 2005. This was because of the ceasefire agreement between Israeli and Palestinian forces after Arafat's death in 2004.[55]

Conclusion

Suicide is seen to have been a tactic resorted to by both state and non-state actors in conflicts that were asymmetric, with mostly the weaker power using the tactic to gain leverage in the conflict. Through its evolution over the years, both successful and unsuccessful campaigns of the use of suicide indicate the pertinent factors required for suicide to be used in an effective and strategic manner.

Narodnaya Volya in Imperial Russia was successful in understanding the practicality of keeping the bomb as close to the human as possible in order to gain control of the detonation and assured success of the mission. On the other hand, Imperial Japan used suicide more systematically in order to make up for the asymmetry in warfare. Both these users of suicide as a weapon understood the basic effectiveness of the 'tool'. However, in the case of both the IRA and PKK, there was a realisation that suicide, to be used as a revolutionary act, must certainly have the support of the masses or the community for which the 'suicide user' is committing the act. In the absence of such support, an air of uncertainty and vacuum gets associated with the act and it is no longer as effective. Moreover, mass support for an extreme act such as suicide is only gained when there is harsh brutality faced by the masses. Both Britain and Turkey did not exert such brutal forms of repression, and, thus, provided scope for a peaceful alternative to the people's grievances. Thus, the required community of support for acts of suicide as a means to achieve ends was not generated among the masses in both these cases.

The events in West Asia around 1979 completely changed things, especially in the realm of suicide terrorism. Prior to this, suicide was used more as an act of revolution for self-determination and 'freedom'. However, with the Iranian revolution and the use of religion by

Khomeini to mobilise the Shiite masses, the very act of suicide became glorified much more than it was prior to this. Suicide terrorism was glorified, not just as martyrdom but as an "ultimate death" associated with religious enlightenment. With the creation of Hezbollah and the use of narratives and propaganda in order to instil among the masses an aspiration to become a 'martyr', terror outfits all over the world gained inspiration. Not only did these events demonstrate to the Islamic world the usefulness of suicide, they managed to impress Prabhakaran, the leader of the LTTE, too. While taking a cue from Hezbollah's use of vehicle-borne suicide attacks, the LTTE demonstrated the strategic use of suicide terrorism in order to strike high-risk targets that would be difficult to hit at in any other kind of terrorist mission.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan saw the creation of a base for *mujahideen* fighters from across the Arab world, eventually forming the foundation of Al Qaeda. Religion was now used liberally in order to carry out suicide terrorism with the global *jihad* that was waged by Osama bin Laden through Al Qaeda. Once again, the use of narratives for propaganda and misinterpretation of both religion and world events led to the foundation of an ideology that resonated among a wide cross-section of people. At the same time, Hamas and the PIJ were instrumental in conducting the Palestinian suicide bombings, once again portraying the limited role of such attacks in the presence of a peaceful alternative to the issue, despite the support for suicide among the masses.

It is pertinent to understand the use of suicide in conflict in order to understand how terror outfits use the tactic to their advantage today. The Iranian Revolution and establishment of organisations such as Hezbollah, LTTE, Hamas and PIJ are said to have changed the way in which terror outfits operated in the modern world, especially in terms of suicide terrorism. However, there seems to have been a further change after the establishment of Al Qaeda and the attacks of 9/11 that completely 'revolutionised' suicide terrorism as a tactic. This is precisely why Al Qaeda is known to be the "trendsetter" of suicide terrorism today, along with one of its factions that went on to become

the Islamic State (IS) which has shown far more widespread and brutal use of suicide terrorism as part of its functioning.

Notes

1. Jeffrey William Lewis, *The Business of Martyrdom: A History of Suicide Bombing* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2012), p. 7.
2. Ibid., pp. 29-57.
3. Ibid., pp. 29-57.
4. Avraham Yarmolinsky, *Road to Revolution: A Century of Russian Radicalism*(New York: Collier, 1962), pp. 268-271.
5. James Billington, *Fire in the Minds of Men: Origins of the Revolutionary Faith* (New York: Basic Books, 1980), p. 388.
6. Bruce Hoffman, "Aviation, Security and Terrorism: An Analysis of the Potential Threat to Air Cargo Integrators", *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 10, No. 3, 1998, p. 66.
7. Lewis, n. 1, pp. 29-57.
8. Norman M. Naimark, *Terrorists and Social Democrats: The Russian Revolutionary Movement under Alexander III* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1983).
9. Anna Geifman, *Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1904-1917* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 45-83.
10. Ibid.
11. Lewis, n. 1, pp. 29-57.
12. Malcolm Higgins, "Japan's Deadly WW2 Kamikaze Pilots", *War History Online*, September 11, 2017. Available at: https://www.warhistoryonline.com/world-war-ii/5-facts-japans-deadly-kamikaze-pilots-mm.html. Last accessed on May 5, 2018.
13. Lewis, n. 1, pp. 57-85.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Kathryn Gregory, "Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) (aka, PIRA, "the Provos," Óglaigh na hÉireann) (UK separatists), Council on Foreign Relations, March 16, 2010. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/provisional-irish-republican-army-ira-aka-pira-provos-oglaigh-na-heireann-uk Last accessed on April 20, 2018; and BBC History, "The Troubles", *BBC*. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/troubles. Last accessed on April 21, 2018.
17. Lewis, n. 1, pp. 115-141.
18. Green Book contents- http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/ira/ira_green_book.htm
19. Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 135-136.
20. Lewis, n. 1, pp. 126-127.
21. Ibid.
22. Jerold M. Post, *The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to Al-Qaeda* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 39-54.
23. Bloom, n.19, p. 102.
24. Dogu Ergil, "Suicide Terrorism in Turkey: The Workers' Party of Kurdistan" in Countering Suicide Terrorism: An International Conference 20-23, 2000 Herzliya, Israel (Herzliya: International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, 2001), p. 107.
25. Lewis, n. 1, p. 136.

26. Ami Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), pp. 86-96.
27. Bloom, n. 19.
28. Lewis, n. 1, p. 138.
29. Post, n. 22, pp. 67-82.
30. Lewis, n. 1, pp. 63-64.
31. Ervand Abrahimian, *The Iranian Mojehedin* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989) pp. 35-222.
32. Lewis, n. 1, pp. 57-85.
33. Ian Brown, *Khomeini's Forgotten Sons: The Story of Iran's Boy Soldiers* (London: Grey Seal, 1990), pp. 88-89.
34. Lewis, n. 1, pp. 57-85.
35. Davis M. Joyce, *Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance and Despair in the Middle East* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), p. 49.
36. Robert A. Pape and James K. Feldman, *Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010), pp. 194-215.
37. Eitan Azani, *Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God – From Revolution to Institutionalisation* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), pp. 47-74.
38. Ibid.
39. Rogan Eugene, The Arabs: A History" 2nd ed., p. 415.
40. Lewis, n. 1, pp. 70-71.
41. n. 37.
42. Table from Lewis, n. 1, p. 67.
43. Table from Ibid., p. 67.
44. Zena Tahhan, "1967 War: How Israel Occupied the Whole of Palestine", *Al Jazeera*, June 6, 2017. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/06/50-years-israeli-occupation-longest-modern-history-170604111317533.html. Last accessed on April 22, 2018.
45. The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Palestine Liberation Organisation", *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Palestine-Liberation-Organization. Last accessed on April 25, 2018.
46. Bethan McKernan, "Intifada: What is it and What Would a Third Palestinian Uprising Mean for Israel and the Middle East?", *Independent*, December 7, 2017, Beirut. Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/intifada-what-is-palestinian-uprising-israel-jerusalem-trump-hamas-capital-west-bank-palestine-a8097331.html. Last accessed on April 26, 2018.
47. Lewis, n. 1, pp. 142-162.
48. Ibid., p. 147.
49. Pape and Feldman, n. 36, pp. 216-250.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. 70% Palestinians had faith in the peace process, while fewer than 20% were in favour of suicide attacks. Mia Bloom, n. 19, pp. 19-44.
53. Lewis, n. 1, pp. 163-190.
54. Mohammad M Hafez, *Manufacturing Human Bombs* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006).
55. Bloom, n. 19, pp. 19-44.

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

3. Dimensions of the Phenomenon

As suicide terrorism has transformed over the years after its first use in Imperial Russia, it has become a widely used and lethal tactic today. There are several reasons behind this and several actors involved that together enable it to become the most challenging threat the world faces. While the events that unfolded in West Asia in the 1980s have changed the very nature of suicide terrorism, the 21st century has brought with itself a further shift in the nature of the threat. Thus, the study of the evolution of suicide terrorism from 1980-present requires an understanding of how the act of suicide was used to serve a strategic purpose for the terror organisation employing it, as well as a symbolic value to the individual participating in it. Committing suicide can seldom be appealing; however, it is interesting then to study how individuals and organisations have been readily prepared to use it as a weapon, in order to coerce their opponents.

Suicide terrorism thrives on the very basic assumption that individuals are ready to inflict self-sacrificial violence upon themselves and along with them, on others. However, the underlying cause that drives organisations and individuals to take up such an extreme form of action is of utmost importance. It is this cause that has shifted over the years from 1980-present, resulting in the heightened use of suicide terrorism today. This timeframe can roughly be divided into two phases, with the first phase begining in 1980 until 2000, and the second phase from 2000 to the present. In the early 1980s, Hezbollah emerged as the major terrorist organisation which employed suicide terrorism as a tactic for the revival of the 'homeland' and struggle for the community's original identity against Israeli forces. This not only gained global attention but garnered support and inspired many terror outfits around the world that were fighting for the protection of their 'homeland' from foreign/external forces, for instance, the Liberation

Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). However, in this very phase, the seeds of the next phase were sown.

In the second phase (2000-present), suicide terrorism has been solely based on ideology and religion, with or without a homeland or a pre-existing community. Al Qaeda is, of course, the most significant proponent of the "global *jihad*" ideology, followed by the Islamic State which goes a step further and seeks to establish a Caliphate for its believers. The shift from terror networks operating as local resistance groups to the transnational form of terrorism is the primary element which distinguishes one phase from the other. These two phases are not absolutely distinct in that there is a transformation between the two which gradually takes place. However, this transformation finds its roots in the first phase, trickling down and dominating the second phase. Hence, solely for the purpose of clarity, the two phases have been defined to portray the emerging transition.

Phase I: Suicide Terrorism in the 1980s

Originating in Lebanon, suicide terrorism took a new turn in the 1980s with vehicle-borne suicide attacks, among other suicide tactics dominating the scene, motivated by religious ideals that were largely misinterpreted for propaganda. Suicide terrorism in this phase was predominantly used for the revival of the 'homeland', as viewed by the terrorists. Starting with Hezbollah fighting for the marginalised Shiite community in Lebanon, it then spread and inspired various other organisations around the world. Suicide terrorism commonly arose from broad-based nationalist liberation movements, those that typically have pursued guerilla warfare and found that a guerilla strategy is inadequate to achieve their nationalist aspirations. These were terror outfits that were devoted to their homeland and with foreign occupation having encroached on their territory, they felt obliged to fight for their land and their people. This further legitimised the existence of the terror outfits and justified the act of suicide terrorism under the pretext of 'martyrdom'. Thus, legitimacy once gained, can enable a group to indulge in suicide terror campaigns and recruit willing individuals for the same.[1]

There was a wide variety of events stirring up the Islamic world in this phase but before that, there was another terrorist organisation directly influenced by Hezbollah and its use of suicide terrorism as a tactic to achieve a certain goal. This was the LTTE in Sri Lanka which nearly tore the country apart with civil war between the Tamils (Hindu minority, comprising 16 percent of the total Sri Lankan population) and Sinhalese (predominantly Buddhists, comprising 74 percent of the total population). The LTTE is unique and essential for the understanding of suicide terrorism and its strategic motives. It is a unique group consisting of Tamils, predominantly Hindus, with a Marxist ideology, who carried out several suicide missions, including for political assassinations, to further their cause. Their main targets were not only the Sinhalese but also military targets, civilian infrastructure, and even the moderate Tamil opposition. Contrary to what we see today, religion was not even remotely connected to the cause of the LTTE, the largest organisation in the world to have used suicide tactics for operations.[2]

At this stage, it is important to mention the evolution of the modern *jihad* in today's world. It is this evolution that found its roots in the 1980s itself. There were three main events that led to the shift in focus from homeland or territory to purely religion and ideology.

The first of these was the establishment of a theocratic regime in Iran, after the shah was exiled and Ayatollah Khomeini came to power. With Khomeini's use of misinterpretation of religion as a tool for mobilising the masses, the Shia Muslims[3] of Iran managed to demonstrate to the world that the theocratic Caliphate was no longer a lost dream but an extremely realistic and viable option in the modern world. Further, it also portrayed how Muslims—Shia or Sunni—should not only reject the Western separation of politics and faith as a principle, but come forward and make it happen. Muslims around the world realised that they could perhaps free themselves from the machinations and interventions of the West, which marked the most significant impact, evident from what unfolded in the coming years.[4]

The second important strategic development was the siege of Mecca in Saudi Arabia, wherein around 300 armed Islamists, inexperienced and ill-equipped, became interested in a holy war against fellow Muslims, who seemed to have deviated from the "path of purity". The concept of *takfirism* came about at this time in order to declare any Muslim who disagreed with them as an apostate or a false Muslim. This was the first war of this kind in the modern world. The house of Saud which was the royal family, were also seen as apostates in the eyes of these men. After the siege was broken, it became clear that these attackers were accompanied by a group of influential Saudi clerics, key members of the *ulema*,[5] the religious leaders of the country. The Saudi king then proposed to spread the *jihadist* ideology within the country, and with government's support, in infidel lands[6] all over the world. This, backed with a massive influx of money from the export of petroleum, made the kingdom the most important force behind the spread of a fundamentalist and radicalised Islamic ideology around the world.[7]

Further, the third major event was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 as it forms a crucial part of understanding the role of national resistance in suicide terrorism. Afghanistan in 1979 laid the foundation of Al Qaeda, an organisation with a transnational ideological appeal of a nature never seen before. As this was during the Cold War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was not welcomed by the United States of America, whose main aim at the time was to contain Communism. The Afghan interest lay in fighting against the foreign occupation of their homeland by an outside invader. Thus, the Afghans and Americans were united in their resentment towards the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Pakistan eventually got involved and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) helped train Afghan fighters or *mujahideen*, as they were known, against the Soviet invaders. This was the time when Afghanistan witnessed massive migration of people to join the fight against the Soviets, united in their belief that the foreign occupiers must leave. This was when scholars, religious leaders, along with individuals willing to become part of the *mujahideen*, all came together in Afghanistan.[8]

Among them was the scholar Abdullah Azzam who was brought in to be involved in Afghanistan by the ISI, the intelligence agency of Pakistan. His work and interpretation of ongoing events in Islamic terms, along with the support of his student and companion, Osama bin Laden, led them to create the *Maktab Al Khidamat* (MAK) to assist the large number of foreign fighters arriving in Afghanistan to wage war. After the Soviets had left Afghanistan and Azzam was dead, Bin Laden inherited the organisation, renaming it as Al Qaeda, meaning "the base" and held something entirely different for the future of all Muslims.

Thus, the pairing of Azzam and Bin Laden, put in place with the Pakistani ISI's involvement and Gen Zia ul-Haq's outlook, funded by both American and Saudi money for different reasons, all formed the factors that enabled the conflict in Afghanistan to become much more complex and intense. Azzam was a renowned and learned scholar, while Bin Laden was a young man, with access to funds owing to his reputed and wealthy family background as well as donors in West Asia. In former President Hamid Karzai's words, "The Soviets left Afghanistan but what was created by external stakeholders in order to get rid of them, never left—the concept of radicalisation".[9]

It can, thus, be drawn from these events that what Ayatollah Khomeini undertook in Iran in order to mobilise the Shiite community, Zia ul-Haq realised in the creation of the *mujahideen*, which was the use of religion as an effective tool in interpreting ongoing events in such a manner that more and more people feel obliged and willing to support and fight for a common 'good'. This is where scholars like Abdullah Azzam are crucial in understanding how the geopolitical crisis of the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan was translated into a religious mandate for action. He knew the importance of ideologues in battle and further even realised that people will not fight for territory or treasury alone but will have to believe in the righteousness of their cause. This is how he managed to justify the ultimate goal of *jihad*, providing not only a rationale but an incumbent obligation on Muslims all over the world to join the battle for Allah against the infidels. He not only tried to prove

through his scholarly work that Muslims had been humiliated and cornered at the hands of "impure Western regimes" but also managed to urge action for defence against the same.[10]

After the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, the next major strategic development was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, which led to the loss of Bin Laden's faith in the royal family of Saudi Arabia, despite being close family friends. This was the point when Bin Laden rose against the king, denouncing him as an infidel too, moving to Sudan along with his organisation Al Qaeda. After planning operations in hiding against all infidels, Bin Laden finally declared a 30-page long *fatwa* titled "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places" which urged Muslims to take up the responsibility to fight and become *jihadis* themselves. In a sense, he did exactly what Abdullah Azzam had done, but this time round, he reached out to a wider net of people and declared the enemy everywhere around the world. With his *fatwa*, he made almost every other person in this world, the 'infidel'. It is interesting to note that even here he talked of a foreign force occupying territory perceived as holy or as one's homeland, and thus, marked the global phase of modern *jihad*.[11]

Robert Pape's Nationalist Theory of Suicide Terrorism

In Robert Pape's significant research on suicide terrorism, he traces all the suicide attacks starting from the 1980s till 2003 and has created the first and only such database of suicide attacks. While researching on the subject, he has devised a theory of suicide terrorism which relates to the linkages between national liberation and the tactic. He says that suicide terrorism only occurs in the case of a particular territory being threatened by an external force or occupier, exerting significant political control over the area. Further, Pape has devised what he calls a nationalist theory of suicide terrorism which predicts that the occurrence of suicide terrorism is dependent on an occupied community's support for individual self-sacrifice; and that support is, in turn, dependent on the relationship between the occupier and the occupied. By this, he, therefore, implies that

suicide terrorism is mainly a response to foreign occupation rather than the product of Islamic fundamentalism or any ideological influence.[12]

While Pape's theory may not seem entirely precise in today's world where Islamic terrorism has emerged as a major threat on the global stage, it needs to be realised that Pape studied suicide terrorist campaigns within the timeframe of 1980-2003 wherein the majority of campaigns were for some territory or the other which had come under threat. For instance, Hezbollah, Hamas, the LTTE and Taliban in Afghanistan, all struggled against occupation of their land. While the LTTE did not exactly fight against a foreign power, like in the rest of the cases, there still existed an 'occupier' of the land that the Tamilians perceived as their homeland. Thus, it is important to draw from his theory, the inferences that he made regarding such campaigns and their success to understand the strategic logic behind them.

According to Pape, in such a scenario wherein the homeland is perceived to be under threat from a foreign power, the differences between the terrorist community and the occupier further enhance their enmity and encourage support to "overthrow" such occupation. These differences can be along the lines of religion, linguistics, ethnicity, nationality, etc. These differences then lead to demonisation—the belief that the enemy is morally inferior as well as militarily dangerous, and so must be dealt with harshly. This, in turn, encourages the two main features of suicide terrorism: the willingness to die and the willingness to kill innocents. Further, religious differences can enable extreme demonisation and the more threatened a community's national identity feels, the more patriotic sentiments are generated, inspiring members of the occupied community to voluntarily accept great personal sacrifice to maintain the community's original identity.[13]

Although this may not be the sole reason for terror outfits to employ suicide terrorism, however, it makes a huge impact in creating an environment conducive to the same. While Pape does not attribute suicide terrorism to religion or ideology, he does mention the impact of these factors in mobilising the masses and gaining legitimacy for the campaign. This is exactly what all the actors involved in Afghanistan

after 1979 must also have realised, most prominent among them being Osama bin Laden. The concept of extensive use of religion globally by terror outfits originated with Bin Laden's interpretation of global events, just as was done by Abdullah Azzam earlier.

Phase II: Suicide Terrorism in the 21st Century

Today, there is an increasing trend towards Islamist suicide terrorism. This means that today terror outfits are gaining legitimacy in different ways. While the threatened 'homeland' was the main reason behind the strategy of suicide terrorism since the 1980s, religious ideologies soon took precedence. While religious differences between the occupier and occupied determined the support for 'martyrdom' operations at that time, purely religious beliefs and ideologies govern suicide terrorism today. At this juncture, it is important to note that Robert Pape's theory is useful in understanding and identifying the motivations of nationalist-inspired suicide terrorists, but what it leaves out is the reasons behind religious groups purely based on ideologues with goals beyond territorial demands employing suicide terrorism.

What mark the most sensational phase of terrorism in today's world were the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre in New York, taking the world by shock. This event also marked the transnational and global phase of terrorism as a phenomenon. Once Osama Bin Laden became aware of the usefulness of interpreting world events in religious and manipulative terms, he continued doing so in the face of many strategic and geopolitical shifts in the world. It was a result of the steadily growing anti-US sentiments within the radical Islamic community across the Arab world. Al Qaeda successfully managed to drive home the narrative that the Americans had no business in the land of the Muslims and that they needed to be removed from the region and prevented from setting up proxy governments there.

The US invasion of Iraq in 2003—ostensibly on the grounds of suspicion about Iraq possessing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)—further added fodder to Bin Laden's strategy and played into what he was preaching at the time. It is imperative at this point to

mention the "Crusader-Zionist Alliance" document which contained the basic elements of Al Qaeda's appeal for recruitment and the ideals on which it lays its foundation. It is clear that Bin Laden's principal innovation has been to reorient various local resistance movements towards the "larger picture" and fight against the one and only enemy—the United States of America (USA). His main call had always been for Islamic groups and their governments to come together, creating a kind of cross-national military coalition against the United States. In this document, he also speaks of a phenomenon called "Veiled Colonialism", also known as the lynchpin in Al Qaeda's strategy, wherein he says that these societies (Muslim) face not direct military occupation or control but "veiled colonialism" in which the US supports repressive regimes that serve the interest of the "Crusader-Zionist Alliance".[14]

Bin Laden further adds religious colour to this narrative by suggesting that the US and Israel are "Crusader States" that are on a mission to bring Christianity to the world. Events such as the American invasion of Iraq only validate his point further in that sense. He not only despised the Americans and the West for being extremely materialistic and "unIslamic" but firmly believed that terrorism must be used for coercion in order to impose high costs on civilians, compelling them to pressurise their governments, and reverse course. The destruction of America was central to his objectives but along with it, the ideals that the West carried. Thus, his target included Western psychology as well, for which suicide terrorism proved to offer the best results.

What started off as a national resistance in Afghanistan, soon grew into a viral ideology that spread rapidly throughout the world and made terrorism a borderless and transnational phenomenon. Hence, there was no particular land or territory that was being fought for, but a completely different force that united people across the world against the most brutal forms of violence that the Muslim world had faced in this century. Ideology is the most effective tool in reaching out to vulnerable people across the world, and this was realised by a faction of Al Qaeda (in Iraq), which would later become the Islamic State (IS).

The IS grew out of Al Qaeda and its network in Iraq (AQI) with Abu Musab Al Zarqawi as its leader. However, till this stage, a number events unfolded, primary among which for Al Qaeda was the killing of Osama bin Laden in 2011 by a covert US operation. Bin Laden was then replaced by Ayman al Zawahiri, whose personality and aura could, however, never match up to his predecessor's. Soon after, there emerged differences in opinion within Al Qaeda especially from the Al Qaeda in Iraq. Further, the crippling state of affairs in Iraq and Syria ultimately led to the terrorist organisation's declaration of the formation of a Caliphate, after gaining some territory in both Iraq and Syria in 2014. It declared the re-creation of the Islamic Caliphate with Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi as the caliph of the Muslim world.[15]

Till now, the ideas propagated by Azzam and further carried on by Bin Laden, spoke of the Muslim world, in the absence of a Caliphate, obliged to do something about it during their own lives. However, the IS gave them a Caliphate with a caliph and asked for the same, except that it "made it more real". The result is for all to see today in an age where social media and communication have become so accessible, providing this ideological base in the 21st century a lethal platform for propaganda. Thus, Europeans, Muslims, even Indians and many other people around the world have not only been recruited and indoctrinated through the ideology but simultaneously also inspired to act independently. The attacks in Europe and even America in the last few years are living examples of how deep an ideology can penetrate through attacks orchestrated and inspired by the IS ideology.

The Islamic State stands for the creation of an Islamic Caliphate, with a caliph as its head and the rule of *Sharia* law. Further, it emphasises the humiliation and suffering of Muslims at the hands of the West and showcases the most brutal forms of violence through its propaganda videos. This ideology and propaganda not only resonates with individuals from all over the world but also with frustrated and disappointed terrorists previously part of another terrorist organisation that does not seem to be doing 'enough'. The Islamic State has managed to propagate an idea that has proliferated across the world through the

sophisticated use of the internet for both communication and display of propaganda through social media and propaganda manuals such as *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah*. In the year 2017, there was a surge in lorry attacks carried out by IS-inspired or IS-instructed perpetrators in the wake of an issue of *Rumiyah* that had glorified the Nice truck attack, where a lorry was used to run over a celebratory crowd in Nice.[16]

Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, the IS spokesman killed in an air strike in 2016, in one of his propaganda messages, called upon all fellow "soldiers of the Caliphate", asking them to single out the disbelieving Westerners and smash their heads with a rock, slaughter them with a knife, choke or poison them or run them over with a car, in the absence of an Improvised Explosive Device (IED), bullet or any other expensive equipment.[17] Thus, the IS increasingly shifted its rhetoric from a "call upon all soldiers to travel to the Holy Caliphate" to "a call upon soldiers to fight where they are, with whatever means available to them". In a sense, the IS decentralised the concept of terrorism, making each and every individual capable enough to act on his/her own.[18]

The IS, also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), has succeeded in establishing psychological fear in, and control of, all those living under its rule. Further, their suicide missions and form of *jihad* have always been self-sacrificial and glorified as martyrdom, exaggerating the psychological impact of terror. The IS not only thrives in the minds of those who fear it, but also the minds of those who are susceptible to empathising with the group. While traditional terror groups are known to conceal their identity or involvement in a particular attack, the IS does not leave the slightest opportunity to claim responsibility for an act of terror/violence against civilians the world over. This gives it a strategic leverage in showcasing the wide geographical reach and appeal of its ideology through "inspired" lone wolf actors.

Despite the IS losing physical presence after its defeat in Iraq and Syria, its psychological presence has been manifested in such a way that it continues to exist and expand extensively across the globe. With lone wolf attacks slowly becoming a common affair, one could even

say that it seems most likely to be the future of terrorist acts. As the IS loses more of its territory at the home turf, it only makes sense for its 'soldiers' to fight from where they are and with whatever means are available to them. This makes it extremely hard for monitoring and surveillance of individuals who do not communicate with anyone prior to their self-initiated radicalisation online and carry out attacks as lone wolves. Thus, cyber enabled terrorism or cyber radicalisation is, indeed, a significant catalyst of terrorism today, especially suicide terrorism. The internet provides an egalitarian space for its users in a virtual world where the flow of ideas cannot be easily monitored or tracked. It provides the ideal platform for radicalisation and the spread of violent extremism on a global scale. This poses a serious threat to the security agencies and institutions globally that are constantly working towards countering terrorism.

Thus, from the 1980s till the present, the underlying cause or justification of suicide terrorism proposed by terrorist organisations and believed in by its followers has changed completely. As terror outfits have evolved, so have their strategic motives, and suicide terrorism has been seen to figure accordingly in their agenda. It must be kept in mind that suicide terrorism has two parties involved in its functioning—the employer and the participant or the organisation and the individual. From the organisation's point of view, suicide terrorism will be employed only if it makes sense and helps achieve the agenda set by it. However, from the individual's point of view, suicide terrorism can only be an option if he/she genuinely believes in not only killing himself/herself but further also killing other targets in the pursuit of coercion through terror. For the individual, suicide terrorism is associated with 'martyrdom' and other equivalent forms of glorification. However, it is obvious that if this really was a case of attaining 'martyrdom', there would not be an employer of suicide involved in the process—one who does not commit self-sacrifice but encourages his followers to do so.

Suicide Terrorism from the Organisation's Point of View

From the organisation's perspective, suicide terrorism should make sense. The decision to employ the tactic is not solely the organisation's prerogative as it has to take into consideration the will and desire of its followers to participate in such an extreme form of terrorism or otherwise. Before that though, the organisation must be fully convinced that suicide terrorism is a necessary means to be taken up in order to achieve the ends that it is striving for. Once the organisation decides that suicide terrorism is the most effective way of furthering its goals, it embarks on charting out the ways and means to employ it.[19] Undoubtedly, suicide terrorism has several advantages over other forms of terrorism, making it all the more favourable for organisations that have the potential to employ it. So, from a purely strategic point of view, suicide terrorism has several advantages that the organisation employing it reaps.[20]

Assured Destruction

In comparison to a regular terrorist, a suicide terrorist is more likely to accomplish the mission and cause maximum damage to the target. This is because of the close proximity between the bomb and the target as the bomb can be easily concealed either on the body/vehicle/surroundings that the perpetrator can keep an eye on and ensure its explosion. In that sense, it is a more lethal tactic because it enables assured destruction of a chosen target. Terrorists can choose a particular time, venue and target population or a more specific target, such as a head of state, to carry out the attack and orchestrate the mission accordingly. Suicide terror can, thus, penetrate almost anywhere and at any time at the discretion of the perpetrators or planners, giving it a strategic advantage over a regular act of terrorism wherein the placing of a bomb in a tactful manner might not fructify effectively. Suicide terrorism gives the attacker the advantage of being flexible and making last minute changes in order to ensure the attack is carried out effectively. Apart from this, the attacker and his organisation can also determine the location of the attack, having carefully examined all options, and arriving at a viable one. This

gives a considerable amount of control in the hands of the terrorist facilitating the success of the attack.

Further, suicide terrorism is more lethal because humans carry the bombs and, thus, security is easier to breach. This can be illustrated with the example of the PNS *Mehran* attack in 2011 at the Pakistan Navy's naval air arm wherein Pakistani Taliban gunmen penetrated the base, ready for a standoff with the authorities. Well armed and prepared for the raid, with food and water to sustain themselves for at least 16 hours, they succeeded in killing 10 soldiers before they were overwhelmed by the Pakistani commandos. However, what was observed by experts after the attack was the easy penetration of the *jihadis* through the base, indicating the spectre of some inside cooperation from military men sympathetic to the Taliban's cause. This is, of course, an added advantage if the terrorist ideology garners sympathisers from within the target community who enable the assured success of such an attack.[21]

Psychological Impact

Terrorism aims to pursue coercion with the threat and/or use of fear as a tool. Suicide terrorism is no different; however, the inclusion of the act of suicide makes it psychologically more lethal. This is primarily because of the element of bewilderment, mystification and preposterousness attached to the whole act of suicide terrorism that gives it the additional value of making the perpetrator the victim of his/her own act, thereby subjecting his tormentors to moral shame.[22] Moral shame is further indicative of the fact that suicide terrorism plays on the mind and is essentially a type of psychological warfare.[23]

The fact that one can kill himself/herself for a particular 'greater good' is not only indicative of sheer dedication and commitment of the individual towards the same but also suggestive of the legitimacy of the organisation deploying such an individual for the act. Self-sacrifice only makes the cause seem more 'noble' and, therefore, helps in inspiring many others to follow suit.

Suicide terrorism, in comparison to other forms of terrorism, magnifies its impact. This is because of the element of suicide which

is an indication of the fact that the attackers are not only dedicated to their particular cause but will not be easily deterred either, creating a fear psychosis. It portrays the plight of the terrorists as so grave that the value of human life, including their own, is close to nothing for them, and that they have given up hope of any other form of reconciliation. This is also how suicide terrorism gains more attention or media coverage, not only to address the issues or reasons which the terrorist organisations are fighting for, but also to enable recruitment. With wide public coverage, the purpose of the terrorists to intimidate the target audience, such as governments or citizens, is achieved through the environment of fear and insecurity that is established and used to their advantage.

Further, there are three target audiences in a terrorist attack: those who are killed, those who are made to witness the attack; and those who sympathise with the terrorists' cause and are drawn towards it. The target audience is not those who are killed but those who are witness to the act and henceforth live in fear, while the first category of audience comprises mostly innocent civilians who are not particularly targeted but tend to become victims of "collateral damage" in order to enable the terrorists to create an impactful attack. Of course, in cases of targeted political assassinations, this does not hold true but in most other cases, it does. As Brian Jenkins says, terrorists simply "want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead".[24]

Relatively Lesser Cost Involved

The training for suicide terrorists is mostly psychological and relies on indoctrination of an individual for him/her to effectively carry out the attack. The individual must be willing to take his own life and convinced about it in order to ensure the success of the mission. Thus, training for such missions does not cost much as opposed to the arms training imparted to regular terrorists who are expected to undertake attacks and survive. Thus, indoctrination forms a very important part of suicide missions but, in turn, is more cost effective than other forms of terrorism in terms of financial expenditure. Suicide terrorists are also trained; however, the absence of the

need to escape after the attack makes this training a lot less complex in comparison to other forms of terrorism. Significantly, suicide terrorism has the capacity to cause major financial losses in as far as the target is concerned, with relatively low investment. For instance, in the case of the 9/11 attacks, Al Qaeda is known to have spent between US$ 400,000 and US$ 500,000 (according to the 9/11 Commission) to execute the entire operation, however, the effects of the attacks were immensely disproportionate to this amount not only by virtue of the extensive destruction caused but also the global media attention they invited, followed by the vast expenditures incurred on security measures worldwide.[25]

Plausible Deniability

In committing the act, the individual is also killed, thereby leaving no trace of evidence leading up to the organisation that was responsible for the attack. This can then lead to plausible deniability in the case of organisations that wish to conduct terrorist attacks without revealing their identity, or vice versa. A clear example to illustrate the same would be the IS' swift claim of attacks that take place throughout the world. The IS has been claiming attacks as a strategic move in order to showcase its geographic reach and has often been seen as "opportunist" when it comes to claiming responsibility for attacks, thereby treading on the fine line between IS-inspired and IS-instructed attacks. This blurred line is exactly what works in its favour, making it far more lethal than any other terror organisation the world has known till date.

In addition, the absence of the option of escape after carrying out the suicide attack ensures a safe ending to the action in terms of the actor being prepared to die, thus, leaving no scope for the security agencies to access information regarding the background and details of the organisation behind the attack. Thus, a suicide mission is devoid of the most critical part pertaining to the planning of an escape strategy.

Once the decision to undertake suicide terrorism has been made by the employer organisation, it is then necessary for the organisation to identify or 'convert' its potential recruits. In many situations, the volunteers may be easily available such as in Afghanistan or Iraq where

resentment among civilians is at its height and the need for bringing about change rampant among the youth. However, in most cases, organisations have to constantly increase their following and are, thus, on the lookout for potential recruits or individuals who are likely to become an asset to the organisation, further, even willing to give up their lives in the process. In today's time, these are mostly individuals who manage to expose their vulnerability or propensity of falling prey to such an organisation's manifesto. It then becomes incumbent upon the organisation to maintain its following through propaganda and tactful use of narratives in a manner so as to keep its adherents engaged, and eventually urge them to take action. This is not to say that the organisation is the sole driver behind an individual's decision to partake in an act of suicide terrorism. The individual does attach himself/herself with the act of suicide through symbolic virtues and a strong belief in the 'cause' behind it. However, the organisation's reinforcement of its particular 'cause' or narrative goes a long way in urging the individual to carry out the act.

Suicide Terrorism from the Individual's Point of View

While terror organisations enjoy several advantages associated with suicide terrorism over other forms of terrorism, the most crucial factor that determines its success is the participation of individuals who are willing to die and kill. The success of suicide terrorism clearly hinges on the individual's belief in the act of suicide and his/her willingness to indulge in it, without which suicide terrorism is most likely to fail in the long run. This has been clearly illustrated in the cases of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), etc. Thus, it becomes extremely important for an organisation that wishes to employ the tactic, to make sure its followers portray this willingness. It becomes incumbent upon it to keep its followers engaged and its cause relevant. According to Ami Pedahzur, there are two processes involved in indoctrination: "presenting the recruit with persuasive thematic material and exploiting charismatic images to help internalize these materials".[26] He goes on to say that "the organisation, along with indoctrination,

attempts to create a strong sense of commitment within the individuals who are to take up the act of suicide, unless such a commitment has not already been established prior to the indoctrination."

With time, the different causes that terror organisations have stood for have also changed, however, the one common factor that has driven their campaigns of suicide terrorism has been the willingness of members to not only commit suicide but also kill others in the process. The decision of coercing and killing civilians in order to achieve a certain goal is indeed rather disturbing, however, killing yourself along with them is an even more lethal and drastic step to take. The decision starts from the suicide bomber's own reasoning of such an act which further enables him/her to carry out the mission. Thus, it is the mind that needs to be determined first in order for a suicide attack or campaign to be successful. This is where psychological indoctrination as well as the use of symbolism comes into play, in order to mobilise people and eventually make them work towards a 'greater good' that they genuinely believe in.

Ultimately, it all boils down to the individual committing the act of suicide terror, or the 'terrorist'. In a very broad sense, there are two categories of terrorists in the world today—one who lives in a conditioned environmental setting conducive to terror as a legitimate means of assertion; and the other who lives in an ordinary environment but is inspired, vulnerable or forced by the communities that use terror as a tool for coercion. Individuals belonging to both categories gain encouragement from the terror-inflicting community and the preconditions that surround it, becoming a part of the terrorist community and functioning on its behalf. By the time the individual is ready to carry out the suicide attack, he/she is fully convinced of the purpose of the act and is confident that he/she is taking a rational decision.

While this is a fairly broad categorisation of the types of individuals who are willing to participate in suicide terrorism, a detailed study to help in 'profiling' terrorists and arriving at a generalisation is impossible because there are no generalised characteristics or traits of

a terrorist personality that can be applicable to all cases. There is no distinct personality type that is prone to becoming a terrorist and the factors motivating an individual to commit an act of terrorism may vary from person to person. In order to understand these motivations, terrorists must, firstly, be considered as rational actors who are fully aware of what they are doing and are part of the same society that we are. Reducing terrorists to irrational or disillusioned actors runs the risk of underestimating their capabilities and, thus, this is the primary assumption one must make in attempting to understand the individual's point of view in suicide terrorism.

Terrorists from Among the Environment of "Terror"

In order for an individual to willingly participate in suicide terrorism, he/she must be convinced that it is the right path to take for demonstrating utmost commitment. This is not entirely difficult to be found in societies where violence is a normal concept and terrorism not an uncommon phenomenon. Thus, what facilitates the commitment of individuals in such surroundings is the social legitimacy of terror in general. Legitimacy is not necessarily gained in a straightforward manner. People need to believe in a particular belief system, for it to become legitimate. This is exactly what suicide terrorism plays on—a population that is vulnerable to believing that justice can only be brought through violence, including self-sacrificial violence. In most cases, this happens because all other peaceful alternatives have either been exhausted or seem futile. This is where the seeds of terrorism are sowed. In such a community, a considerable amount of support is extended towards organisations that promise to make the lives of such a community better and, thus, terror entities appear like a ray of hope. Thus, the community of support for 'martyrdom', thereby politicising the act of suicide terror, forms a major part of the symbolic aspect of suicide terrorism. Individuals who are part of such a community are conditioned to believe in the justice of violence.

From person to person, however, the incentives to become a suicide terrorist may vary from socio-cultural, religious and material incentives to more altruistic ones. Further, some reasons may be drawn from

intense group pressure or even personal loss, despair, discrimination and/or revenge. According to Mia Bloom, people who perceive their lives as having little significance otherwise would be more likely to follow such a path. This does not take away from the fact that a sense of despair and discontent is the point of origin, regardless. While many scholars have tried to study and find a pattern of terrorist profiles, none has been discovered yet and doesn't seem likely in the future also. What one can see are some central and common elements present in most such societies encouraging terrorism.

According to Professor Robert Pape, suicide terrorism is a result of the military occupation of a state by external forces or powers. Historically, it has been seen that misinterpretation of global events by leaders of terror outfits leads them to believe that their homeland is being 'occupied', sowing the seeds of national resistance against foreign occupation. This then has been seen to be the prime motivator behind suicide terrorism. The prime examples of this would be Hezbollah (marginalised Shias trying to protect their land from the clutches of Israeli forces), the LTTE fighting against the Sinhalese majority in Sri Lanka, etc. In such cases, there is a perceived "occupier of the homeland" for terrorists; it is the identity of the occupier that determines the grounds on which alienation and oppression spring up in the society, providing a fertile ground for terror outfits. This very alienation and oppression then makes it imperative for certain organisations and people to feel the need to fight against it. A sense of duty or obligation comes about while fighting for the homeland and is seen to be the greatest motivating factor for suicide terror campaigns from the 1980s onwards. However, after the global movement that was started by Al Qaeda, this fight for the 'homeland' has extrapolated itself manifold, making terrorism cut across territorial borders, united in ideology and spread through the internet to reach a wider audience.

Belonging to an environment where violence is normalised is not reason enough for people to easily participate in suicide terror. There are various factors that contribute to the conditioning of the mind in such a manner so as to make suicide terrorism a 'noble' concept or the

path to secure a greater good. As already discussed, the community of support plays a crucial role in encouraging terror campaigns and further glorifying suicide terror campaigns, seen as fighting for a cause. In the case of the 'homeland', individuals attach a sense of belonging with their homeland which is perceived to be under threat from foreign occupation or influence. This makes it crucial for them to protect their territory and gain their political right over it, as apparent to them, enabling the entire process to become a 'cause' that they are fighting for.

This cause today has been further justified by misinterpretation of religion in order to derive an ideology from within it. Such ideologies appeal to a wide section of people (rich and poor, educated and illiterate, fanatic and liberal, conservative and modern) for various reasons. The ideology becomes so important to these individuals that any threat to it can lead them to even cause self-sacrificial violence, which is seen to be completely justified. This is the most important factor involved in the symbolic aspect of suicide terrorism because ideologies can be propagated widely through different means, and can be based on extremely radical and intolerant propaganda.

It can be said that the 'cause' sows the seeds of the foundation of terror organisations and attracts funding from wealthy individuals as in the case of Al Qaeda as well as effective leadership. This cause then is further propagated and exaggerated through the use of an ideology, to reach out to the vulnerable masses of people, who get drawn to it. Once they are attracted and driven to such an ideology, they are not only willing to rise against any threat to it, but also willing to sacrifice themselves in the process. Further, this very willingness to protect their ideological beliefs and rise against oppression is reaffirmed with any strategic development that takes place in the world which reinstates their fears of a threat to the ideology. This then becomes a vicious cycle because the grounds for negotiation are close to none.

While terror outfits that believed in protecting their 'homeland' in the 1980s acted like local resistance organisations, today, it is the very 'ideology' that requires protection and is the most critical element for its believers. As clearly seen in the case of the Islamic State (IS)

today, terrorism has no territorial boundaries and owes its transnational nature to the power of ideology. An ideology is something that can not only be propagated easily across the world through modern and advanced electronic communication channels and the social media, but can further touch the hearts and minds of many virtuous and uninvolved people in today's globalised and connected world. The ways and means with which ideas are propagated to attract individuals who are either frustrated with their own lives or just simply inspired by terror outfits and their ideological beliefs, are the core indicators of this reality. The messaging and propaganda within such ideological terror groups is undoubtedly very appealing and suitably calibrated to touch the raw nerves of vulnerable people and societies. Because an ideology manifests in the mind, there is nothing more dangerous and lethal than it as one cannot relate any individual to a particular ideology.

This very cause and/or ideology used by terror outfits and the symbolisms that people attach to it, enable the politicisation of suicide terrorism into 'martyrdom', completely transforming the way in which the act is perceived and its very meaning and essence. Emile Durkheim's typology of suicides shows how suicide terrorism fits in that framework and reveals the difference between brainwashing and indoctrination. This difference is of utmost value in order to truly understand the altruism of suicide terrorism. This is present in mostly all suicide terrorists. The perception of achieving a 'greater good' by self-sacrifice comes from the belief that it is a moral duty which an individual is obliged to perform. Ideologically, individuals are forced to believe that fighting for their brothers, for instance, is a moral duty for which they shall be rewarded through prestige, honour, commemoration and in some cases, glory in the afterlife.

Homegrown Terrorism

With 9/11, the entire global community's attention was drawn towards the threat that terrorism represented. The United States launched the Global War on Terror (GWOT), joining hands with most nations of the world that vowed to come together and stand united against this

threat. The GWOT aimed to not only eradicate terrorism but also condemn states that provided safe havens to such elements. Thus, in the understanding of most Western nations, a terrorist was an "outsider" and terrorism was largely an external threat. One can go on to say that the terrorist was seen as the individual discussed in the above section —one who has been conditioned to use violence as a means to achieve an end because of the surrounding environment that he/she came from. However, today, the scenario has completely changed. While foot soldiers comprise a significant portion of terrorists today, there is a large number of individuals who are recruited from countries and societies that do not accept violence as a legitimate tool or are fairly 'progressive' in that sense. The threat of terrorism is, thus, beginning to grow from 'home' or within progressive Western nations of the world in the form of homegrown terrorism. A useful definition of homegrown terrorism has been stated in the Violent Radicalisation and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act 2007 of the United States, according to which homegrown terrorism is described as:

> ... the use, planned use, or threatened use of force or violence by a group or individual born, raised, or based and operating primarily within the United States or any possession of the United States to intimidate or coerce the United States government, the civilian population of the United States, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.[27]

Of course, this definition is flawed if one is to understand homegrown terrorism in a global context. Thus, for such an understanding, it is imperative to take the same definition and apply it to any nation-state. In other words, a homegrown terrorist is one who wishes to inflict violence and terror towards his/her own people. The more common name given to such terrorists today is "lone wolf". However, this does not mean that all homegrown terrorists are lone wolves which often obscures the actual meaning and threat of lone wolf terrorism. According to Marc Sageman,

> When the threat came from the outside, a reasonable defense against it was to harden national borders against the intruders. Now that the threat comes from inside, the only way to defend against it is to understand the process of radicalization and devise strategies to prevent its reaching the point of violence.[28]

The Brussels attacks in the year 2016 by IS terrorists at Zavantem airport and Maelbeek metro station are typical examples of homegrown terrorism. It was a case of individuals who were born and raised in Brussels but pledged allegiance to the belief system of a terror network operating in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State. They were instructed to carry out the attack and lived in Molenbeek district of Brussels, a ghetto colony for Muslim immigrants in the country. The most commonly asked question in such cases is: what reason would a person living in Brussels have to commit such an act? This question compels one to assume that members of immigrant communities, with their origin in certain countries, are more prone to indulge in terrorism, in line with the general understanding one has of a terrorist the world over. However, the rise of homegrown terrorism contradicts this very understanding. Europe has always faced the problem of integration and assimilation of immigrants into their societies, one of the major issues that came to the fore with these attacks. Statistics related to the skill levels, income and employment of Belgian Muslims indicate the enormous challenge they face in integrating into the mainstream, thereby remaining ghettoised and alienated. They have created a world of their own in a country where they constantly feel like 'outsiders'.

The rise of homegrown terrorism has also managed to push aside the standard reasons that most terror scholars would attribute to people who become terrorists. Marc Sageman suggests that most terrorists come from the "middle class" and are not too poor or illiterate to become terrorists. This is entirely true for homegrown terrorists who lead fairly comfortable lives in terms of basic needs and are still drawn towards the ideology of terror organisations.[29]

Lone Wolf Terrorism: A New Feature of the Islamic State

Lone wolf terrorists are assumed to be self-radicalised or self-taught through online platforms and propaganda material. However, this is not entirely true. While such factors, indeed, help facilitate the process of an individual becoming a terrorist, the process of turning inspiration into action is that of the individual alone. This is why terrorist organisations with strong ideological foundations are successful in attracting vulnerable individuals who do not even have to be instructed to carry out attacks, but are first driven by a certain factor before the inspiration begins. This has been seen extensively relevant in the case of the Islamic State. Charlie Winter classifies six key narratives that the Islamic State portrays: *brutality*, *mercy*, *victimhood*, *war*, *belonging*, and *utopia*.[30]

The first of these, *brutality*, is portrayed through harsh violence videotaped and spread across the internet in an effort to establish both "vengeance" and "supremacy". This not only helps in intimidating the "enemies" but also facilitates recruitment from among those who wish to be part of something that seems superior to all owing to its brutality. The second, *mercy*, has been used in a more sacred sense to show that the Islamic State is open to those seeking 'repentance' before God, and is open to all who are willing to let go of all their previous beliefs and abide by this one. Thirdly, *victimhood* plays on the portrayal of the victimisation of Muslims all over the world and appeals to those who connect to this narrative. The fourth kind of branding that the Islamic State indulges in is *war* or the military-style depiction of the terror organisation with information on its gains, training methods and facilities in order to once again portray supremacy. The fifth narrative is extremely important. It establishes a sense of *belonging* and emphasises the idea of "brotherhood" or togetherness in the Caliphate. Thus, Islamic State propagandists recognise that "offers of friendship, security and a sense of belonging are powerful draws for its supporters abroad". The last and most important narrative is that of *utopia*. The Islamic State stands to prove itself as the ideal Caliphate. The mere declaration of the creation of an Islamic Caliphate with a caliph as its head has proven to be a

radical step that no Islamist terrorist organisation has taken in the modern era of terrorism. Thus, this utopian idea resonates with not only foreigners, but even terrorists belonging to other organisations such as Al Qaeda who wish to join the IS instead.[31]

Today, the term "lone wolf" is used quite liberally, however, it must not be so. This underestimates the power of the factors that actually cause this "lone wolf" to act. To assume that an individual is acting completely alone, takes away the responsibility of the catalysts that enabled him/her to do so. Therefore, even lone wolves must be understood in their environment and surroundings in order to realise what led them to commit a self-sacrificial act of terror.

Other Motivations

While understanding the altruism of suicide terrorism and the power of the ideology, it would be wrong to ignore other motivations that lead to the same result. While large numbers of people are recruited in organisations owing to their altruistic motives, many are looking to achieve an upliftment in their lives. This is brought about through the honour and prestigious status that is granted to 'martyrs', morally uplifting their status and making them feel part of a more real and substantial purpose in life. This again is attributed to the strong messaging and indoctrination of individuals within terror outfits that make people believe that their lives are to change for the better. Thus, in order to be willing to die, the indoctrination process is more crucial for suicide terrorism than other forms of terrorism. There needs to be a gain that the individual sees in his own personal life, along with that of others, in killing and dying for the greater good. Once again, the community of support within the terror outfit contributes tremendously in legitimising the act of suicide terror as 'martyrdom' and promising to the individual prospects that he/she views as significantly better.

There are more than often, terrorists who are driven to participate in terrorist acts, particularly suicide terrorism, for less altruistic or noble reasons. There is a countless number of factors that affect the individual motivations to commit such an act. The first of these may be purely financial circumstances. A case in point is that of Ajmal Kasab, one of the

perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks (26/11), who was from an extremely poor background, trying to provide for his family, and, in the process, fell prey to the handlers of terror networks in Pakistan, thus, agreeing to carry out the attack along with his fellow attackers. Financial incentives work for those who live in extremely impoverished conditions and attribute very little value to their own lives. One has come across instances where, in situations of extreme poverty, families have willingly let their children join terror entities, accepting their departure as a sacrificial act for the greater 'cause'.

Another personal motivation found among terrorists is the negative fallout of a personal crisis such as being a victim of racism, bullying, an abused childhood or a feeling of bitterness and resentment due to a variety of personal reasons that could lead one to becoming vulnerable towards terror networks and communities. The support that such an individual receives from the terror community leads him/her to believe in, and to be wanting to do anything for, the community's well-being, an attribute that is exploited by the handlers. A major personal crisis, especially in war-torn areas, has been seen as the feeling of revenge. Afghanistan is a clear example of this phenomenon wherein operations carried out by the Western powers involving air strikes have ensued massive civilian casualties, generating resentment among the local population towards such "interventionist" powers. The Afghan Taliban is primarily made up of such individuals and is known to have seen a hike in volunteers willing to join the organisation with each drone strike carried out in the region.

While these are merely some of the reasons and motivations behind the individual's agreement to take part in suicide terrorism, it is impossible to generalise and profile potential terrorists among individuals in a society. What is imperative to understand, however, is the crucial role of recruiters or handlers of terror networks who keep an eye on the vulnerabilities of individuals who could potentially work for them. Such people identify what must be offered and to whom, in order for the individual to fall prey to the cause of the terror outfit and its ideology. The internet makes the job of such people a lot easier, with

chat rooms and forums where interactive communication enables terror outfits to portray their propaganda in a more effective and impressive manner online.

Conclusion

Suicide terrorism is the most popular and new face of terrorism in today's world wherein the phenomenon has been steadily on the rise. Thus, in order to tackle this global challenge, it is imperative to understand the causes of suicide terrorism and further investigate all the aspects involved therein.

The strategic mileage achieved through suicide attacks is immense not only by virtue of the long-term lethal impact it creates but also by way of significantly influencing governments and decision-makers who tend to look at issues differently once the suicide terror aspect comes into play. At the operational strategic level, such attacks not only tend to leave an everlasting impression in the minds of the people and governments but also enhance the prestige and image of those behind such attacks, thus, giving the organisation and its leadership the advantage of being infallible in their action, and the scope for further recruitment. Owing to the fact that suicide attacks can be organised at any place or time, without leaving any evidence of the perpetrators, it becomes difficult to trace the organisation responsible for the attack until the organisation or entity claims responsibility. Thus, tracing and detecting an organisation after a suicide attack becomes challenging. Further, individuals who may be part of a terror organisation are also hard to identify as ideology cannot be traced or detected either, and exists in the minds of individuals, motivating them to do what they feel is necessary in order to achieve the 'greater good'. This gives suicide terrorism a strategic leverage over other forms of terrorism and makes it one of the most challenging global threats.

The driving force behind suicide terrorism has always been traced back to a particular cause. This cause has been propagated using the support of an ideology, in order to mobilise and reach out to a larger number of people. However, over the years, ideology has been seen to

have itself become a cause. Simply put, ideology has gained such a firm ground that instead of being a means to mobilise people, it has become the very motive for which terror organisations employ suicide terrorism. This is because ideology has no territorial boundaries and can penetrate any section of society across the world. Further, people have become more accessible and connected through evolved information technology and social media, making it easier for terror organisations to circulate propaganda material and exaggerate capabilities and promises. This enables the politicisation of suicide terrorism as 'martyrdom', creating a symbol of heroism for recruits and enabling the willingness of individuals to sacrifice their lives. As long as terror outfits can identify potential recruits (among the vulnerable in society), they will continue to approach them and further their own propaganda. The meaning that a suicide mission holds for the individual committing the act is more symbolic. His/her dedication, commitment and determination to undertake suicide missions driven by symbolism shall remain the underlying spirit of most such attacks.

Notes

1. Robert A. Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House Trade Paperback Edition, 2006), pp. 79-101.
2. Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 45-75.
3. Shia Muslims belong to the second largest branch of Islam (Shia Islam) after Sunni Islam. The Iranian Revolution was for the creation of the Shiite identity as Iran is a predominantly Shia state.
4. Sebastian Gorka, "1979: Annus Horribilis—Modern Jihad Goes Global" (Book excerpt: *Defeating Jihad: The Winnable War*),The Washington Free Beacon, 2016. Available at http://freebeacon.com/culture/1979-annus-horribilis-modern-jihad-goes-global/ Last accessed on February 15, 2018.
5. A body of Muslim scholars who are recognised as having specialist knowledge of Islamic sacred law and theology. Website: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ulema
6. Lands that were not of "Islamic soil".
7. n. 4.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Eitan Azani, *Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God – From Revolution to Institutionalisation* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), pp. 137-174.
11. Ibid.

12. Pape, n. 1, pp. 79-101.
13. Ibid., p. 90.
14. Ibid., pp. 117-118.
15. Graeme Wood, "What ISIS Really Wants", *The Atlantic*, March 2015. Available at: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/ Last accessed on May 2, 2018.
16. Ibid.
17. Yara Bayoumy, "ISIS Urges More Attacks on Western 'Disbelievers'", *Independent*, September 22, 2014. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-urges-more-attacks-on-western-disbelievers-9749512.html. Last accessed on May 3, 2018.
18. Daniel Byman and Jennifer Williams, "ISIS vs Al Qaeda: Jihadism's Global Civil War", *The National Interest*, February 24, 2015. Available at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/isis-vs-al-qaeda-jihadism%E2%80%99s-global-civil-war-12304. Last accessed on May 2, 2018.
19. Ami Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), p. 25.
20. Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism: Third Edition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), pp. 145-153.
21. T.V. Paul, *The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World* (Gurgaon, Haryana: Random House India, 2014), p. xv (Introduction).
22. Bloom, n. 2, p. 77.
23. Ibid., p. 77.
24. John Horgan, *The Psychology of Terrorism* (New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2014), p. 13.
25. Hoffman, n. 20, p. 142.
26. Pedahzur, n. 19, p. 40.
27. Peter A. Olsson, *The Making of a Homegrown Terrorist: Brainwashing Rebels in Search of a Cause* (Santa Barbara, California: Praeger, 2014), pp. 1-42.
28. Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century* (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2009), p. 71.
29. Ibid., pp. 71-88.
30. Charlie Winter, "The Virtual 'Caliphate': Understanding Islamic State's Propaganda Strategy", *Quilliam*, 2015. PDF available at: https://www.stratcomcoe.org/charlie-winter-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-states-propaganda-strategy. Last accessed on May 6, 2018.
31. Ibid.

4. Analysing Suicide Terrorism through Case Studies: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Al Qaeda

Throughout the history of terrorism, there has been a systematic evolution of terror entities, each resorting to progressive and innovative tactics. Suicide terrorism was one of many such tactics that was employed by several terror outfits. These outfits either realised the strategic importance of the craft, or the symbolic value that it held to mobilise support and attention to their cause. While the list of organisations using suicide terrorism is profuse, this chapter focusses on two organisations that have used the tactic in their own unique ways to further their agendas: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Al Qaeda. While the former demonstrated the use of suicide terrorism as a military force in Sri Lanka aimed at overthrowing the majority-dominated rule, the latter came to be the creator of an international ideological movement.

Most minority communities in the world face oppression or discrimination in some form or the other. The LTTE managed to portray to the world the capacities and scope of minority retaliation, with escalating levels of hatred and unflinching commitment and dedication towards the 'homeland'. It is perhaps the only terrorist organisation in the world to have indulged in several outright armed conflicts with the military. The LTTE did not want to be associated with terror organisations such as Al Qaeda because of their rampant use of terror attacks on civilians. It was very clear on establishing itself as a military force targeting the state right from the very beginning and it managed to function exactly like one.

The same cannot be said about Al Qaeda though. Using ideology to penetrate the minds of people, Al Qaeda is more of a phenomenon or an ideology that exists in the minds of its sympathisers even today. It demonstrated the lethal implications that misinterpretation of religion and a viral ideology have. Further, it has shown the world how effectively communication technology and propaganda warfare can transcend territorial boundaries.

While there exists hardly any relation between them, their starkly contrasting methods of employing suicide terrorism tactics makes them relevant for understanding the wide scope and implications of this form of terrorism.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

The LTTE came to be known as the masters of suicide bombing in the 1990s with their systematic and thorough use of the tactic during the ethnic tensions in Sri Lanka. The group portrayed itself distinctly as a military force and did not target civilians as part of its mission. It became the protector of the alienated Tamil community in the independent country and served as a role model for many terrorist organisations, in terms of tactics and discipline. The discrimination against the Tamils through the 1970s led to the formal establishment of the LTTE in 1976. Its capabilities in terms of operational planning and strategy could be gauged through the armed conflicts, also termed as Eelam Wars, that it fought against the Sri Lankan armed forces, spread over a period of four phases. Around this time, Hezbollah in Lebanon had marked a new era in modern-day suicide terrorism. The LTTE's leader, Prabhakaran, known to be the sole reason behind its success, was influenced by Hezbollah's style of attacks being used in West Asia. Apart from the various tactics and missions carried out by the LTTE, its suicide missions received wide global attention. Prabhakaran realised the practical and strategic relevance that suicide attacks held for certain targets.[1]

It would, first, be imperative to know the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka through the socio-political situation in the country to establish an understanding of the LTTE.

Origin of LTTE

Sri Lankan politics has always seen the involvement of two of its main inhabitants, the Sinhalas and Tamils. The Sinhalese are the largest ethnic group on the island, constituting approximately 74 percent of the population. They have their own language known as Sinhalese or Sinhala, and are usually of the Buddhist faith. The Tamils comprise approximately 16 percent of the population and further fall into two categories—Sri Lankan Tamils and plantation Tamils. While the Sri Lankan Tamils are larger in number (approximately 10 percent) and have been on the island for over thousands of years, the plantation Tamils (approximately 6 percent) are more recent arrivals. These Tamils immigrated from India to serve as agricultural labour on the plantations. They speak the Tamil language and are mostly adherents of Hinduism. The Muslims form the other ethnic group in Sri Lanka comprising approximately 10 percent of the population. However, the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka only involves the Sinhala and Tamil communities.[2]

While most would assume a more ancient or historically rooted explanation for their animosity against one another, the contrary holds true in this case. The ethnic tension between the Tamils and the Sinhalese only emerged in the 19th century. Until the British arrived to colonise the country, the Tamil minority governed itself in the northern and eastern parts of the country which was then called Ceylon. Prior to the British, the Dutch colonised Ceylon, starting from 1658 and the Portuguese even before that, from 1515. However, in 1818, Ceylon was united under one administration, as directed by the British, thereby eliminating separate nationalist entities. This decision is regarded as the spark which led to the aspiration of a separate Tamil homeland, and eventually the creation of the LTTE. However, this spark did not ignite the wave of Tamil nationalism immediately. Under British colonisation, the Tamil minority was favoured by the colonial policies. The most evident instance of this was the disproportionate share of government positions that the Tamils held.[3]

After the independence of Ceylon in 1948, the Sinhalese nationalist wave took root, enabled by a systematic policy of reverse

discrimination. First of all, a Sinhalese prime minister was elected and slowly the policies adopted by the government left a large number of Tamils disenfranchised and disadvantaged. In 1956, a decree declared Sinhalese as the only language to be recognised in the country, which was amended in 1958 after considerable protests and dissent. After the amendment, Tamil was allowed to be spoken in certain parts of the country (northern and eastern) while Sinhalese still remained the official language. Discrimination on the basis of language resulted in the systematic loss of government jobs by the Tamils. Further, a quota system at the university level restricted Tamil enrolment. By the 1970s, there was increasing unemployment among the Tamils.[4]

Significantly, in May 1972, the Sri Lankan government introduced a new Constitution, according to which Buddhism was established as the state religion, and, once again, Sinhalese remained the only recognised state language. In addition, the name of the country was changed from Ceylon to Sri Lanka which meant "resplendent island" in Sinhalese. By this time, dominance by the majority in the country penetrated all aspects of civil life, thereby invoking a sense of Tamil nationalism among the threatened minority. The weak provisions of the new Constitution ensured the state's failure in protecting or defending the Tamil minority in any manner whatsoever. The organised Tamil reaction to this came in the form of four Tamil political groups uniting under the Tamil United Front (TUF). It observed May 22, the day the new Constitution was formed, as a day of mourning and, in the next few months, called for a campaign of political action against the government. In May 1973, the TUF officially decided to push for an independent Tamil state, to be known as Tamil Eelam.[5]

While the Tamil youth were increasingly frustrated due to unemployment and educational restrictions, the Tamil politicians' inability to address these issues with the government made matters worse. Eventually, what this resulted in was the creation of many underground violent gangs of youngsters who were radical and politically motivated. Most of these groups dissolved rather quickly, but there were five prominent organisations that lasted for a couple of years:

- Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) in 1974.
- Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS) in 1975.
- Tamil Students League, formerly part of the TUF, changed to the Tamil New Tigers (TNT) in 1973-74 after becoming more radical. Its leader was arrested in 1975 and thereafter the organisation came under the sway of Vellupillai Prabhakaran, who changed its name to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in 1976.
- People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE or PLOT) in 1979.
- Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) in 1980.

Marxist-Leninist ideology dominated the rhetoric of these groups. Of these five, the LTTE was the most successful and was driven by its militant nature, rather than ideology. The ethnic tensions and violence throughout the 1970s and early 1980s led to the displacement of Tamils who at one time lived among the Sinhalese. The Tamil population, thus, became geographically concentrated in the north and this helped increase the membership of the LTTE exponentially. What further helped mobilise the Tamilians under the cause of the LTTE was the charismatic leadership of Prabhakaran.[6]

Growth of LTTE Amidst Ethnic Tensions

When he took over the TNT, Prabhakaran was a young boy of 18, with a powerful vision, clear foresight and cult leadership. From a very young age, he was interested in political activism and was known to have a strained relationship with his family. He has revealed in interviews that his childhood was filled with thoughts about freedom and struggle, along with fascination for power and dynamic characters. Within the TNT itself, Prabhakaran rose to prominence after he murdered the Mayor of Jaffna, Alfred Duraiappa, who was considered a traitor for his lack of support to the secessionist movement, in 1975. The following year, he led a bank robbery and eventually took over the group and changed its name to LTTE. The group set up training camps and soon started carrying out several attacks in the city of Jaffna against the

police network. The success of the LTTE's assassination campaigns and attacks attracted a significant number of Tamil youth to Prabhakaran's cause.[7]

By the second half of 1977, anti-Tamil riots broke out in the north and the Jaffna peninsula, killing and displacing several Tamils. By 1979, the government became more authoritarian and passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), giving the army and police extensive authority to detain and hold prisoners. This led to rampant arrests of Tamils as the authorities abused their powers. By 1981, the violence intensified and conflicts with the LTTE led to significant loss of lives among police personnel too. This, in turn, led to civilians retaliating against the Tamils, and looting and destroying Tamil property.[8]

In the next two years, by 1983, what came to be known as the "July Holocaust" by Prabhakaran led to escalation of violence on both sides. This started with the LTTE's ambush of an army patrol in Jaffna, killing 13 soldiers. Approximately 2,000 Tamils were killed brutally, either hung or hacked or burned alive. What was even more alarming was the 1,75,000 Tamils who were displaced by the violence. The anti-Tamil gangs clearly enjoyed a high degree of complicity of the government. Further, in the same year, the Sixth Amendment was passed which required all parliamentarians to swear allegiance to Sri Lanka, condemning any form of separatism. This led the TUF to withdraw from the Parliament, closing all political options of reconciliation and dialogue.[9]

With a lot of reluctance, Prabhakaran joined the other Tamil resistance groups in 1985 to hold talks with the Sri Lankan government in Bhutan. However, the talks quickly broke down and the LTTE came out with its own version of Eelam. This version was more brutal than before and now targeted not only the Sinhala dominated Sri Lankan government, but also political and military rivals within the Tamil community. Soon after , LTTE militants murdered 127 Sinhalese riders travelling in three buses, and detonated a bomb in Colombo, killing 113 people in 1987. These brutal incidents established the personal vision of Tamil Eelam as viewed by Prabhakaran, as a reality. It came to be

considered as the most dangerous group in the Tamil insurgency as it did not just fight the Sinhalese opponents but also people from its own community who were rivals. The willingness of the group to use such violence against members of its own ethnic community demonstrated an extraordinary degree of ruthlessness and discipline, characteristics that could be traced back to Prabhakaran himself.[10]

In the next few years, India got involved in the ethnic conflict in response to the Sri Lankan armed forces' launch of Operation Liberation, a campaign to reassert governmental control in Tamil lands. This was viewed by the then Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, as a brutal operation suppressing the Tamil independence movement. Indian intervention in the late 1980s, thus, yielded safe havens, weapons and financial support for the Tamil fighters. This was seen by the Sri Lankan government as direct assistance and support by the Indian government towards the Tamil rebels. Subsequently, following the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord in July 1987, wherein the Sri Lankan government made a number of concessions to the Tamil demands, India sent in the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) to establish order in the north and east of Sri Lanka. A large number of Tamil civilians were favourably disposed towards the IPKF as they hoped for the conflict to end. While the IPKF managed to wrest the northern town of Jaffna from the LTTE and successfully disarmed most Tamil militant groups, the LTTE refused to disarm and instead began aggressively targeting the IPKF. However, with the IPKF suffering several losses and with nationalist sentiments brewing in Sri Lanka, there was pressure on the IPKF to leave the island. Subsequently, with the change in government in India and with VP Singh becoming the new prime minister, the IPKF withdrew from Sri Lanka in March 1990. However, the LTTE held deep-rooted sentiments against the Indian state and specifically against Rajiv Gandhi. This became evident with the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 by a female Black Tiger, in the most extraordinary assassination ever carried out in Indian history.[11]

Rajiv Gandhi's assassination was a catastrophic incident which scarred the bilateral ties between India and Sri Lanka and is remembered by India till date. Suicide bombing was once again tactfully used by the

Black Tigers in order to assassinate a political target with high levels of security surrounding him. Dhanu, a young girl in her late twenties, was responsible for the operation on May 21, 1991, as she approached the prime minister with a garland and a concealed girdle of grenades under her gown. The explosion instantly killed her and Rajiv Gandhi, proving to be a strategic victory for the Tamil Tigers. This was also the first suicide attack which was executed with the help of a suicide belt. The assassination was planned in anticipation of any future win by the Congress in elections in India, which could lead to the return of the IPKF to Sri Lanka, which the Tamil Tigers were opposed to.[12]

Apart from this, there were several other political assassinations that the LTTE carried out. A suicide bomber managed to kill Vice Adm. Clancy Fernando of the Sri Lankan Navy in 1992; further, in 1993, in another bold mission, President Premadasa was murdered, making the LTTE the second[13] organisation in the world to kill a sitting head of state in a suicide attack. This attack was unique as it portrayed the LTTE's dedication and patience in order to carry out its mission. The Tiger who assassinated President Premadasa had infiltrated the president's close circle, becoming a member of his personal staff for approximately two years prior to undertaking the mission. Along with the president, 23 other people died, thus, underlining the relevance of suicide bombing for political assassinations which became a common aspect of the struggle for Eelam by the LTTE. Civilians were never targeted by these attacks, however, there would most often be collateral damage. The other destructive attacks employed by the LTTE, apart from political assassinations, were targeted against symbols of the Sri Lankan state such as defence bases, central banks or convoys of military personnel. Suicide attackers were also used by the LTTE in its ongoing campaign against Tamil rivals.[14]

Functioning of the LTTE

Apart from all the militant activities that the LTTE carried out, a major aspect of the organisation was the manner in which it raised money through publicity and propaganda, as well as its military procurement strategies. The LTTE existed pretty much as a proto-state. It had set

up a parallel civil administration within the lands it occupied, with structures such as a police force, law courts, postal services, banks, administrative offices, television and radio broadcasting stations, etc. The territory that it occupied mainly comprised the north and east of Sri Lanka while the operational command was spread across three theatres—northern, eastern and southern[15] (see Fig 4.1).

Much prior to its inception and the insurgencies in the 1970s, Sri Lanka had an active criminal world wherein the LTTE came to have its roots. 'Taxation' was a traditional source of income for the Tigers— money was extorted from civilians and revenues came from businesses. The Tigers ran protection rackets (for protection money), and decided which businesses could operate in their 'territory', brutally enforcing their rule over residents and potential rivals alike. According to some sources, families were forced to pay the LTTE Sri Lankan Rupees 10,000 (approximately Indian Rupees 5,000) and one family member was to be spared to serve the LTTE . Further, those who wanted to leave the group, required an exit visa which amounted to another Sri Lankan Rupees 10,000 and a replacement who could be a standby for the vacated post. Families that were well off or had relatives living abroad were taxed higher amounts of money. Property was also confiscated and further, the occupation of Jaffna peninsula enabled the LTTE to collect smuggled goods as well as maintain an enhanced shipping network.[16]

The public outreach of the LTTE was so widespread and appealing that it was believed to have cells located in at least 54 countries, which generated a majority of the financial support. These included countries such as Switzerland, Canada, Australia, the UK, US and the Scandinavian countries. The role of these cells was to carry out propaganda, and organise the procurement and movement of weapons, besides raising funds from the Tamil Diaspora.[17] Further, the British Refugee Council reported on extortion within the Tamil community, indicating that Tamil refugees in Germany and other European nations were required to pay about US$ 60 a month.[18]

The LTTE also had a very capable marine wing which had a state-of-the-art boatyard with a wide variety of boats, including a mini-submarine. The ships would frequently visit countries such as Japan, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, South Africa, Burma, Turkey, France, Italy and Ukraine, scouting for arms. This, perhaps, was how the group came to be in possession of some of the most advanced arms and ammunition. Further, the LTTE used its naval fleet for drug running to Europe, particularly moving heroin from Southeast to Southwest Asia as well as through the Soviet Union. The extent to which the LTTE relied on narcotics trafficking was evident with the 200 Tamil drug runners who were arrested around the world by 1985. According to a report, the Tamils were moving over 1,000 kg of heroin a year, with much of the profit going to the LTTE.[19]

Fig 4.1: Map of Sri Lanka Indicating Territories During LTTE Control

Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6e/Extent_of_territorial_control_in_sri_lanka.png

LTTE and Suicide Terrorism

The LTTE comprised a differentiated special operations capability, with attack units that included the Sea Tigers (naval wing), Air Tigers (air wing), Baby Brigade (child soldiers), Leopold Brigade (orphaned children), Freedom Birds (female unit), Internet Black Tigers (the first cyber terrorist group), and the most elite group of all, the Black Tigers. The Black Tigers were the suicide squad of the LTTE and were known for their cult-like fanaticism. They were seen as the most noble and glorified members of the LTTE and enjoyed a great sense of pride and honour, one of the most important drivers of the organisation. Prabhakaran managed to instil a profound sense of pride in the Black Tigers for being freedom fighters, directing their belief in the struggle for Eelam in such a manner that they would not accept the terrorist label.[20]

The most dramatic symbol of this dedication was the use of potassium cyanide which LTTE cadres were required to carry with them after joining the group. This was introduced in 1984 as Prabhakaran was influenced by a Tamil youth Sivakumaran who swallowed a cyanide pill, poisoning himself to death before submitting to arrest in the early 1970s. This made the group distinctly unique in portraying the recruit's willingness to die rather than betray the organisation or its leader. The added advantage that cyanide had was group security in the long run as no information would be passed on to the Sri Lankan authorities by captured members. By July 1988, over 200 Tamils were known to have become 'martyrs' due to cyanide. What was most extraordinary about the Rajiv Gandhi assassination was not the death of one Black Tiger who killed herself while targeting Gandhi, but further, nine other people involved in the planning who killed themselves in order to avoid being captured after the assassination.[21]

The first suicide attack of the LTTE was the most significant because of the symbolic value that it held. As part of Operation Liberation, the Sri Lankan armed forces had captured a school building which was on Tamil territory, converting it into a temporary military base. On July 5, 1987, the Tamil Tigers launched a mission to retake it, despite the insurmountable challenges that they would have to face. In what

is considered a landmark incident by the LTTE, a young member of the Black Tigers, Vallipurum Vasanthan, volunteered for the operation and agreed to drive a vehicular bomb into the core of the Sri Lankan forces located in the school premises. He is remembered by the name Captain Miller, and was made to drive a truck packed with explosives. He was tied to the steering wheel and accelerator to ensure that he did not back out from the operation at any point. The explosion on the truck ramming into the main building, caused approximately 20-40 Sri Lankan casualties, along with 20 others who were severely injured. The entire mission was videotaped by LTTE members for recruitment and propaganda purposes. Miller was posthumously promoted to the rank of captain, and is remembered as one of the most respected and revered martyrs within the LTTE. In fact, his face became the insignia for the Black Tigers, and July 5 was declared a holiday known as Black Tigers Day. As a mark of respect to Captain Miller, on the fifteenth anniversary of the attack, the LTTE unveiled a statue in his memory , flashing a victory sign with his right hand, near the site of the remains of the school building.[22]

The success of Tiger operations such as these was a result of the systematic effort on Prabhakaran's part to intensify discipline, dedication and commitment in order to prepare the group for the pursuit of Tamil Eelam. His vision of Eelam as a secular entity contributed largely to this as Prabhakaran took pains to emphasise that the LTTE was not a religion, so as to not offend the sensibilities of the different religious traditions represented through its membership and also to serve as a contrast to the Buddhist chauvinism of the Sri Lankan forces.[23] Prabhakaran managed to obtain the willingness of his followers to die, even to kill themselves, and turned it into social capital that held the organisation together. He further managed to create camaraderie and belongingness within the LTTE community through holidays and rituals. Black Tigers Day in honour of Captain Miller was celebrated every year in commemoration of his sacrifice and martyrdom. The LTTE even turned the graves of its 'martyrs' into shrines for the secular ones, establishing an ongoing presence

of the dead among them. Thus, the LTTE always offered symbolic immortality to its martyrs, not only to honour and remember them, but also for them to pose as symbols of influence for the existing Black Tigers, thereby supplanting tradition and custom in the treatment and remembrance of the dead.[24]

The tradition of militancy, thus, took precedence in the LTTE, serving the role of traditional religion. For the LTTE members, martyrdom held many of the same rewards as it did for members of other faiths, which gave them respect and meaning in this life, remembrance in the aftermath and even some form of immortality. Suicide terrorism, therefore, became increasingly self-reinforcing, with more attackers inspired by Captain Miller and the use of cyanide, legitimising the cause and further reinstating discipline within the group. Suicide terrorism was, thus, only the result of intensification of the trend of unwavering commitment and discipline within the group. It was also unique in the sense that it reinforced the political power of a single individual—the group's leader—rather than a political or religious cause.

Although the size of the Black Tiger unit was kept a secret, its membership was definitely a privilege. Committed and determined cadres of the LTTE constantly competed with one another for membership of the Black Tigers. The training of the Black Tigers was intense and their indoctrination was deep, strengthening the reliability of their operations. The cadre came to be known as an elite group and on joining, the Tigers would fight amongst themselves for positions of further prestige. The mindset of the LTTE cadres, especially those part of the Black Tigers became so strongly rooted, that they admitted fearing the loss of Prabhakaran's faith, rather than death. The LTTE also made extensive use of female suicide bombers called the 'Black Tigresses' and later, the 'Freedom Birds'. It can be said that the numerical advantage that the Sri Lankan forces had over the Black Tigers was also a factor that led to the use of suicide terrorism by the group as a force multiplier component.[25]

An Assessment of LTTE Strategy through Suicide Terrorism

It can be seen that what drove the LTTE towards its missions and militant ideology was the centralising power that Prabhakaran exerted, personifying the cause for his followers. He left no successor after him, which is perhaps the reason behind the group officially ceasing to exist post his death in 2009, and the movement collapsing. Further, the funds collected by this organisation internationally and through various activities had been an immense contributor to the strength and capacity of its forces. This was possible through the wide sympathy and support that the organisation managed to garner for the plight of the Sri Lankan Tamils from Tamils across the world. Having said that, however, there are also traces of evidence that suggest that the LTTE garnered the support of the masses through persecution rather than persuasion and was also responsible for a lot of deaths among Tamilians as well.

Despite this, the willingness to die within the LTTE predominantly came from the reward in its aftermath, in the form of pride and honour which was solely established by Prabhakaran slowly and methodically. It is interesting to note that the psychological implications of suicide terrorism were not directed towards the target audience. In essence, Prabhakaran realised the advantage that suicide attacks have for political assassinations and, thus, employed the tactic in order to eliminate certain eminent leaders or actors who came in the way of the movement. The act of suicide was not intended to create any psychological fear although it did, of course, have that impact, only adding value to the cause. Suicide terrorism was one of many tactical weapons used by the LTTE as its effectiveness in assassination operations, targeting of military installations and undermining the political system proved it to be the ideal tool for the situation. However, there was a dramatic decrease in the number of suicide attacks by the LTTE after 2000, which may have been because the benefits of the tactic had been exploited to the full.

The LTTE was also known to have been conscious of its international image and was not interested in being placed in the

same category as organisations such as Al Qaeda. Thus, prestige and honour came as a direct result of protecting the homeland and fighting for the community's cause. Not only did Prabhakaran manage to use political mobilisation strategically for the LTTE's operations, but a general community of support within the Tamil homeland added to the legitimacy of the cause.

Al Qaeda

Al Qaeda defined the global *jihadist* movement, posing the biggest threat to the world's superpower, the United States of America. It shall remain one of the deadliest organisations of the world, responsible for carrying out what was dubbed "the most spectacular terrorist act in history" as well as "an act of mass casualty super-terrorism".[26] Al Qaeda's evolution from a structured terrorist organisation into an ideology-based movement presents a complex counter-terrorism challenge. The group created a disaggregated entity that is more difficult to predict and preempt. While its physical presence was diversely spread across the world, its ideological presence had no boundaries whatsoever and connected its sympathisers in a stronger manner than seen before. While terrorist attacks may be fundamental to the existence of a group, it is the psychological belief and morale that is required to sustain the organisation in the long run. Al Qaeda did exactly that. Further, Al Qaeda is known to have been responsible for 95 percent of the world's suicide bombings.[27] Thus, this willingness to kill and die prevalent among its members is something that has been created in their minds through an ideology manifested throughout the world. Al Qaeda was not only a terrorist organisation, but a full-fledged ideological movement, with a worldview and a vision.

Origin and Growth

The Afghanistan and Pakistan region is recognised as the "epicentre of terrorism".[28] While terrorist organisations today seem to be more transnational in nature, spread widely across various regions of the world, it is specific regions that provide the foundation of such

organisations and play a major role in their germination. The Soviet invasion in 1979 brought multiple challenges for Afghanistan and the region as a whole. Developments in the 1980s following the Soviet invasion provided fodder for one of the world's most lethal terrorist organisations, Al Qaeda.

The USSR, in its attempt to shore up the newly-established pro-Soviet regime in Kabul, was also looking to further its interest in Gulf oil, buoyed by the Cold War dynamics prevalent then. The government in Kabul drew a lot of resentment from the locals for forcing an invasion by the Soviets for its protection. As part of efforts to contain the spread of Communism and to oppose the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, the US injected huge funds and weapons into Afghanistan in support of local resistance movements, organised to fight against the Soviets. The Afghans' interest in this was to fight against the foreigners occupying their land, while America's interest lay in containment of Communism, its primary agenda at the time. These were Afghans who were fighting on nationalist and ethnocentric lines. However, with the US alliance with Pakistan under Gen Zia ul Haq, the movement gained a religious momentum as well.[29]

At this point, it would be crucial to mention the key influential actors who played a major role in the Afghan arena. Afghanistan saw massive migration during the Soviet invasion. The migrants were from nearby lands who felt for the cause of the Afghan struggle. Two key people who also travelled to Afghanistan for the same reasons were Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam. Bin Laden came from a wealthy family, but his mother had been ostracised from the family, leading to him undergoing discrimination throughout his childhood. He attended university in Jeddah and eventually went on to become the leader of the terrorist organisation, Al Qaeda. Significantly, Abdullah Azzam, a radical Islamist professor, played a crucial role in influencing the political ideology of Osama bin Laden, the creator of Al Qaeda. Their first interaction was at King Abdul Aziz University, Jeddah, where Azzam was a radical Islamist professor and Bin Laden had been working towards a business degree. While Azzam went on to

join the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, he met Ayman al-Zawahiri, a founding father of the Islamic Jihad of Egypt, who later would become Bin Laden's deputy.[30]

During the Soviet invasion, Azzam was brought into Afghanistan by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to serve its agenda. His work and interpretation of ongoing events in Islamic terms, along with the support of his student and companion, Osama bin Laden, led them to create the Maktab Al Khidamat (MAK), with Azzam as its leader. The MAK was set up to assist a large number of foreign fighters arriving in Afghanistan to wage a war, providing them with food and other amenities.[31] Azzam was instrumental in assigning the task that was required of Bin Laden as well as all Muslims in their holy war or *jihad* against the godless Soviet invaders, in order to defend the Muslim state of Afghanistan. Thus, the MAK Services Office in Peshawar, Pakistan, was an international recruitment network, advertising all over the Arab world for young Muslims to fight the *jihad* in Afghanistan. Further, the United States also oversaw the recruitment efforts and eventually over 10,000 fighters or *mujahideen* were inducted.[32] It was through this recruitment mechanism that some of the most deadly terrorists came up, including Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, who would go on to become the leader of the Al Qaeda faction in Iraq (AQI), which eventually became the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014.[33]

Azzam and Bin Laden, along with the Pakistani ISI's involvement and Gen Zia ul-Haq's outlook, funded by both American and Saudi money for different reasons, all contributed to factors that enabled the conflict in Afghanistan to become much more widespread than it was perceived. Azzam was the renowned and learned scholar, while Bin Laden was a young man with access to funds owing to his reputed and wealthy family background as well as donors in West Asia.

Osama bin Laden's involvement in the Afghan *jihad* led to various experiences and interactions that were transformational for him as a leader. He generously contributed to the *mujahideen* movement, using his own funds and, through his rhetoric, would inspire followers who eventually came to adulate him. Eventually, the Soviets left

Afghanistan in 1989 and this encouraged Osama bin Laden and his associates to believe that such a victory would not have been possible had God not been on their side. With this triumph, Bin Laden and his followers were keen on pursuing *jihad* on a global framework, thus, seeking to help all Muslim resistance movements, including in Algeria, Angola, Bosnia, Chechnya, Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan. By defeating a superpower, the *mujahideen* felt it appropriate to assume the role of protector of the Islamic world as a whole, defending it from all the challenges of modernisation and globalisation. This was also because the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan came to be perceived by most in the Arab world, as an invasion of the Islamic community, regardless of nationality, inadvertently laying the groundwork for a broader form of pan-Islamist ideology.[34]

However, Azzam was of the opinion that all efforts must be focussed on building Afghanistan into a model Islamic state. This developed tensions between the two, leading to an eventual split in 1988, and soon after, Azzam died in a mysterious car bomb explosion. Thus, Bin Laden inherited the organisation, becoming the undisputed leader of the movement. In spite of his close ties with the royal family of Saudi Arabia, on learning that the United States has a military base on Saudi soil owing to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the 1990s, Bin Laden immediately lost faith in the royal family. He felt that the Saudi government had been sold out to the "infidel Americans". This led him to rise against the king, denouncing him as an infidel too, as a result of which Bin Laden was put under house arrest, from where he escaped and fled to Sudan. It was in Sudan that he connived several anti-Saudi and anti-US plans and operations. Thus, his target and enemy had switched from the erstwhile superpower, the Soviet Union, to the current superpower, the United States of America.[35]

Operating in hiding against all infidels, Bin Laden finally declared a 30-page-long *fatwa* titled "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places" which spoke of expelling the American military from Arab soil. The document spoke of a

Zionist-Crusader alliance, that is, the United States of America, along with Israel, which had been perpetuating injustice against Muslims the world over, at the expense of their blood. The document used instances of oppression and malpractices against fellow Muslims in countries such as Palestine and Iraq, as well as Tajikistan, Burma, Kashmir, Philippines, Somalia, Chechnya and Bosnia-Herzegovina.[36] In this manner, Bin Laden managed to justify defensive *jihad*, which is also the fourth form of *jihad*, in this *fatwa*. This fourth form of *jihad* is also known as *jihad* of the sword as it obliges Muslims to resort to the sword against those who have taken up arms against them.[37] Thus, Bin Laden wanted to remind all Muslims of the atrocities their community had suffered from at the hands of the Zionist and Crusader states, thereby urging Muslims to take up the responsibility to fight and become *jihadis* themselves.[38]

Following this, another major declaration was made which was more pernicious than the previous one. This was the "Declaration of the World Islamic Front for *Jihad* against the Jews and Crusaders" wherein the definition of the enemy had dynamically changed. This *fatwa* declared each and every American—civilian and military—as the enemy, to be killed wherever found. The enemy was no longer a particular establishment or state, but all individuals seen to be supporting anti-Muslim US policies.[39] The US presence in Saudi Arabia, the Israel-Palestine War, the growing US influence on various Middle East regimes were all considered a challenge by Al Qaeda and its objective, thus, clearly was anti-West or anti-US and the need to secure the sanctity of the Islamic world and the land of the Muslims at any cost. In the process, it also planned to target governments in West Asia which, it felt, had the propensity to fall prey to Western influence.[40]

While these *fatwas* would be issued by Osama bin Laden and his aides, the message in each would be clear: this is Allah's message and not ours. Thus, it is God on whose behalf Bin Laden speaks, and with authority. Perhaps that was why the *fatwas* appealed to most Muslims across the world. In the meantime, Bin Laden's vision was only reinforced by his triumphs against the ultimate enemy, the US. These were in the

form of the World Trade Centre bombing in 1993; the bombing of the US military residence, the Khobar Towers, in Dahran, Saudi Arabia, in 1996; the coordinated twin city bombings of the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the forced withdrawal of the US from Somalia in 1998; the attack on the USS *Cole* in Yemen in 2000 and, of course, the most spectacular attack in the history of terrorist events, 9/11 in New York in 2001. Each of these events helped bolster the Al Qaeda cause and encourage its followers more than ever. As Martha Crenshaw rightly claims, the execution of successful operations helps build morale within a group and demonstrates to potential converts that the organisation is operationally dynamic.[41]

Ideology and Propaganda

The movement of "global *jihadism*", as Jeffrey Lewis puts it, continued gaining momentum. According to Lewis, this is a movement wherein the global *jihadi* designates a member of an extremely small minority of Sunni Muslims that uses violence to promote a religious agenda dedicated to combating the influence of Western political and economic structure in the Muslim world. The idea originated much prior to Al Qaeda's existence, in the 1950s and 1960s, with the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, especially Sayyed Qutb. Qutb was a key intellectual figure in the Muslim Brotherhood and had a major influence on Al Qaeda's Egyptian hard core. He provided the theoretical underpinnings for "violent Muslim resistance to regimes that claim to be Muslim, but whose implementation of Islamic precepts is judged to be imperfect".[42] Even Abdullah Azzam was known to have been exposed to, and absorbed, the ideology of Qutb, while pursuing his doctorate in Cairo. It is key influencers such as these who are extremely crucial for one's understanding of the ideology that Al Qaeda stood for, led by Bin Laden's messianic vision.[43]

It would certainly not be an exaggeration to say that ideology was the sole driver of Al Qaeda. As can be seen from the way the organisation grew, people's faith in a particular cause drew them closer

to acting upon it. Scholars such as Azzam understood the importance of ideologues in battle and further realised that people will not fight for territory or treasury alone but will have to believe in the righteousness of their cause. This is how he led Bin Laden to justify the ultimate goal of *jihad*, providing not only a rationale but an incumbent obligation on Muslims all over the world to join the battle for Allah against the infidels. He not only tried to prove through his scholarly work that Muslims had been humiliated and cornered at the hands of "impure Western regimes" but also managed to urge action in defence of the same. These features are evident in the vision that Bin Laden envisaged for Al Qaeda through his *fatwas* and the activities that he carried out.

Moreover, Al Qaeda's ideology, right from its inception, has been increasingly internationalist, contextualising local conflicts as part of a broader global struggle. It has been widely agreed that Al Qaeda follows *salafi-jihadism*, which is an approach to *jihadism* coupled with an adherence to *salafism*.

Jihadism is driven by the idea of *jihad* or religiously sanctioned warfare, incumbent upon all Muslims as part of their individual obligation, imitating the Muslim tradition from the pre-modern era. According to *jihadism*, the leaders of the Muslim world in the modern world are illegitimate and do not command the authority to ordain justified violence. Thus, due to the absence of such an authority, *jihadism* urges every able-bodied Muslims to take up the mantle of *jihad*.[44]

Further, *salafism* is the idea that the most authentic and true Islam is found in the living example of the early, righteous generations of Muslims, known as the *Salaf*, who were closest in both time and proximity to the Prophet Muhammad.[45] They believe in the sanctity of the text and are known for trying to imitate the particular habits of the first Muslims.

Salafi-jihadism can, therefore, as Gilles Kepel put it, be described as respect for the sacred texts in their most literal form, accompanied with an absolute commitment to *jihad*.[46]

Thus, the followers of Al Qaeda were proponents of *salafi-jihadism* and the themes used by the terror organisation would resonate with millions of people across the Muslim world, who had anyway been

seeking coherent, unified explanations for the suffering in areas of conflict, as well as a way of personal and political transformation.[47] It is this very connection that Al Qaeda managed to make with a large cross-section of the Muslim community that enabled it to spread across territorial borders, making it a global movement. Most of the credit for this also goes to the manner in which the campaign was propagated.

Al Qaeda was one of the first terrorist organisations to have established such a wide reach using the electronic media, or the internet. This electronic presence of the group served as an enabler of recruitment, penetrating deep into Muslim communities around the world. Further, the electronic media was also used to glorify certain terrorist attacks and also to warn of greater violence and destruction likely to take place. The group has used this medium remarkably in the realm of planning, mobilisation, communication, fund raising and, of course, recruitment. The group has also used videos portraying voice messages from Bin Laden or even recorded footage of impressive terrorist attacks which were then either broadcast on the group's own media channels or even the international media. Al Qaeda also maintained several propaganda and training manuals which performed the dual role of instructing terrorists and spreading the worldview of the terror outfit, along with justification for the violence. Thus, it would be best to understand Al Qaeda's propaganda mechanism in Gabriel Weimann's words, "Al Qaeda combines multimedia propaganda and advance communication technologies to create a very sophisticated form of psychological warfare".[48]

Financial Support

According to a CIA report, Al Qaeda's financial requirements before the September 11, 2001, attacks amounted to US$ 30 million annually.[49]Al Qaeda as an organisation did not exist in one particular region, as Osama bin Laden and his close aides, forming the top core of Al Qaeda, shifted sanctuary from time to time, depending on the circumstances. In addition, the group consisted of veteran combatants

who had received training in Afghanistan, but served in dozens of countries around the world. Apart from this composition, there was a large number of fresh radicalised militants across the world who would then receive training and direction from the veterans, joining the *jihadist* enterprise.[50] As it was so widespread, effective methods of communication and travel were important for the organisation. Thus, all of this required a substantial amount of money to sustain the organisation's living costs as well as training and development for its various activities.

The largest financial contribution that the organisation received was from its core fund raisers tasked to solicit money in the form of donations. These donors were mostly in the Gulf area, specifically Saudi Arabia. While some of the donors would be aware of the final destination of these funds, others would not. Charity is one of the fundamental principles of the Islamic religion. During the month of Ramadan, mosques usually raise *zakat* (obligatory almsgiving which is 2.5 percent of savings annually), a significant portion of which would be diverted to support the cause of radical Islam. Apart from *zakat*, Islamic traditions also advocate *sadaqah* (voluntary contributions) to the most needy. Thus, most Muslims pay such donations and Al Qaeda managed to infiltrate employees in charities to divert this money to serve its purpose. Further, Al Qaeda has also used charitable organisations to disseminate and preach the most radical forms of Islamic fundamentalism.[51]

Al Qaeda also indulged in the use of fictitious companies and offshore fiduciary companies to shield the identity of individuals or entities taking part in terrorist financing. These were companies, funds, entities or businesses that were registered in an extra-territorial financial centre. One example is Barakaat, a network of companies which, in 2001, had a foothold in 40 countries operating its telecommunications, construction, money remittance and cash exchange services from the United States to Somalia.[52]

There has been clear evidence to show that a lot of the money came to Al Qaeda through drug trafficking and other criminal

activities. In January 2010, a Drug Enforcement Administration official revealed that Al Qaeda groups in West Africa were charging protection fees from cocaine drug-trafficking groups affiliated with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is also known to have obtained money from kidnapping ransoms.[53]

The group used cyber networks extensively. They maintained websites that openly solicited money and resources, posing as legitimate charities and organisations. They, thus, engaged in online fraud, identity theft and other internet crimes in order to collect funds for their activities. Opening offices in countries like Pakistan where the government crackdown on Islamic fundamentalist activities was less, allowed these charities to operate with ease. The transfer of funds took place through *hawala*, a form of transporting financial obligations from one place to another without the physical movement of money and often without a paper trail. *Hawala* operations are often run by extensive family networks based on regional and tribal connections among those who use it. Thus, the security, anonymity and versatility of *hawala* operations have attracted illegal organisations such as Al Qaeda to misuse them.[54]

Al Qaeda and Suicide Terrorism

While Al Qaeda owes its mass support to ideology, a cult of martyrdom has been found to be at the heart of it. Fighters or *jihadis* joining Al Qaeda have showed an inherent willingness to sacrifice their lives for Islam. The prospect of a glorious afterlife post death also promised individual self-fulfilment to prospective members of the community.[55] While 'martyrdom' operations have been known to be a subset of terror outfits, Al Qaeda and its affiliates contained within their core ideology, the spirit of martyrdom and its glorification. *Jihad*, in their terms, was seen as the path of struggle for Islam wherein death was inevitable at an eventual stage. It is this belief in martyrdom and glorification, ending with self-sacrifice, that brought young Muslims together, generating a sense of camaraderie and togetherness in the pursuit of the "holy path".

It is suspected that the employment of suicide bombing by Palestinian Islamists has played a role in influencing groups such as Al Qaeda and Hezbollah. The simultaneous attacks on US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, demonstrated the suicide bombing capabilities of Al Qaeda. This generated a US response with a counter-productive cruise missile strike directed against militant training camps in Afghanistan, and further raised the stature of Bin Laden in the eyes of the Taliban. The USS *Cole* attack in Yemen, in 2000, portrayed Bin Laden's symbolic leadership of the *jihadi* movement. This was, of course, displayed to the entire world in the September 11 New York attacks in 2001.[56] The 9/11 attacks were meant to not only signal to the world what Al Qaeda was capable of, but further to attract militants seeking empowerment. As Martha Crenshaw states, "Efficacy is the primary standard by which terrorism is compared with other methods of achieving political goals"[57]. In a sense, this is what the 9/11 attacks did for Al Qaeda, thereby legitimising the *jihadi* movement more generally and suicide bombing more specifically.

On September 11, 2001, a series of four coordinated attacks took the city of New York by storm, indicating a "declaration of war"[58] on the United States of America. The attacks which led to the collapse of the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre, shook all Americans and spectators across the globe, changing their perceptions of terrorism, and becoming the worst suicide bombing in human history. The ease with which the hijackers managed to thwart screening processes to smuggle sharp blades into the aircraft and circumvent intelligence and security monitoring, led to one of the most dramatic overhauls ever in the US security infrastructure and the field of aviation security the world over. Al Qaeda was furthermore, instrumental in mastering the use of suicide terrorism, drawing attention from foreign fighters as well. One such significant contingent comprised the Moroccan radicals who travelled to Iraq after the US-led invasion. The simultaneous series of their attacks of 2003 and 2007 were indicators of Al Qaeda's role in guiding them with the relevant technical knowhow.[59]

At the same time, with the destruction of Al Qaeda's central command in Afghanistan towards the end of 2001, veterans of its Afghan network began to return to Saudi Arabia. Moreover, Israel's actions and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, along with Saudi security forces' efforts to crush the militants, only increased hostilities in the Arabian Peninsula. The attacks of Al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula were organised and executed locally, but the influence of Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda hierarchy regrouping in Pakistan was undeniable.[60] Most of the fighters were citizens of Saudi Arabia, had experience fighting on behalf of Al Qaeda elsewhere, and still considered themselves to be part of Bin Laden's movement.[61] Eventually, the AQAP reestablished itself in Yemen, after a significant number of militants were captured.

Between 2003 and 2009, Iraq witnessed more than 1,286 suicide bombings.[62] Al Qaeda's presence in this region was dominated by Abu Musab al Zarqawi, a Jordanian who travelled to Afghanistan to participate in the struggle against the Soviets in Afghanistan. His formal allegiance to Al Qaeda once again transformed his coalition into Al Qaeda's Iraq-based franchise (AQI) in 2004. Zarqawi was a hardline Sunni, who felt the need to carry out attacks against the Shiite community of Muslims, much to the disagreement of Bin Laden. Therefore, the *jihadis* in Iraq escalated sectarian tension, leading to a civil war between Iraq's Sunnis and Shiites, using suicide bombing. As more and more Muslims were targeted as a result of suicide attacks carried out by AQI under Zarqawi, the image of global *jihad* deteriorated internationally. This faction of Al Qaeda eventually comprised the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, formally splitting from Al Qaeda in 2014.

Al Qaeda Strategy through Suicide Terrorism

After the death of Osama Bin Laden in 2011 in a US operation, Ayman al Zawahiri inherited Al Qaeda as its leader. However, his personality and aura could never match up to his predecessor's. This was perhaps why Al Qaeda became less relevant, with a declining capability to undertake terrorist attacks thereafter. Another reason could be the proactive US crackdown on Al Qaeda as well as its stringent counter-

terror measures that proved to be effective. Most of the *jihadis* who felt frustrated with Al Qaeda and were inclined towards Zarqawi's strand of *jihad* joined the Islamic State (IS) subsequently . It is a known fact, however, that the sleeper cells of Al Qaeda are still very much present.[63]

Al Qaeda is the biggest proof of the fact that when violence is justified through an ideology, counter-violence can never be the ultimate solution. Al Qaeda is, thus, a classic example of an organisation wherein suicide attacks not only formed part of the strategic objective for the organisation but also emerged as a phenomenon that terrorists aspired to participate in. This was possible only because of the deep-rooted religious ideology prevalent in the community that it appealed to. Further, the ideology was not solely based on a particular thought or idea but was systematically emphasised, using old texts and scriptures, creating a step-by-step justification of the rampant use of violence, making it seem all the more legitimate and convincing for entire communities to fall prey to.[64] This trend was only enhanced by the successful actions carried out by the group, further asserting its claim and worldview. What made Al Qaeda unique in the time it originated was its global approach, transcending territorial borders, local conflicts and other political struggles, merging all into one global *jihadi* movement. Al Qaeda may not actively exist today, however the ideology it has germinated in the minds of its follower community may not be diminished easily.

Suicide terrorism employed by Al Qaeda, was targeted at the world community, including civilians, in order to make them live in constant psychological fear. This psychological impact of suicide was further used for potential recruits to identify the legitimacy of, and eventually join, the organisation. Ideology was the sole connector and justifier of violence and even suicide, but these justifications found roots in religion and its misinterpretation. Apart from religion, global events and strategic shifts in the world were also misinterpreted by scholars and the top leadership with the intellect to manipulate the willingness to die. Thus, suicide terrorism was seen as a legitimate tool to spread terror and meet the larger aims of leaders like Bin Laden and many others, who played a major role in making old texts and narratives relevant in the current global state of affairs.

LTTE and Al Qaeda: Concluding Assessment in the Realm of Suicide Terrorism

The use of the tactic of suicide terrorism by both organisations served different purposes. However, one can still draw certain similarities and differences in their use.

First and foremost would be the role of the top leadership in the form of guidance and support for the survival of their respective organisations. Prabhakaran had an impressive and dominating personality and was known to draw a certain degree of respect and devotion from his followers. His strict and disciplined way of life was evident in the way that the LTTE conducted its activities, further keeping his cadres in constant fear of him and encouraging them to strive to impress him. He was a man with the promise of a separate Tamil state and the most convincing one at that, including his speeches during various rituals that the Tigers celebrated, serving as a major source of motivation for his fighters.

At the same time, Osama bin Laden was a learned man who was successful in creating a rhetoric and backing it with his wide knowledge to convince people of a certain ideology. His intellect and radical ideas came from sacred texts and scriptures which he interpreted in order to understand the world as it exists today and explain it to people. He had the ability to convince the Muslim community about the oppression that they had faced in the past and continue to face, further posing as a messenger of God's words in their eyes.

Secondly, it is pertinent to understand that people can never be mobilised without a justified reason or an issue that they feel strongly for. In the case of the Tigers, their land was under threat from the Sri Lankan government and its forces that suppressed their identity and voice in the country. Thus, the struggle for the homeland was what the Tigers strived and fought for and, therefore, called themselves a military force. In the same manner, Al Qaeda's ideology was rooted in the fact that "the holy cities have been invaded by outsiders". First, it was Afghanistan and eventually Iraq that saw intervention from the Western nations, generating wide anger at foreign occupation of

their 'homeland' . A sense of perceived alienation by a foreign occupier not only makes communities feel threatened, but alienates them to the point that they unite on the basis of this common hatred for the occupier. Seeing a common enemy is known to bring people together and act upon it, and both organisations showed clear signs of the same.

Further, the willingness to kill and also die, in the case of both the LTTE and Al Qaeda came from a sense of prestige and honour. The Tigers not only strived for membership of the Black Tiger unit but even after membership, they would constantly compete for suicide missions. This came about because of the mindset that the LTTE had created and the various symbolisms it had established for its community. The Black Tigers, post death, were seen in the same light as any military establishment looked at its martyrs. The reward in the aftermath in the form of commemoration and honour was enough for them to strive to die. The same can be said for the Al Qaeda, though the rewards it promised in the form of prestige and honour came with a sense of religious devotion and obligation to God. Those who sacrificed their lives in the path of *jihad* were said to live in paradise in their afterlife, with better prospects than in the present life.

Having said that, both LTTE and Al Qaeda had fundamental differences. The LTTE was based on the pretext of an ethnic conflict and worked towards the restoration of the ethnic entity in its perceived homeland. On the other hand, Al Qaeda turned towards religious fundamentalism and appealed to people of a certain religious faith. In doing so, the LTTE remained limited to one specific region of the world, while Al Qaeda cut across territorial boundaries and spread at an ideological level. Moreover, the LTTE never targeted civilians although a lot of civilian casualties had ensued as a result of collateral damage. Al Qaeda, however, wanted to establish psychological fear and attention to its cause through the rampant use of violence against civilians. Thus, in the strategic sense of the tactic, suicide terrorism served as a practical tool for the LTTE to carry out certain assassinations, whereas in the case of Al Qaeda, it depended on the serious psychological impact through the use of lethal weapons to create worldwide havoc and despair. It then becomes clear how suicide terrorism can be used with different

motives and result in lethal consequences. While ethnic tensions are limited to a certain area, it becomes easy to monitor the said area for any prospective terrorist activities. But when religion based ideological motivation penetrates the belief system of humans, it becomes difficult and challenging to monitor such trends and realise as to when they might be triggered into acting for a cause. Thus, studying the various ways in which suicide terrorism has been manifested through its employment by different organisations becomes increasingly important.

Notes

1. Jeffrey William Lewis, *The Business of Martyrdom: A History of Suicide Bombing* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2012), pp. 86-112.
2. Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 45-75.
3. Ibid.
4. Gamini Samaranayake, "Political Terrorism of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka", in P.R. Kumaraswamy and Ian Copland, eds., *South Asia: The Spectre of Terrorism* (New Delhi: Routledge, 2009), pp. 175-187.
5. Lewis, n. 1, p. 90.
6. Bloom, n. 2, pp. 45-75.
7. Vellupillai Prabhakaran, "How I Became a Freedom Fighter," *Tamil Nation*, April 1994. Available at http://tamilnation.co/ltte/vp/interviews/94velicham.htm. Last accessed on February 20, 2017.
8. Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism: Third Edition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), pp. 145-153.
9. Ibid.
10. Jerold M. Post, *The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from IRA to Al-Qaeda* (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 86-112.
11. Robert A. Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House Trade Paperback Edition, 2006), pp. 139-154.
12. Ibid., pp. 226-230.
13. The first was People's Will in Imperial Russia.
14. Lewis, n. 1, pp. 86-112.
15. Ibid.
16. Mackenzie Institute, "Funding Terror: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and their Criminal Activities in Canada and the Western World", Mackenzie Institute, December 25, 1995. Available at: http://mackenzieinstitute.com/funding-terror-the-liberation-tigers-of-tamil-eelam-and-their-criminal-activities-in-canada-and-the-western-world/ Last accessed on April 27, 2018.
17. South Asia Terrorism Portal Website Available at: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/terroristoutfits/Ltte.htm
18. n. 16.

19. Al Jazeera, "The History of the Tamil Tigers", *Al Jazeera*, April 28, 2009. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2008/11/20081120191158513 43.html Last accessed on May 2, 2018; and N Manoharan, "Tigers with Fins: Naval Wing of the LTTE", *IPCS*, June 1, 2005. Available at: http://www.ipcs.org/focusthemsel.php?articleNo=1757. Last accessed on May 2, 2018.
20. Lewis, n. 1, pp. 86-112.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ami Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), pp. 70-86.
25. Ibid.
26. Post, n.10, Ch. 13, p. 197.
27. Robert Spencer, "Al Qaeda Behind 95% of World's Suicide Bombings", *Jihad Watch*, January 15, 2014. Available at: https://www.jihadwatch.org/2014/01/al-qaeda-behind-95-of-worlds-suicide-bombings. Last accessed on April 23, 2018
28. Hillary Clinton's speech, available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/Af-Pak-border-is-epicentre-of-terrorism-Hillary/article16882827.eceLast accessed on February 24, 2017.
29. Al Jazeera, "Afghanistan: The Soviet Union's Vietnam", *Al Jazeera*, April 24, 2003. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2003/04/200841011384242076 0.html Last accessed on May 2, 2018.
30. Post, n.10, pp. 194-196.
31. Sebastian Gorka, "1979: Annus Horribilis – Modern Jihad Goes Global" (Book excerpt: *Defeating Jihad: The Winnable War*),The Washington Free Beacon, 2016. Available at http://freebeacon.com/culture/1979-annus-horribilis-modern-jihad-goes-global/ Last accessed on February 15, 2017.
32. 5,000 from Saudi Arabia; 3,000 from Algeria; and 2,000 from Egypt.
33. Bruce Riedel, "The 9/11 Attacks' Spiritual Father", *Brookings Op-Ed*, September 11, 2011. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-911-attacks-spiritual-father/ Last accessed on May 2, 2018.
34. Gorka, n. 31.
35. Ibid.
36. The full script of the *fatwa*, translated in English with explanations, compiled by CENGAGE. Available at http://college.cengage.com/history/primary_sources/world/two_holy_mosques.htm. Last accessed on February 17, 2017.
37. Jon MC, "Jihad – The Four Forms and the West", *The Counter Jihad Report*, November 4, 2013. Available at: https://counterjihadreport.com/tag/four-kinds-of-jihad/ Last accessed on May 5, 2018.
38. Pape, n. 11, pp. 102-125.
39. n. 36.
40. Pape, n. 11, pp. 102-125.
41. Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 4. July, 1981, pp. 379-399. Available at http://courses.kvasaheim.com/hist319a/docs/Crenshaw%201981.PDF. Last accessed on February 15, 2017.
42. Robert Irwin, "Is This the Man Who Inspired Bin Laden?", *The Guardian* (London), November 1, 2008. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/nov/01/afghanistan.terrorism. Last accessed on February 12, 2017.
43. Lewis, n. 11, pp. 193-218.

44. Rashid Dar, Shadi Hamid, "Islamism, Salafism, and Jihadism: A Primer", Brookings Institution, July 15, 2016. Available at https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/07/15/islamism-salafism-and-jihadism-a-primer/Last accessed on February 16, 2017.
45. Ibid.
46. Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2002)
47. Angel Rabasa et al., *Beyond Al Qaeda Part 1: The Global Jihadist Movement* (CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), Ch. 2, p. 12.
48. Gabriel Weimann, "How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet", United States Institute of Peace, Special Report No. 116, March 2004. Available at https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr116.pdf. Last accessed on February 19, 2017.
49. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004), *Monograph on Terrorist Financing,* Staff Report to the Commission. Washington, D C, p.19. Available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Ch2.pdf. Last accessed on February 24, 2017.
50. Juan Miguel del Cid Gomez, "A Financial Profile of the Terrorism of Al-Qaeda and its Affiliates", *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. 4, No. 4 2010. Available at: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/113/html. Last accessed on May 3, 2018.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Rachel Ehrenfeld, "Drug Trafficking, Kidnapping Fund al Qaeda", *CNN World*, May 4, 2011. Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/05/03/ehrenfeld.al.qaeda.funding/ Last accessed on May 5, 2018.
54. del Cid Gomez, n.50.
55. Lewis, n. 1, Part III, Ch. 7, p. 197.
56. Ibid., p. 198.
57. Martha Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice", in Walter Reich, *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 1998). Available at https://rampages.us/colombomj/wp-content/uploads/sites/2867/2014/10/Martha-Crenshaw-the-logic-of-terrorism.pdf. Last accessed on February 20, 2017.
58. In the words of the US President at the time, George W Bush. Full text available on *The Guardian* at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/september11.usa13. Last accessed on May 4, 2018.
59. 9/11 facts on History.com https://www.history.com/topics/9-11-attacks
60. Lewis, n. 1, pp. 193-218.
61. Thomas Hegghammer, "Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi Arabia", *Middle East Policy,* 13, No. 4, 2006, pp. 39-60; Hegghammer, *Jihad in Saudi Arabia*, Ch. 9.
62. Lewis, n. 1, pp. 193-218.
63. Daniel Byman and Jennifer Williams, "ISIS vs Al Qaeda: Jihadism's Global Civil War", *The National Interest*, February 24, 2015. Available at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/isis-vs-al-qaeda-jihadism%E2%80%99s-global-civil-war-12304 Last accessed on May 2, 2018.
64. Ibid.

5. Analysing Suicide Terrorism Through Anti-India Terror Groups: Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979) poses the most defining moment in the history of terrorism. It facilitated the evolution of the phenomenon that further evolved into a number of movements across the world, laying the very foundation of Islamist terrorism. While the Af-Pak region is regarded as the "global hub of terrorism", the anti-India agenda has predominantly been sponsored by Pakistan. Post the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) was founded in 1990 and began its operations against India ever since. Buoyed by their successes and ability to restrain the indomitable Soviet Army, the *mujahideen* participating in the Afghan *jihad*, were encouraged to look elsewhere to wage *jihad*. This led to the formation of the Markaz Dawat wal Irshad or MDI which eventually came to be renamed the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), whose military wing is the LeT, created for waging *jihad* against India.

The Af-Pak region, during the Soviet invasion, would quite fairly be regarded as the launch pad of most terror outfits that exist today. With the spread of Wahabi influence, funded by Saudi Arabia in most Muslim nations of the world, Pakistan was not an exception. An intermingling of ideology and religion is what was used by Islamist terror outfits at the time. The JuD also had a larger ideological cause that it was striving towards, and waging *jihad* in India seemed to its members, one of the significant steps to achieve their agenda. Another such organisation founded in Pakistan was the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) formed in the year 2000 and also based on ideological grounds. It is considered to

be one of the most dangerous organisations committed to undertake deadly missions inside India, targeting vital national assets.

While the situation in Afghanistan post 1979 facilitated the realisation of the power of religious ideology, the state of Pakistan had understood this much earlier. Pakistan is not new to the idea of using religion as an essential strategic tool of the country's security framework. In addition , its stance on India, especially with respect to the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), has always been aggressive. The strategic vision of terror outfits such as LeT and JeM vis-à-vis India indicated some form of alignment with the stated policy of Pakistan. Thus, what ensued was a complex nexus between the state and non-state actors in Pakistan, directed towards wreaking havoc in India.

Both the LeT and JeM have carried out terrorist activities involving the use of suicide attack, in the form of *fidayeen* attacks. While such attacks are not exactly similar to the traditional form of suicide terrorism in their planning and application, the spirit and nature of these attacks, however, show a preference by, and inclination of, the perpetrators to eventually die during their missions. While the JeM came into existence less than two decades ago and is fairly new in comparison to the LeT, its activities have been more lethal and devastating, with targeted suicide attacks against security personnel and military installations being their sole and primary objective . Understanding the nature and scope of the *fidayeen* attacks is essential for India to understand and gauge one of the most severe challenges that it faces in the domain of terrorism. However, what makes the challenge more lethal is the support that such terror outfits receive from a state actor sponsoring the facilitation of such attacks. It is, therefore, imperative to first understand the nature of India's neighbour, Pakistan, and how the agenda of terror outfits such as the LeT and JeM gains its unwavering support.

The State of Pakistan

Since the creation of Pakistan, the country has constantly witnessed a tussle between Western-style democracy and military rule, with political instability and a dominant military force ruling the roost. The

history of Pakistan has been extremely turbulent, with the country's minimal political elite, on the one hand, not having managed to create strong democratic institutions, and the military, on the other, dismissing the democratic system and focussing on national security and stability through military means. The foundation of the country was laid by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who envisioned the creation of a separate entity for Muslims back in 1937. While the idea itself emerged in 1929, it became a demand in 1937 and led to the formal declaration in 1940 at the All India Muslim League conference. The Congress, being a secular party, was not enthusiastic about Jinnah's demands. As the years passed by, the Congress stuck to its goal of creating a democratic order in India post independence, based on majoritarian and secular principles making each vote count. However, the Muslim League was in support of a representational government based on communal membership wherein equal weight or parity was given to the Muslim minority population in contrast to the majority as compensation. It was felt that without doing so, the Muslims in India would not be able to voice themselves and, therefore, would not be given their due political rights.[1]

Eventually, in 1947, the two independent dominions of India and Pakistan were created. The province of Kashmir, led by the Hindu Maharaja Hari Singh, was viewed by the leaders of Pakistan as a part of their state, owing to its significant Muslim population. However, as part of the Indian Independence Act 1947, while all the princely states of India were given the choice of joining either India or Pakistan, the Hindu Maharaja could not take a definitive call on whether to accede to India, Pakistan or remain independent. In this backdrop, India and Pakistan witnessed the first Kashmir War in 1947-48, ignited by the incursion of proxy elements by Pakistan in the form of the tribal *mujahideen* from the Northwest Frontier Province into Kashmir. Threatened by a forceful takeover, the maharaja turned to India for help, thereby, acceding to India. This not only angered the Pakistani political circles further, but laid the foundation for the major rift between India and Pakistan. The Pakistan Army's sole objective thereon has been to

strengthen the belief in the military establishment that Pakistan is an incomplete state without Kashmir. This conflict consumed most of Jinnah's leadership after the creation of Pakistan. He was said to be a secular man personally, according to various accounts, however, he was not entirely so when it came to the idea of nation-building. He believed in Islam as the unifying force among the minority population of Muslims in India and, thus, used religion to mobilise people. In doing so, he made possible the creation of a state based on a powerful symbol of identity and used it to strategic effectiveness. While he was responsible for the creation of the state, he could not be as influential when it came to nation-building and strengthening of the institutional framework of the newly independent country. He died in September 1948, and left Pakistan to chart out its own fate.[2]

Jinnah was succeeded by Khwaja Nazimuddin who was governor general till 1951, but was at the mercy of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, who wielded more power than Nazimuddin. From then on till 1958, Pakistan witnessed various shifts in the assumption of both these positions as a result of the assassination of Khan and the subsequent dismissal of Nazimuddin's government after he took over from Khan. After several other leaders assuming these positions, by 1956, the post of the governor general was replaced by that of the president. The person appointed to this position was mostly backed by the army and bureaucracy, instead of a political party. This resulted in the failure of a strong political foundation in the functioning of the state of Pakistan, which saw the increasing role of the army and bureaucracy, thus, rendering actual power and authority of the state in the hands of a very few.[3]

In the absence of strong political leaders, and with a dominant army, even the civilian leaders drawn from the bureaucracy could barely hold legitimacy in Pakistan. The top leadership in Pakistan gave the army the most pivotal role in state functioning, and defence expenditures had increased significantly as well. In the meantime, the Cold War had deepened and while the United States was looking for allies, the Army Gen of Pakistan, Ayub Khan was instrumental in concluding the 1954 Defence Treaty with the United States. Gen Ayub Khan was

appointed as the first military ruler of Pakistan or the chief martial law administrator, by the president in 1958. This military takeover further hampered the possibility of any functional democratic institution coming into being in the country and Pakistan began receiving arms from the United States, which were much superior to those of India. These were put to test in the 1965 War between India and Pakistan, which was once again prompted by the latter in an attempt to send trained *mujahideen* to "Indian Kashmir" to dislodge the Indian Army installations in the area. This was repelled with much greater force from the Indian side, eventually leading both countries to agree to a ceasefire. Not only did the 1965 War bring forward the real capabilities of Pakistan's military but in its aftermath, Gen Ayub lost support and legitimacy in the eyes of his own people.[4]

In the following years, from 1965-71, Pakistan faced the problem of resentment among the East Pakistanis who felt alienated and unrepresented in the state set-up of Pakistan. While Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of East Pakistan had won the elections in 1970-71, West Pakistan refused to acknowledge his success and, instead, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto became the prime minister of Pakistan. In the meantime, Mujibur Rahman launched a movement for the independence of East Pakistan, which led to mass killings and the rape of thousands of Bengalis across East Pakistan by the Pakistan Army and its supporters – the *Razakars*. The independence movement witnessed the creation of a guerilla force called Mukti Bahini which fought alongside the Indian Army in countering the Pakistan Army. Eventually, the state of Bangladesh was created on December 16, 1971. The then Pakistan Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was known to have significantly contributed towards the Islamisation of Pakistan and its intolerance towards minority sects within Islam. He was a socialist and used Islam to unite and stabilise the country and even gave in to the Islamists' demands for banning drinking, gambling, and night clubs; declaring Fridays as official holidays ; and increasing the content of Islam in school syllabi.[5]

In 1977, Gen Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq staged a coup to dismiss Bhutto's government, destroying civilian rule and sending Bhutto

to prison. Zia was convinced that Islam was the only force that could unite Pakistan and brought about staunch Islamisation in the country. His coup brought to the fore a new class of army officers who belonged to Punjab and held views similar to his own with respect to Pakistan. Further, Zia brought about *Sharia* laws and facilitated the penetration of the *Wahabi* influence into the educational system of Pakistan through the opening of *madrassas* and mosques, funded by Saudi Arabia. In this manner, Zia heralded an era of Islamisation of the country, using religion not only as a binding factor among the people but also as a motivation for the army to ensure national stability and security. The pan-Islamist sentiment was used as a unifying agent in the army merely to project power beyond Pakistan's borders, as it sought to exert its influence in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Islamic unity was promoted in Pakistan with the intention to balance out the overrepresented Punjabis and undercut the competing ethno-nationalisms in the country. However, Islam also became a unifying agent for Pakistan, in its bitter relationship with India post partition. This set the stage for the next turn of events that took place in Pakistan's neighbourhood and within the country itself, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.[6]

During the invasion, the United States needed an ally that could help take charge of the situation. Thus, Pakistan received huge supplies of arms and funds from the US, for use in training the Afghan *mujahideen* fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan. The US, thus, utilised Zia's Islamisation of Pakistan and the country's links with radical elements based along the Af-Pak border. This further enabled the acceleration of the process of Islamisation of Pakistan, with Zia making the radical Muslim groups in the country more powerful. Radical fundamentalism and extremism formed part of the training schedule of the *mujahideen* fighting the Afghan *jihad* besides the traditional weapons and physical training. They were given an ideological justification, a cause to believe in, and to give up their lives fighting for. The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Agency played a crucial role in this process, followed by the army which also enabled the same. At the time, this served the

purpose of the US government and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was encouraged to pump in money for such training and indoctrination. It was in this backdrop that prominent personalities such as Osama bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, etc played a crucial role, coming from all around the Arab region to participate in the Afghan *jihad*. It was seen as a fight for the brothers whose holy lands were invaded by outsiders, thus, making it a common cause for which people from far and distant lands wanted to fight and contribute towards.[7]

Among those eager to participate in physical combat, Afghanistan saw a massive migration of the clergy, teachers and scholars preaching the Islamic religion. They were the most instrumental in adding religious vigour to the *mujahideen* movement and in orienting it towards a cause that all those involved associated themselves with. However, many of the clergy and religious scholars were unable to physically travel to Afghanistan and especially in Saudi Arabia, the *Wahabi* ideology had resulted in people wanting to contribute towards the Afghan *jihad* from whereever they were. As a result, a lot of funds came in from Saudi Arabia as well, to help with the *mujahideen* movement. In this manner, the intermingling of preachers of Islam, who interpreted the Soviet invasion along religious lines, along with the ISI's involvement and Gen Zia ul-Haq's outlook on the Pakistani front, accompanied by funding by both the Americans and Saudi well-wishers, all formed factors enabling the conflict to transform into a movement that became a significant turning point in the history of events of that region.[8]

Essentially, the Afghan theatre was the foundation for many terror organisations that were formed in the next decade or two thereafter, including Al Qaeda and MDI.[9] The struggle in Afghanistan was instrumental in equipping the *mujahideen* with training for covert warfare, along with access to influential networks in order to procure the required weapons and other equipment. Further, it was instrumental in bringing about an ideologically motivated strategy in order to bind people and enhance recruitment for the cause. Afghanistan proved to

be a playground for ideology, armed resistance and the realisation of a transnational cause. Around the end of the Afghan War, Pakistan witnessed Zia-ul Haq's death under suspicious circumstances in 1988 and the arrival of Benazir Bhutto as the prime minister of Pakistan, the post to which she was later reelected in 1993 as well.[10]

India has been facing Pakistan sponsored terrorism for more than 30 years now, through non-state actors such as the LeT and JeM, that enjoy the support of the state and its intelligence agency. Both the LeT and JeM have been responsible for several terrorist attacks directed against India as can be seen from Fig 5.1[11] below, which shows the total number of terror incidents orchestrated by the LeT and JeM from 1970-2017. Of the 292 incidents that took place in that time, 46 incidents were suicide or *fidayeen* attacks which may not seem like a significant number, however, what is critical to understand is the steady increase in the use of such attacks as shown in Fig 5.2.[12]

Fig 5.1: Graph Portraying Total Number of Terror Incidents Carried out by LeT and JeM from 1970-2017
Total number of incidents = 292



Source: Global Terrorism Database (University of Maryland)

Fig 5.2: Graph Portraying Increase in the Number of Suicide Attacks (46 out of 292) Carried out by LeT and JeM from 1970-2017



Source: Global Terrorism Database (University of Maryland)

While the use of suicide or *fidayeen* attacks has clearly been on the rise, especially in the recent past, it becomes increasingly important to understand the functioning of both these organisations and their inclination towards the use of such attacks in recent times.

MDI or Jamaat ud Dawa (JuD)

Soon after the Afghan *jihad*, the MDI was created with the objective of putting in place an organisation that would propagate and champion the cause of Islam through preaching and *jihad*. This was in line with Pakistan's strategy with respect to India and, thus, the entwining of the MDI, particularly its militant wing, LeT, and Pakistan's Intelligence Agency, ISI was inevitable. While many other militant organisations are known to exist in the region and receive some degree of support from Pakistan, the LeT is known to have remained the most loyal and central to Pakistan's covert warfare strategy against India. Both the Pakistani establishment and the LeT were hand in glove and served one another's purpose.

The MDI was formed in Lahore in the year 1987 by a group of scholars and clergy of the Ahl-e-Hadith school of thought. The founding members were Hafiz Mohammad Saeed and Zafar Iqbal, and eventually Zaqiur Rehman Lakhvi merged his group of anti-Soviet

jihadists with theirs. Another prominent founding member of the MDI was Abdullah Azzam, who along with the other founder members, consultatively agreed to form the organisation with Allama Rashdi as the *de facto emir*. At the time, the Salafi hierarchy was kept in mind and members were assigned roles and duties in the organisation according to their hierarchical position. These were all people who were literate and well read, they were professors or scholars prior to the formation of the organisation and, thus, their roles in the organisation remained largely educational.[13]

The MDI's initial primary objective was to gather all the other Ahl-e-Hadith entities under the ambit of its umbrella. In trying to achieve this, MDI members would deliver lectures and preach Ahl-e-Hadith ideology, along with physical training, in various mosques and prayer halls. Not only were sermons on *jihad* given but further, the ills of democracy were also explained. The headquarters of the MDI is at Muridke, a town north of Lahore. While the group was formed in 1987, with Rashdi as the *emir*, Hafiz Saeed officially took over the organisation in 1993. He went on to rename the organisation, from MDI to Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD). This came in the wake of various sanctions imposed by President Bush against the LeT, the militant wing of the MDI, designating it as a terrorist organisation.

Broadly speaking, the JuD has categorised itself into three parts in order to carry out its agenda.

The first is *dawa* or the religious part, which speaks of the coming together of the Ahle-e-Hadith community and even encourages conversion from other sects of Islam to the former. This is carried out through a network of religious institutions such as mosques and *madrassas*; various publications and manuals along with the holding of annual congregations. The second aspect is *khidmat* or social welfare, which works with the help of trusts, donations, charities, disaster relief work, emergency support, etc. The third part is that of *jihad* which uses extreme violent means to achieve strategic objectives.[14] The interplay of all three aspects of the JuD can be understood better through Fig 5.3.

Fig 5.3: Table Portraying the Different Wings/Departments Functioning Under the MDI/JuD



It is important to note here that the MDI was not formed just to preach a certain ideology, but also to equip its recruits to be able to wage *jihad*. The main focus of the group was *dawa* (preaching) and *jihad* (holy war). Thus, there were two units within the MDI that worked mutually to shape the cadres' training in accordance with their agenda. One was that of the *ulema,* consisting of learned and scholarly people who were known to have in-depth and specialised knowledge of the Islamic law and theology. The expertise of such people like Allama Rashdi was sought to be shared among those within the community who were ignorant about the sacred religious texts. In essence, it served the purpose of indoctrination of the cadres and developing a mindset among them which shaped their perspective. This made them see the true meaning of *jihad* and demanded their selfless abidance to the cause.[15]

The second unit was that of the *jihadist* agenda. It focussed primarily on physical training and consisted of people like Hafiz Saeed and Zafar Iqbal who were better equipped to guide recruits on how to wage *jihad*. However, as happens with most groups consisting of two

clearly defined units, there was an immense power struggle between the two. The *jihadist* unit had started growing stronger, and between 1987 and 1992, it even won critical support from the ISI to advance its *jihadist* agenda in return for taking part in the *jihad* in what it regarded as Indian Kashmir. Eventually, the members of the *ulema* group slowly left and Rashdi died, making space for Hafiz Saeed to rise as the head of the organisation. It is this militant unit of the MDI, which became the military offshoot of the MDI, that forms the LeT, headquartered in the Kunar province of Afghanistan. The ideology and objectives of both remained the same. In fact, the JuD and LeT must not be taken as two distinctly separate groups. The LeT remains the militant wing of the JuD and shares the same common objectives. However, the LeT carries out militant activities, particularly targeting India, in line with these objectives.[16]

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT): The Militant Wing of the JuD

While *dawa* and *jihad* remain the two main pillars of the JuD even today, it is in waging *jihad* that the duty of purifying Islam rests, according to its sympathisers. The JuD had various branches pertaining to *dawa*, but there was a clear distinction between its militant wing, the LeT and the rest of the branches of the organisation. The first camp of the LeT was set up in Kunar province of Afghanistan in 1990. The LeT or as per its literal translation, the Army of Madinah, stood for the domination of Islam throughout the world, a vision made clear by its chief Hafiz Saeed. He has remained a strong unifying force within the organisation. During his tenure as lecturer in religious studies at the University of Engineering and Technology in Lahore, he was sent to Riyadh by the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). The JI was a radical religious party whose objective was to establish an Islamic state in Pakistan. During his tenure in Saudi Arabia, Saeed was deeply influenced by radical scholars and their works, including Ibn-e-Taymiyyah, Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Baz, Abdullah Azzam and Sayyid Qutb. Taymiyyah was the first to declare *jihad* against the Mongols, Abdul Aziz was the first religious teacher to declare a *fatwa* of *jihad* in Afghanistan, and

the latter two have proposed various ideas of *jihad* and *dawa* to spread Islam, fuelling radical movement across the globe.[17]

The works of these scholars have not been entirely violent or supportive of *jihad,* however, it is interesting to note that Saeed categorically chooses those commentaries of Ibn-e-Taymiyyah that pertain to *jihad* and has even posted them on the MDI website. Taymiyyah has quoted the verses of the Quran in order to argue that *jihad* is the ultimate goal which every Muslim must strive for. This line of thought is supported by Saeed who declared on the website of the JuD that Taymiyyah is the role model of Islam for the organisation and this was reflected in many other postings on the website too. Apart from this, Abdullah Azzam's ideologues on *jihad* also played a significant role in fostering the vision of the JuD/LeT. Not only was Azzam one of the founding members of the MDI and the LeT, but had also shaped the creation of Hamas and Al Qaeda. Azzam's views on *jihad,* however, were universal, seeking a global Muslim *ummah* or Islamic Caliphate by means of using *jihad*. Qutb saw *jihad* as a struggle or war that was to be carried on for an indefinite period, thereby making it a continuous struggle. This view is reflected in Saeed's outlook with respect to India, particularly. These are the factors that were instrumental in shaping Hafiz Saeed's worldview of *jihad* and, in turn, that of the LeT.[18]

Documents posted on the website of the LeT contained its ideological belief regarding *jihad*. Two of the most prominent of these was *Jihad in the Present Time* and *Hum Jihad Kyon Kar Rahe Hai?* (Why Are We doing *Jihad*?). The first talks about how, in the absence of a Caliphate, it was obligatory on every Muslim to take up *jihad* to achieve eight objectives: elimination of persecution; dominance of Islam; to force the disbelievers to pay *jizya* (tax); to help the weak and the oppressed; to seek revenge for the murder of a Muslim; to punish those who violate their oaths; to fight to defend; and, to recapture occupied territory.[19] The document goes on to establish that it is incumbent upon all Muslims to fight until such time that Islam becomes a way of life and dominates the entire world, enforcing the rule of Allah. Further, in the event of a Muslim land being occupied by a non-Muslim force, it

is the duty of Muslims to rise against the disbelievers with the aim of retrieving their holy land. In this manner, these eight objectives found their way to the second document, *Hum Jihad Kyon Kar Rahe Hain?* and became the sole justification of mass violence and the foundation of the LeT. Once this perspective on *jihad* is understood, it is easy to gauge the functioning of the organisation and the activities that it undertakes to achieve this vision. Saeed made it very clear that it was obligatory for every Muslim to take part in *jihad* as long as these eight reasons existed. Moreover, he ensured the need to broadcast the organisation's vision on its website, going to great lengths to explain his agenda. His world vision includes the establishment of a Global Islamic Caliphate whose responsibility it would be to wage *jihad*. However, he believes that in the absence of such a Caliphate, the responsibility rests on each individual. He regards democracy as a menace, whose basic functioning goes against the Islamic state.[20]

Analysing the Ideology and Objectives of JuD

Broadly, Islam comprises two branches – Shia and Sunni. Within each there are various sections and communities corresponding to a distinct way of following the religion. Wahabism and Salafism is one such sect under the Sunni branch of Islam and is considered to be the root cause of Islamist extremism today. Wahabism comes from Saudi Arabia, where it was founded by Mohammed Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in 1703-92 who was fairly influenced by the ideas of Ibn Taymiyyah. Wahabism stresses on the absolute sovereignty of God and rejects reliance on any other interpretations of Mohammad, denouncing pilgrimages and urging for their destruction along with a return to the purity of Islam. The Wahabis were responsible for the siege of Mecca. Wahabism was developed further by Sayyid Qutb, leading to the rise of neo-Wahabist groups. They have begun to embrace *salafiyah* or the ideology of primitive Islam which seeks social justice and Koranic punishments. Such interpretation of Islam, coupled with the use of violence has further led to the rise of ultra-Wahabists such as Al Qaeda, ISIS and Boko Haram and attracted unemployed young people since the 1980s.

Wahabism and Salafism, thus, adhere to the purest form of Islam as well as an opposition to the Shia branch of Islam.[21]

The Saudi clergy were responsible for spreading this influence to spheres beyond just religion—into the political sphere as well. During the Soviet invasion, the ideology penetrated different Muslim lands through Saudi funding, backed by strong oil rich resources and Saudi charities that started Wahabi schools or *madrassas*. This was primarily because around this time, the Iranian Revolution in 1979 had mobilised the Shia Muslims all over the world, creating tensions between the two branches of Islam globally. This was when Saudi Arabia, the country known to be the protector of Sunni Islam, along with some other Islamic countries like Iraq, began funding Sunni *madaris*[22] and institutions that already existed, besides funding the creation of new ones. Pakistan has witnessed a huge amount of such funding in the years after 1979.[23]

In Pakistan, of the 95 percent Muslims in the country, approximately 75-80 percent are Sunnis and 15-20 percent are Shias. Among the Sunnis, a majority belong to the Barelvi sect (about 60 percent) followed by the minority sect of Deobandis, and an even smaller section of people belong to the Ahl-e-Hadith sect. The militant *jihadi* groups of Pakistan proscribe to the two minority sects within the Sunni branch of Islam – Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadtih. While the Sunni branch of Islam is known to adhere to the Sunni Hanafi school of jurisprudence, the Ahl-e-Hadith doctrinally reject any school of jurisprudence, setting themselves apart from the rest of the Sunnis. Thus, it is interesting to understand the ideological and fundamental differences between the two sects in order to gain a better understanding of the militant *jihad* landscape of Pakistan.[24]

Most militant outfits in Pakistan belong to the Deobandi sect, which originated in the Indian town of Deoband in the mid-1800s and was devoted to the teachings of the Quran[25] and the Hadith.[26] The sect is known to oppose rational studies based on human reasoning, and focussed mainly on religious learning in terms of education. The Deobandis are followed strongly among the Pashtuns in Balochistan, the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered

Tribal Areas (FATA) along Afghanistan. In the 1990s, the Pakistani government as well as Saudi Arabia and Iraq vehemently started boosting funds towards Sunni *madaris* in the aftermath of the Shiite revolution in Iran, which also resulted in heightened sectarian clashes within Pakistan. Injection of funds and support from the central government in Pakistan as well as Saudi Arabia and Iraq, in an effort to revive or strengthen Sunni Islam, benefited the Deobandi militant groups hugely in Pakistan and Afghanistan.[27]

The Ahl-e-Hadith sect is also the outcome of the colonial context in India. Adherents of this sect perceive Islam to have become corrupt, thereby urging a return to the study of the original sources of Islam which are the Quran and Hadith. They reject any form of Islamic jurisprudence that interprets these texts and advocate individual interpretation of the same by those who are sufficiently qualified to do so. Education, according to the Ahl-e-Hadith sect, must merge Islamic education with modern subjects, however, this does not permit the adoption of Western culture by its followers or students. These nuanced differences between the Ahl-e-Hadith and other sects of Sunni Islam make it stand apart from the rest. However, this sect also benefited majorly from the funding towards Sunni *madaris* and groups in Pakistan. While the Ahl-e-Hadith did not enjoy a lot of support in Pakistan initially, it eventually made inroads into the society from the 1980s. Its members faced stiff opposition from the traditional Sufis in Pakistan who believed in a very different form of Islam which was not based on scriptural literalism.[28] Most militant *jihadi* outfits in the Af-Pak region belonged to the Deobandi sect, but the LeT was the only organisation to belong to the Ahl-e-Hadith sect and urge for the individual obligation towards military *jihad*.[29]

The Ahl-e-Hadith is often described as the "South Asian variant of Salafism" and derogatorily also called the "South Asian version of Wahabism". Salafi Muslims universally are known to preach a return to the original sources of Islam which the Ahl-e-Hadith find the Quran and Hadith to be. The Wahabis were known to be different from the Ahl-e-Hadith sect during the British rule in India as the Ahl-e-

Hadith demonstrated loyalty to the British Raj and did not want to be associated with the Wahabi sect, which had rebelled against the Empire. However, eventually, owing to the Saudi funding and the large number of Pakistanis working in the Gulf region, as well as increased interaction between all these sects, especially on their pilgrimages, there has been growing connection between the Salafis and Wahabis in Saudi Arabia and the Deobandis and Ahl-e-Hadith sects in Pakistan and Afghanistan, creating the "ultra-Wahabist" brand. During the period of Gen Zia-ul Haq, there was also an active sponsorship and encouragement of Sunni establishments by the state as the Afghan *jihad* called for an expansion of resources and aid for militant *jihadi* groups in the form of money and ammunition.[30]

The school of thought that the JuD stands for, an "*umma*-oriented *jihad*", is in line with what Thomas Hegghammer classifies as *jihadi* outfits that wish to protect the entire community of believers of Islam as. Such a vision has been propagated by people such as Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden as well, however, in the case of Al Qaeda, the "far enemy" or the United States of America is the primary target. What Saeed, through the JuD, envisions as the "near enemy" or the enemy closer to home, is India. The Lashkar is mainly led by the pan-Islamist perception of *jihad* but has been more focussed on India since the mid-1990s.[31]

The manner in which the LeT wishes to achieve its objectives is through *dawa* and *jihad,* as mentioned earlier. The LeT is known to be the most dedicated towards *dawa* among all other *jihadi* outfits in Pakistan. In establishing *dawa*, the organisation aims to establish schools, *madrassas*, impart lessons on the Quran, hold seminars, conferences and come up with publications in the form of journals and books widely available in Arabic, Urdu and English. This helps it in creating not just an ideology or a perspective, but the very foundation of knowledge for generations to learn from and imbibe in the times to come. Further, with respect to *jihad*, a huge number of *mujahideen* are trained to fight against non-Muslims who have oppressed their "fellow brothers" in near and far lands.[32]

Post the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the *mujahideen* saw their victory as a boost to take upon themselves the liberation of other

such lands that were under perceived threat or faced injustice. Thus, the Kashmir Valley was seen by them as another land in the clutches of evil anti-Islam forces. India, with a Hindu majority population, is seen by them as the biggest threat to Muslims living in South Asia, and Kashmir is the starting point to establish rule over India. As of today, hundreds of *mujahideen* have fought in the Kashmir Valley and a large number continue to undertake targeted attacks against India.[33]

While the JuD had a clear vision of the world, the LeT, however, focussed on directing its activities against India. India was seen as the biggest threat to the Lashkar's aim and objective of creating an Islamic state. Saeed made it clear that just like the 'Afghan *jihad*', there must be a 'Kashmir *jihad*'. He believed that it was the duty of the Muslims in Pakistan to undo the mistakes of partition which led to the usurpation of Muslim land by India. He even went on to post an article on the JuD website stating that the whole of India, including Kashmir, Hyderabad, Assam, Nepal, Burma, Bihar, and Junagarh comprised Muslim territory, and that it had, unfortunately, fallen into the hands of the "evil disbelievers". This was encouraged and nurtured by Pakistan and the ISI which eventually led to a proxy war in Kashmir as the interests of both merged in the region.[34]

For the ISI, annexation of Kashmir was solely a strategic objective of ensuring water security, creating a land bridge with China and undermining India's security by capturing the strategic heights.[35] On the other hand, for Hafiz Saeed, Kashmir posed a religious obligation. It is learnt that Saeed also had a personal vendetta with respect to India, as he had lost 35 family members during the riots post the partition of India. Thus, he managed to take revenge and channelise his anger against India through the justifications proposed by his idea of *jihad*. The idea was to start with *jihad* in Kashmir and eventually penetrate throughout India, disintegrating the country howsoever possible. The roots of this idea stem from the fact that there is no space for any other faith to coexist in the Islamic Caliphate and a predominant Hindu India, thus, needed to be demolished. This desire to destroy India has been consistent within the LeT literature, and the entire Indian subcontinent is seen to be targeted by the group to achieve its objective.[36]

In other words, India was the biggest threat coming in the way of the LeT's path in establishing the Islamic Caliphate, and its elimination was therefore inevitable. In order to make its recruits realise this approach, a strategic method of training and indoctrination was used to train them in such a manner that it would become socially acceptable for them to become a *mujahid*. In fact, most families in the Valley were aware of their children's participation in the Kashmir *jihad* and encouraged the trend or treated it with passivity. *Jihad* was made out to be a righteous cause, and gained legitimacy within a large section of the community in Kashmir. The death of a *mujahid* was never mourned, but treated as martyrdom.

Profile and Activities

With respect to Kashmir, Saeed's thoughts were clear, and made vocal. He did not believe in politics and only regarded *jihad* as the basis of Islamic politics. The group's stance on Kashmir was publicised through publications, website bulletins and CDs. The stance was four-pronged: first, India had illegally occupied Kashmir during the partition; second, Kashmiri Muslims have the right to decide their political future; third, the fight for freedom is their legitimate right after they were denied their right to self-determination; and, fourth, Pakistan must support the freedom struggle in Kashmir.[37] In the Kashmir Valley, the LeT carried out activities such as attacks and raids on army camps, beheading and ambushing of Indian soldiers. It was able to do so with the help of the training camps and safe houses it had managed to establish, supported by the ISI and local entities. This support not only helped it in infrastructure development but further equipped it with advanced weapons and ammunition. This encouraged the LeT to devise plans that spanned across the rest of India as well. The first strike on the capital of the country by the LeT was at the Red Fort in December of 2000, in which two people were killed and one seriously wounded.[38]

The LeT's terrorist activities are termed by the group as *fidayeen* attacks, which are basically a form of suicide attacks. The nature of these attacks is very different from the suicide attacks employed by most terror

outfits. This can be illustrated with the help of the most spectacular attacks carried out by the LeT in Mumbai. On November 26, 2008, 10 LeT terrorists from Pakistan carried out a series of 12 coordinated shooting and bombing attacks which lasted four days across Mumbai. The terrorists involved in the attack carried AK-47s and hand grenades which they used extensively, targeting innocent civilians in Mumbai's most frequently visited and iconic spots. Given these circumstances, it was clear that the terrorists had very little hope of survival. For them, survival was an afterthought and no escape plan had been put in place. The Mumbai attack was one of the most well orchestrated and lethal attacks organised by the LeT. Since its inception, it had not carried out an attack on such a large scale before.

Apart from terrorist activites, the LeT also engaged in infrastructural work in order to facilitate the recruitment and indoctrination of its cadres. In the year 2001, various changes in the functioning of the LeT were seen. These were due to two incidents that took place in this year. The first of these was the historic attack of 9/11 carried out by Al Qaeda on the USA, and the second was the attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001. The world was shaken up by the ingress of terrorist outfits and the scale of their activities called for stringent measures to be undertaken globally. Further, the Parliament attack forced the Indian government to take immediate action including in the form of massive deployment of troops along the Indo-Pak border. This, alongwith the continued presence of US troops along Pakistan's western borders in Afghanistan, led to excessive pressure on Pakistan and the MDI. These developments compelled the MDI to be renamed the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) by Hafiz Saeed, on the instructions of the ISI. In order to counter the negative narrative the group came to be associated with, the LeT proactively expanded its role in the social welfare domain. It expanded the network of educational and social organisations, gaining credibility and, in turn facilitating recruitment. As of today, under Pakistani patronage, there are terrorist training camps of the JuD throughout Pakistan and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) wherein cadres are trained in infiltration, weapon handling, guerilla warfare, etc.[39]

In order to equip itself effectively to wage *jihad* in Kashmir and eventually India, the LeT had to look for allies within India as well. There was no dearth of such allies, with the existence of various anti-establishment elements in India. In this manner, among the first of the LeT's allies were Sikh separatists, seeking a separate Khalistan for themselves. The next potential ally for the LeT were the Naxalites. Despite the fact that neither of these groups shared the same vision as the LeT, it was the common anti-India agenda that brought them to seek a temporary common objective. Various Kashmiri groups such as the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) also joined hands with the LeT. While groups with differing ideologies were regrouping and coming together in the Valley, united by their anti-India agenda, Saeed kept reinforcing his aggressive fundamentalism on the society. This was evident in the religious decrees passed by him or other LeT leaders, as well as the conversion of mosques on the Jammu-Srinagar highway into Wahabi ones.[40]

The financial support structure of the JuD includes funding by the ISI, charities and collections, criminal activities such as money laundering, narcotics, arms trafficking, extortion, earnings from front companies, etc. Pakistan began to fund the LeT in the 1990s and it had grown considerably by 1995. The Pakistan Army and ISI both helped establish the military structure of the LeT with the intent of using it against India. Apart from this, funds were also received through the efforts of the MDI's Department of Finance. Public fund-raising events using charity boxes in shops and mosques and personal or publicly collected donations also formed a great part of its finances. The outfit also collected donations from the Pakistani Diaspora in the Persian Gulf and UK as well as Islamic Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Pakistani and Kashmiri businessmen. Most people donating money are, in fact, blinded by the philanthropic activities that the JuD carries out, allowing it to enjoy a high degree of popularity for the work carried out by its charitable arm.[41]

The LeT had a wide global network, primarily due to its vision of extending support to any fellow Muslims facing oppression or injustice.

With respect to expansion, the Let followed three programmes: its pan-Asian programme, recruitment of foreigners, and, lastly, fund-raising. For its pan-Asian network, the LeT (at the time, MDI) had cells in virtually every South Asian country, namely, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Maldives and Bangladesh. As far as recruitment of foreigners was concerned, the group focussed on recruitment and training of recruits from the US, UK, France, Belgium and other parts of Europe. Moreover, its fund-raising programme focussed on West Asia and the UK, along with the US and Europe. The outreach of the LeT was such that apart from its cells in Asia, it managed to send its *mujahideen* to various places across the globe, where they received training for *jihad*. Bosnia, Herzegovina, Tajikistan, and the Philippines were a few among the hundred or so countries where the MDI and, eventually, the LeT, had sent troops in order to wage *jihad*.

Philanthropic Activities

Despite a number of international bans and sanctions imposed against the JuD and its operations wings like the LeT, it continues to function openly on Pakistani soil under the garb of philanthropic activities. Denying any link with violence, the JuD continues to enjoy a high degree of popularity for its social work, especially during natural disasters. In fact, the LeT had become the saviour during the 2005 earthquake in POK with its remarkable rescue, relief and rehabilitation operations in the region. It had set up several mobile dispensaries and had organised teams of doctors from different countries, ensuring that all immediate requirements pertaining to food, shelter, health and other basic needs were catered to. Further, with its increasing role in charity related activities, the LeT set up a distinct entity as part of the charity wing of the JuD, the Falah-e-Insaniyat Foundation (FIF) which is involved in politico-philanthropic work and various relief activities. The FIF is known to have a country-wide network in Pakistan specialising in humanitarian and relief activities. The FIF has also been involved in relief work in Syria and a number of other countries, thereby drawing global attention of the Muslim *ummah*. Over a period of time, the FIF

successfully extended its global outreach to Indonesia, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Myanmar, Ghana, Somalia, Turkey, Syria, etc providing assistance to areas/regions facing scarcity of basic amenities due to natural disasters. Apart from this, the FIF regularly holds workshops to educate locals on healthcare, medical camps, free medicines, distribution of equipment such as wheelchairs and other such activities.[42]

Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)

The Jaish-e-Mohammad, translated into 'Army of Mohammad' was created in the year 2000, formed out of the terrorist organisation Harkat ul Mujahideen (HuM). The HuM had similar goals to that of the JuD, but belonged to the Deobandi school of thought. HuM was a group created with the goal to fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and also provide humanitarian relief to all those in need during the Afghan struggle, especially those who had sought refuge in Afghanistan. HuM was also involved in the *mujahideen* movement and started waging *jihad* in the region. Post Soviet withdrawal, however, it directed a major portion of its cadres towards the *jihad* in Kashmir and has since been involved in waging *jihad* against secular Muslim governments, India and Western countries. In Kashmir, HuM seeks Kashmir's secession from India, and its union with Pakistan in order to create a pan-Islamic entity. It also follows the same notion of preaching and *jihad* as it believes that true Islam has been lost and must thus be brought back through awareness.[43]

The objective of establishing JeM is known to aggregate the Deobandi pan-Islamic militants in Jammu and Kashmir. In line with JuD, the JeM is also intolerant towards other religions, including Shia Islam and is known to be politically aligned with the radical pro-Taliban bloc. As an Islamist terrorist group of the Deobandi sect, it had close ties with terror entities such as the Afghan Taliban, Pakistan Taliban and various anti-Shia outfits such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan, and even Al Qaeda.[44] Its primary goal is to eliminate India, until which, it believes, peace will never reign supreme in the Muslim world. Pakistan's ISI is known to support and

foster the functioning of the JeM, making the organisation an ardent competitor of the LeT, eventually escalating tensions in Kashmir. Most of the JeM leaders romanticised the idea of an Islamic Caliphate in South Asia with Pakistan leading the movement.

The JeM was founded by Maulana Masood Azhar on January 31, 2000. He was one of the three terrorists who were released by the Indian government in exchange for the 155 passengers of Indian Airlines Flight IC 814, hijacked to Kandahar in December 1999. The JeM is known to have the backing of Deobandi scholars and was also deeply influenced by other terror outfits such as the LeT, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Sipah-e-Sahiba Pakistan (SSP) and many other such groups operating out of Pakistan and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.[45] Ideologically, the JeM has more or less the same objectives as the LeT. Its main aim is to unite Kashmir with Pakistan, overthrowing Indian rule and ensuring that Pakistan is ruled by *Sharia* law. While the JeM might not tag its objectives and goals as similar to those of the LeT, however, it can be seen that the immediate goals of most of the terror outfits operating in the Kashmir Valley converge and thus, the Kashmir *jihad* became a cause that each of them identifies with.

Profile and Activities

Soon after its inception in 2000, the JeM faced a split in 2001 when one faction of the group no longer wished to remain loyal to the Pakistani establishment. Ideological rifts within the group led to its break up as the group's ideology resonated with that of the Afghan Taliban, towards whom Pakistan had turned its back. Given the circumstances, it was understandable that these cadres no longer professed loyalty to the state and wanted to stick to their ideological character by opposing the Pakistani stance. Masood Azhar, however, decided to stick with the state and remain loyal to it, thereby gaining the ISI's confidence in him.[46]

The JeM is present in most parts of Pakistan, and is closely associated with Al Qaeda and the Taliban. However, it engages in activities that demand the convergence of various militant outfits. It is a member of the United Jihad Council which was formed in 1990 in order to bring

all the militant groups focussing on Kashmir together. It is reported that in 2008, the JeM took part in activities that were anti-government and against the coalition forces in Afghanistan in collaboration with the Taliban.

The organisation is known to have various departments, similar to those of the JuD, in order to carry out the functions of its military and missionary groups. However, its militant activities in the region have by far been the most threatening. This is not only because of the several thousand-strong cadres of the JeM trained to carry out militant activities, but also due to the overlap with other entities in the region in order to collaborate for planning and undertaking attacks.

The JeM is known to have brought suicide terrorism to the Kashmir Valley, with the first attack at the Badami Bagh Indian Army base in Srinagar, through which the outfit gained prominence. An 18-year-old boy from Srinagar detonated a car-bomb outside the Army's 15 Corps headquarters, proving to be the first instance of a militant strapped with explosives operating in Kashmir.[47] The JeM has predominantly used suicide attacks to carry out various missions, particularly targeting Indian military establishments in the northern parts of India. The organisation is held responsible for the Indian Parliament attack in 2001 wherein five armed men in a white Ambassador equipped with IEDs and automatic weapons drove through the gates of the Indian Parliament. All the attackers eventually died in the crossfire with the security personnel, and the masterminds behind the attack were subsequently identified. Among them was a Kashmiri called Afzal Guru who was found to have a significant role in the attacks. He was eventually hanged by the Indian authorities following investigations, though no public announcement was made ahead of the hanging due to a variety of reasons, including security factors. The JeM along with other radical groups exploited public sentiments on the discreet manner in which the hanging took place, thus, strengthening its anti-India stance further. The JeM has, thus, not hesitated in carrying out militant activities against India in order to seek revenge in the name of Afzal Guru.[48]

The JeM has retained a low profile but has geared itself for some of the more deadly operations. It is known to undertake more organised and lethal terror attacks, inevitably causing serious damage and impacting the public psyche in order to assert its capability to deliver. The attacks on the Indian Air Force base in Pathankot (January 2016) and the Indian Army's base in the northern Kashmir town of Uri (September 2016) were also attributed to the JeM. The outfit strives to achieve success by aiming for critical and difficult targets using *fidayeen*. The attacks carried out by the JeM are extremely well planned, using sophisticated weapons and involve a very high degree of professionalism. As a result, the attacks carried out by the JeM inevitably leave an indelible mark in the minds of the people, at times affecting the national psyche. The attack on the Indian Parliament brought both the nuclear neighbours—India and Pakistan—to the brink of war with both sides amassing troops along their borders. Further, the JeM's external outreach is evident from the fact that one of the perpetrators of the London bombings in 2005 is known to have communicated with a JeM operative.

The JeM and the other entities operating in the Valley have the unique capability of amalgamating with other groups for carrying out operations in different locations. The organisation has come to notice, enhancing its activities in Afghanistan lately. The role of the JeM is suspect in a number of recent terror attacks in Afghanistan, including the blast in Kabul on May 31, 2018, even though the Afghan intelligence has held the Haqqani network responsible for the same. The Haqqanis are known to work closely with the ISI and the latter has been known to provide cadres from groups like the JeM for their operations. The JeM's presence in Afghanistan has been a cause for concern for India as attacks planned against Indian assets, including Indian missions in Afghanistan, are usually led by cadres from the JeM. During the attack on the Indian mission in Mazar-e-Sharif in January 2016, the attackers had scribbled the following in Urdu: *Afzal Guru ka inteqam* (Afzal Guru is avenged), and *Ekshaheed, hazaar fidayeen* (for one martyr, there would be a

thousand suicide bombers).[49] The Afzal Guru connection makes the JeM's role more evident as JeM cadres have been known to seek revenge for his hanging. The attackers on the Indian Air Force base in Pathankot also had made their intention clear in seeking revenge for the death of Afzal Guru.[50]

Funds and Recruit Base

Sympathisers across Pakistan and Kashmir form the major fund base for the JeM due to which the finance wing of the organisation is seen to be operating throughout the year. The JeM has two funding agencies which assist it financially in a major way.

One is the Al Rashid Trust which collects donations and charities, and the other source of funds is its several publications. The Al Rashid Trust was also a major contributor to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. It had been banned by the US, which had urged the Pakistan government to freeze all its bank accounts. While the Pakistani government did comply with the ban directive, it had, at the same time, alerted the outfit of the ban in advance, thus, allowing it to withdraw most of its assets before being frozen.[51]

The JeM also continues to sustain its activities through large scale fund donations from the public, using its media channels, including its official website Al Qalam. It seeks donations from the public in the name of "Saving Islam". The donation campaign cited on the website seeks just rupee one from donors and mentions how all Muslims could contribute to the cause of Islam through such minimal contribution. Further, Osama bin Laden is also known to have supported the JeM with money and weapons in its nascent stage. The recruits of the JeM are primarily known to come from Punjab and from educational institutions and *madrassas*. Until 2001, the JeM's training centres were in Afghanistan but were closed down with the collapse of the Taliban regime. This was when its military department relocated its camps to POK and Pakistan's frontier border, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), where both military and religious training was imparted to the cadres. Apart from *jihadis* from Pakistan and Kashmir, individual *jihadists*

from around the world were also trained at these facilities. The JeM is also known to train militants in Bangladesh, Nepal and West Asia.[52]

While Kashmir remains the JeM's primary focus, elements within the group have broadened the focus to include the targeting of members of the Pakistani state and the Western presence in Pakistan. As members of a previously unknown group "Jundallah," JeM trained members were among a number of militants drawn from several Pakistani extremist groups responsible for the twin car-bomb attack near the US Consulate in Karachi on May 26, 2004. On June 9, 2004, the same terrorist cell was involved in a terrorist attack against a heavily armed military convoy carrying Karachi's military commander, resulting in seven deaths. In August 2006, the Pakistan government ordered a crackdown on the JeM faction Jamaat-ul-Farqaan following intelligence that its members were planning to target Western interests in Pakistan. Members of the JeM are also reported to have been involved in two assassination attempts against Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf in December 2003.[53]

The ability of the JeM to attract followers from among the widely spread out Pakistani population abroad also remains a serious cause for concern. The 2005 London bombing is evidence of this as one of the four London bombers was in touch with a member of the JeM ahead of the bombing. Moreover, a JeM militant, Ahmad Omar Sheikh, had even organised the visit of the bombers to a JeM training camp in Manshera in KPK.

Training and support is provided, not only to JeM members from Kashmir and Pakistan, but also to individual *jihadists* from other parts of the world. Suicide bomber Mohammad Bilal, a British national, travelled to Pakistan to volunteer for the JeM directed suicide attack in Kashmir on December 25, 2000 which killed six Indian soldiers and three Kashmiri students. It is feared that the JeM may be facilitating the activities of international *jihadists* who intend to conduct terrorist operations outside Kashmir or India, including in the United Kingdom. The British national, Rashid Rauf, arrested in Pakistan as one of the main coordinating figures allegedly responsible for the disrupted

British trans-Atlantic plane bombing plot in August 2006, is strongly suspected of having links with the JeM.[54]

Employing Suicide Terrorism: Use of Fidayeen Attacks

Both the LeT and JeM have traditionally employed the *fidayeen* in order to carry out their missions. A *fidayeen* attack is known to be a form of suicide attack wherein the perpetrator fights until his/her death and aims to cause maximum damage to the target before such death. The Kashmir Valley has seen a significant number of *fidayeen* attacks in the last three years. Further, the year 2016 seems to have witnessed the highest number of casualties among the security forces in the region.[55]While the LeT is known to involve its cadres mostly in "high risk" missions, the JeM is known to employ full-fledged suicide missions in order to further its agenda. The ultimate goal of the LeT cadres is to achieve *shahadat,* or what can be termed as martyrdom. Thus, while on their mission, they attempt at escaping if they have not been overpowered in order to return to base and prepare for more such missions. The attempt at escape is not out of cowardice, because their ultimate and eventual goal is death. The JeM cadres, on the other hand, have been seen to conduct suicide missions planned in a manner where the scope and intent of escape remains remote.

Strategic Motive

There has been a distinctive rise in *fidayeen* attacks in the recent past, which can be attributed to the following factors:

- **Assured Destruction:** It is a known fact that *fidayeen* attacks are bound to cause greater damage when compared to hit and run or standoff fire assaults. This is primarily due to the assured destruction that such an attack is certain to cause, with the *fidayees* expecting to die and having "nothing to lose" during the attack.
- **Attention:** Such attacks are extensively captured by the media, enabling the terror outfits to effectively spread fear and terror in the public psyche both in the affected regions and in other parts of the world.

- **Penetration of Secure Areas:** What must also be realised is that the nature of the targets that groups such as the LeT and JeM aim to strike are extremely secure and well protected. *Fidayeen* attacks are known to be more effective in such areas as they are capable of penetrating the most impregnable of security barriers and causing the maximum damage before being neutralised.

Ideological Objective

While the strategic motive behind *fidayeen* attacks can be gauged through their effectiveness, it becomes vital to understand the nature of recruitment for such attacks. The principal binding factor at the bottom of it all remains the ideology. Both organisations were involved in preaching *jihad* and while suicide terrorism comes under the category of *jihad*, it cannot be understood in isolation. Preaching has an equal, if not greater role to play in *fidayeen* attacks. Most *fidayees* are young boys like Ajmal Kasab who belong to either Pakistan or Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and have gone through intense training and educational programmes, facilitating their belief in the "cause" for which they willingly carry out such attacks. Setting up of mosques, *madrassas* and schools in order to preach an extreme and aggressive form of Wahabism makes *jihad* more than just an ideology. Moreover, handlers and recruiters are always on the lookout for potentially vulnerable boys for indoctrination. Most of them are given promises of money, women, and paradise in their afterlife as well as the honour of martyrdom after their death. These boys easily succumb to the temptation of having better prospects in an afterlife, especially given that their present life does not hold any optimism. Needless to say, the regions from where the *fidayees* are recruited have been facing violence or some degree of tension over the decades. Thus, the average life of the youth does not hold many promising prospects for the future. In such an atmosphere, groups like the LeT and JeM, with their narrative, seem like the only ray of hope. In addition to this, the philanthropic activities of these terror outfits, particularly the LeT, help garner support from families

that are willing to send their children or relatives for indoctrination and training. Most poor and needy families are known to fall prey to the narrative of such groups. The social work that the groups carry out not only legitimises the cause of such organisations but further, often generates indebtedness of the community towards the outfits.

Thus, *fidayeen* attacks are a result of vulnerable communities, massive state sponsoring of terrorism by Pakistan, and strategically motivated terror organisations all bound by a foundation that is based on aggressive and extreme religious ideologies. This complex web of factors makes it compelling for India to shape its counter-terror measures in order to accommodate each of these.

Notes

1. T.V. Paul, *The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World* (Gurgaon, Haryana: Random House India, 2014), pp. 34-68.
2. "A Brief History of the Kashmir Conflict", *The Telegraph*, September 24, 2001. Available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1399992/A-brief-history-of-the-Kashmir-conflict.html. Last accessed on May 4, 2018.
3. Paul, n. 1, pp. 34-68.
4. Shalini Chawla, *Pakistan's Military and Its Strategy* (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2009), pp. 155-177.
5. Paul, n. 1, p. 138
6. Stephen Tankel, *Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba* (Gurgaon, New Delhi: Hachette India, 2011), pp. 11-31.
7. Chawla, n. 4, pp. 181-202.
8. Sebastian Gorka, "1979: Annus Horribilis – Modern Jihad Goes Global" (Book excerpt: *Defeating Jihad: The Winnable War*),The Washington Free Beacon, 2016. Available at http://freebeacon.com/culture/1979-annus-horribilis-modern-jihad-goes-global/Last accessed on February 15, 2017.
9. Tankel, n. 6, pp. 11-31.
10. Paul, n. 1, pp. 34-68.
11. University of Maryland Global Terrorism Database: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=1970&end_yearonly=2017&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&perpetrator=20233&perpetrator=20275&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
12. Ibid.
13. Arif Jamal, *Call for Transnational Jihad: Lashkar-e-Taiba 1985–2014* (New Delhi: Kautilya Books, 2015), pp. 42-63.
14. C. Christine Fair, "How Pakistan's Intelligence Agency Created A Pliant Proxy and Implacable Foe of India", September 11, 2015.
15. Jamal, n. 13, pp. 42-63.
16. Ibid.

17. Wilson John, *The Caliphate's Soldiers: The Lashkar-e-Tayyeba's Long War* (New Delhi: Amaryllis, 2011), pp. 1-26.
18. Ibid., p. 11.
19. Tankel, n. 6, pp. 33-44.
20. Christine Fair, "Lashkar-e-Taiba Beyond Bin Laden: Enduring Challenges for the Region and the International Community", May 24, 2011.
21. Telegraph Reporters, "What is Wahhabism? The Reactionary Branch of Islam from Saudi Arabia said to be 'the Main Source of Global Terrorism'", May 19, 2017. Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/29/what-is-wahhabism-the-reactionary-branch-of-islam-said-to-be-the/Last accessed on 21 June, 2017.
22. Plural of *madrassa* – religious school or seminary
23. Tankel, n. 6, pp. 11-31.
24. Ibid.
25. Holy book of Islam.
26. The Islamic text which transmits the path or traditions of the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH)
27. Tankel, n. 6, pp. 11-31.
28. Yoginder Sikand, "Islamist Militancy in Kashmir: The Case of Lashkar-i-Tayyeba", November 20, 2003.
29. Tankel, n. 6, pp. 11-31.
30. n. 21.
31. John, *The Caliphate's Soldiers: The Lashkar-e-Tayyeba's Long War* (New Delhi: Amaryllis, 2011), pp. 1-26.
32. Tankel, n. 6, pp. 33-44.
33. Jamal, n. 13, pp. 92-119.
34. Ibid., pp. 92-119.
35. Ibid.
36. John, n. 17, pp. 94-107.
37. Jamal, n. 13, pp. 92-119.
38. D. Suba Chandran and Rekha Chakravarthi, "Lashkar-e-Toiba", in Arpita Anant, ed., *Non State Armed Groups in South Asia: A Preliminary Structured Focused Comparison* (New Delhi: Pentagon Security International, 2012).
39. n. 6.
40. Jamal, n. 13, pp. 92-119.
41. Chandran and Chakravarthi, n. 38.
42. S.C. Kohli, "Falah-e-Insaniyat (FIF): An Imbrued Pakistani NGO", *Merinews*, July 21, 2014. Available at: http://www.merinews.com/article/falah-e-insaniyat-foundation-fif-an-imbrued-pakistani-ngo/15899363.shtml. Last accessed on May 3, 2018.
43. Imitiaz Gul, *The Al Qaeda Connection: The Taliban and Terror in Pakistan's Tribal Areas* (New Delhi: Viking by Penguin Books India, 2009), pp. 155-170.
44. Christine Fair, "Bringing Back the Dead: Why Pakistan Used the Jaish-e-Mohammad to Attack an Indian Airbase", December 1, 2016. Available at http://www.christinefair.net/pubs/Dead.pdf. Last accessed on June 21, 2017.
45. n. 38.
46. Imitiaz Gul, *The Al Qaeda Connection: The Taliban and Terror in Pakistan's Tribal Areas* (New Delhi: Viking by Penguin Books India, 2009), pp. 155-170.
47. Sameer Yasir, Firstpost, "Uri Attack Carried out by Jaish-e-Mohammad Militants, Confirms Indian Army". Available at: http://www.firstpost.com/india/uri-attack-carried-out-by-jaish-e-mohammad-militants-confirms-indian-army-3013332.html. Last accessed on 21 June, 2017.

48. n. 44.
49. HT Correspondents, "Revenge for Afzal': Messages in Blood Link Mazar-e-Sharif to Pathankot", *Hindustan Times*, January 6, 206. Available at: http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/attack-on-indian-consulate-in-mazar-e-sharif-revenge-for-afzal-guru/story-WamI7u5gYOM4Co8EtvNy4N.html. Last accessed on June 21, 2017.
50. n. 44.
51. Mapping Militant Organisations - http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/95
52. n. 44.
53. n. 45.
54. Rohit Honawar, "Jaish-e-Mohammad" *Special Report by Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies*, No. 4, November 2005. PDF available at: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/100232/IPCS-Special-Report-04.pdf. Last accessed on May 3, 2018.
55. Vivek Chadha, "Countering Fidayeen Attacks", IDSA. Available at: http://www.idsa.in/policybrief/countering-fidayeen-attacks_vchadha_151216. Last accessed on June 21, 2017.

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

6. Evaluating the Vulnerabilities of States Dealing with Suicide Terrorism

With suicide terrorism growing as a phenomenon, it is imperative to understand the root causes of such campaigns and to introspect. The circumstances under which such campaigns are established must be fully understood so as to reach a conclusion in understanding the phenomenon. The causes from which such violent agendas stem are more often than not rooted in social, political, economic, religious and other such spheres of society. It is, thus, crucial to understand the working of certain suicide terrorist campaigns that existed in the past, and that continue to exist, in order to realise their very basis. This chapter evaluates four countries that have witnessed some of the most prominent suicide campaigns: Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Further, it aims to understand the measures undertaken by the states to curb these campaigns and to what extent they have or have not been successful in tackling the phenomenon. Two of these suicide campaigns —Hezbollah and LTTE—no longer exist but have had a long lasting impact on the history of the phenomenon. The other two—Al Qaeda and LeT—are campaigns that due to their very nature, are never ending. Thus, a detailed assessment of the Af-Pak region would be carried out in order to understand the dynamics surrounding the largest hub of suicide terrorism in the world today. It is also pertinent to understand what makes such states fertile ground for suicide terrorism to flourish despite consistent large scale global efforts in countering terrorism.

Lebanon

Lebanon has predominantly been a country with a diverse population comprising Christians and Muslims – both Shias and Sunnis. However,

the Lebanese Constitution drafted post French decolonisation in 1946 favoured the Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims of the country. This was because these groups proved to be the two larger confessional groups of Lebanon. The government was sectarian, meaning that it accorded the various religious sects of the country with different powers—both ethnic and religious—on a proportional basis.[1] This proportional distribution of political and institutional powers was done on the basis of a census conducted in 1932 which suggested that the Maronite Christians comprised the majority in Lebanon, followed by the Sunni Muslims and then the Shiites . Though of doubtful reliability, this census nevertheless remains the last official census conducted in Lebanon. Thus, being the third largest confessional group in Lebanon, the Shiite Muslims got a position far weaker than the other two groups. Further, they constituted the poorer section of Lebanese society, mostly residing in Bekaa Valley and southern Lebanon. Over the years, the Shiite population increased manifold, leading to a demographic shift in the country. Despite this, the Constitution was never amended and the Shiites of Lebanon continued to be treated as a minority confessional group, leading to their marginalisation.[2]

This laid the ground work for the politicisation of Shiite Muslims which effectively took shape only in the 1970s. A number of social, political, religious and economic factors were also responsible for this. It began with the Arab-Israeli War that took place in 1948 wherein the newly formed state of Israel fought with its Arab neighbours, leading to a refugee crisis in the region. This resulted in an influx of refugees in Lebanon and the setting up of many refugee camps in the southern part of the country, where the Shiite Muslims lived. In the 1960s, a Lebanese Shiite, Imam Musa al-Sadr began organising the Shiites. This is how the Movement of the Deprived or Harkat al-Mahrumin was formed as a Shiite mass movement established by Musa al-Sadr in 1974. He managed to channelise the victimisation and humiliation of the Lebanese Shiite into a military organisation. This movement also came to be known as Amal.[3] The group proposed restructuring of the Lebanese political system so as to not let Shia interests get subordinated

and for a non-sectarian commitment to national unity.[4] From here on, the Shia disgruntlement only kept accelerating with the chain of events that took place subsequently.

Simultaneously, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) formed in the 1970s comprised the refugees in Lebanon who aimed to unite all Palestinian Arab groups in order to create an independent Palestinian state. They fought the Israeli forces from southern Lebanon and indulged in various combat and guerilla tactics to achieve their objectives. In 1982, Israel retaliated by invading Lebanon and forcing the PLO and many other Lebanese Muslims and Palestinians out of southern Lebanon. Initially, the Shiite Lebanese Muslims welcomed Israel's invasion as it helped in driving out the PLO forces from southern Lebanon. This led to a split among the Amal members and formation of various small and new militias fighting against Israeli forces.

Israel's initial stated goal in invading Lebanon was to destroy the 15,000 troops of the PLO who resided in the south, to force the PLO leadership near Beirut to leave the country and to compel Syria's military forces which had been in Lebanon since the 1975 civil war, to leave as well. The first two objectives were met but Syria refused to withdraw and Israel began to implement a long-term plan in Lebanon to stabilise the central government controlled by the Maronites. Thus, Israel's invasion was at first welcomed as it was seen to oust the PLO and Syrian troops from Lebanon but eventually, with their continued presence in Lebanon, animosity against them developed within the Shia community. Lebanon saw the involvement of American, French and other Western troops as well in the years following 1982, thus, increasing the discontentment against the foreign military occupation. Soon, Hezbollah saw a massive influx of recruits, and by 1986, it had over 7,000 members dedicated to ousting the foreign powers encroaching their territory. As resentment grew among the Lebanese Shiites, Hezbollah became an umbrella organisation for all local resistance movements in Lebanon against foreign military occupation.

In the midst of these developments, Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini, in the first Conference of the Downtrodden in Tehran, met a number

of Lebanese clerics, urging them to organise resistance movements in Lebanon against Israel's invasion. One of these clerics, Sheikh Abbas Musawi, formed Hezbollah, or "the Party of God", dedicated to the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon. Not only did Hezbollah stand against Israeli and Western forces but also stood for the marginalised Shia minority which formed the party's popular support base. They were essentially treated like second class citizens in Lebanon and the movement appealed to them. The economic inequality that the Shias of Lebanon faced in the 1970s was, indeed, a major instrument in their mobilisation. What added to this was the support which the movement gained from Iran. In 1982, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards helped Hezbollah expand its military capabilities by providing it training and support in the Bekaa Valley. The Iranian secret service is also said to have contributed in this endeavour. Members of Amal started joining Hezbollah as the group started to gather momentum and expand popular support.[5]

Most importantly, the relationship between Hezbollah and the administrative system of Lebanon is extremely crucial in order to understand its rise and growth in the Lebanese political set-up. In the 1980s, the main political actors in Lebanon were the Lebanese government, the Christians and the Muslims. While the government was extremely weak and unable to exercise considerable influence in the country, the Christian group played a great role in the chaos and violence that took place in the country in this time period, systematically obstructing Syria's efforts to bring stability to the country. This had an indirect impact on the evolution of Hezbollah as well. The third actor was the Muslim group consisting of the Shiites, Sunnis and Druze, striving to take charge of the community. Within the Muslim group further, there were four major players—Amal, Hezbollah, the Druze militia and the Sunni sect.[6]

From the mid-1970s, there was discrimination on the part of the Lebanese government towards the Shiite community, causing frustration among, and acts of protest by, the Shiites. The civil war in 1975 further weakened the political system of the country, thus, further justifying

the existence and role of the Shiite militia. Further, with the Iranian Revolution, violence broke out between the pro-Iranian groups and the Amal movement, alongside that between Palestinian organisations and left-wing organisations in Beirut and southern Lebanon. Thus, an environment of violence and protest spread through the country with the establishment of various sectarian militias, making space for the emergence of protest movements. Soon, the Shiites realised that the Lebanese government lacked the ability to provide basic services as well as security to the community, a job that the Shiite militias could do better. The situation within the political and security arena in Lebanon from the 1970s till about 1982, facilitated the establishment of Hezbollah as a movement that stood for the Shiite community and against the weak yet discriminatory government of the country.[7]

In the following years, while the movement was being consolidated, the Lebanese government, with Amin Gemayel elected as the president in 1982, saw the regulation of a new governmental order in Beirut. However, Gemayel's ignorance towards the Shiite community and signing of an agreement with Israel in 1983, reversed the stability that his efforts were supposed to bring to the country. Another wave of violence, thus, began, along with the renewal of the Sunni-Christian alliance as well as the Amal movement having expanded its control over the Beirut centres of power and economy. This made the Shiite sect an integral part of the Lebanese political system, further giving Hezbollah the leeway to establish itself in a more elaborate manner with provisions of training and operations in Lebanon. Moreover, the Lebanese government's management of the state of affairs was so inadequate that it even led the movement of Shiite resistance in the country to aim at overthrowing the regime through force with the help of the various militias that had come into existence.

In 1985, Hezbollah stated its goal to establish an Islamic republic in Lebanon through the use of violent means. Soon, the Lebanese government realised the grave threat the movement posed to its stability and while it did try to limit and restrain the activities of Hezbollah, it was unable to do so in an effective manner. This conflicting

relationship between the government and the Hezbollah continued until the second half of the 1980s, and while the creation of an Islamic republic was the stated goal of Hezbollah, a debate ensued within the movement on how to achieve this objective. There were two opinions within the internal system of the movement. The first, proposed by Fadlallah and supported by most, was based on the Iranian model of an Islamic republic, with Khomeini's concept of the imposition of Islam all over the world, while resorting to both political and violent means. While anarchy still prevailed in Lebanon, the marginalisation of the Shiites was enabling the support for the Hezbollah movement. In the meantime, Hezbollah refrained from indulging in conflicts amongst the militias in Lebanon, while continuing to act violently against the Amal movement.[8]

While Hezbollah did not interfere in the militias' wars, it did object to the various agreements being conceived at that stage that could have probably changed the situation in the country. The most prominent of this was the Ta'if Agreement, which the group objected to in 1989. The group itself, however, struggled to outline a successful framework for cooperation among the different actors in the Lebanese theatre. Further, Hezbollah's extremist Islamic image also worked against the organisation in garnering support from among the wider Muslim community. The Ta'if Agreement was eventually signed on September 30, 1989, marking a turning point in the administrative system of Lebanon. It was the first attempt in a long time for the stability and continuity of the Lebanese political arena, with some remarkable milestones in its contents.[9]

The Ta'if Agreement changed the dynamics of the Lebanese political arena, making the government a leading player in its aftermath. The Christians, particularly the Maronites, perceived the agreement as an attempt to eliminate their power, while the Muslim group felt the exact opposite. Within the Shiite community, the rivalry between Amal and Hezbollah continued. While the former almost gave up all its arms, the latter refused to do so and continued to strive towards Israel's expulsion from Lebanon as well as its own participation in the political system

as a party. In 1992, while all militias were made to disarm, Hezbollah refused to do so. In 1993, it was agreed upon by the minister of labour that Hezbollah would be allowed to carry out its activities focussed on Israel only, and gain protection from the government in return for sticking to the suggested framework of the government.[10]

By the end of the 1990s, the support for Hezbollah within the government increased with a reshuffling of personnel, and the movement was not disarmed even after the Israeli Defence Forces' (IDF's) withdrawal from Lebanon. In 1992, Lebanon held parliamentary elections after a period of two decades without any elections. Hezbollah won 12 seats in the elections, gaining political representation. It was deeply involved in Lebanon's political system and had a reasonably well laid out political agenda as well. By August 2000, the Lebanese political system was set on the path towards stability and continuity, with the armed militias becoming an integral part of the Lebanese system through parliamentary participation. Thus, the use of violence for achieving ends in Lebanon was replaced by oppositional activity in the Parliament. Eventually, in the same year (2000), when Israeli troops withdrew from the areas they were occupying in Lebanon, Hezbollah gained credit for pushing them out. Its leader, Hassan Nasrallah was seen as the person most instrumental in achieving this objective. With the eviction of the Israelis from Lebanon, Hezbollah was immortalised in the eyes of the Arab world and Nasrallah came to be seen as not just a man of words, but of action, capable of astutely dealing with Israel in a complex situation. While Hezbollah came out looking victorious, Israel lost the image it once had of an undefeated hegemonic power in the West Asian region.[11]

This image of a 'victor' was extremely important for Hezbollah, especially in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the launching of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) by the United States of America. The GWOT put countries such as Lebanon, Iran and Syria in a dilemma with its aim to stop the sponsoring of terrorism by countries that were hosting such organisations. While Iran was seen as the primary symbol

of Islamist fundamentalism in the wake of the Iranian Revolution, Hezbollah was viewed by the US as its terrorist arm that functioned in Lebanon with the country's approval. However, by this time, Lebanon and most of the Arab world understood the necessity of Hezbollah as a militia crucial to counter the Israeli threat in the country, especially its southern parts. Thus, Lebanon, Iran and Syria, along with other Arab countries, refused to acknowledge the 'terrorist' label of Hezbollah, strongly advocating its role as a legitimate resistance organisation. Despite this, there was enough information on the terrorist activities of Hezbollah that only confirmed the US' resolve on the status of the organisation.[12]

Israel and Lebanon went to war again in 2006 when two Israeli soldiers were kidnapped by Hezbollah, causing what came to be known as the July War or the Second Lebanon War. Israel retaliated brutally and around 1,200 people were killed in the conflict, most of whom were Lebanese. Hezbollah also managed to inflict significant damage through its air campaign as well as guerilla warfare with the Israeli Defence Forces. Once again, Hezbollah managed to change the picture around, with Nasrallah interpreting the August 2006 ceasefire implemented by the UN on his own terms. He suggested that Israel always wanted to go to war with Lebanon and further championed the manner in which Hezbollah withstood the aggressive Israeli attack. Israel was subject to harsh international criticism for its brutal force of retaliation and Hezbollah went on to gain even more legitimacy, besides a significant psychological and political boost. Another aspect of Hezbollah's agenda was the philanthropic activities that it carried out. Its social service included charities, humanitarian assistance, along with setting up of hospitals, medical clinics, schools and orphanages. This accelerated the support that the group received from the Shia community, leaving an ideological impact in the minds of Lebanon's poor Shias who had been neglected by their government previously.[13]

In 2006, while Lebanon celebrated five years since the IDF's withdrawal, Nasrallah, in a speech, outlined the importance of Hezbollah as a resistance organisation and set out reasons why

it should not be disarmed—a debate that had taken shape in the internal political system of Lebanon since the disarming of the other militias. He emphasised the threat that Israel posed to Lebanon even after its troops had withdrawn, as it should be considered an enemy country, and, thus, the need to keep the resistance armed and trained in pursuit of the national interest and security. Further, in 2009, Hezbollah's new political manifesto was published, encompassing its marked shift towards achieving its political aim of integrating into the Lebanese system, while hiding its long-term goal of establishing an Islamic republic within the system. Its stance on Israel remained the same and the United States was also portrayed as an 'enemy'. Hezbollah further continued its operational functioning, convincing the Lebanese that its weapons were not directed against internal targets, but against Israel. While Hezbollah did not gain a majority in the Parliament, it managed to wield power within the Lebanese political system. Thus, began the movement's political journey, and its attempt to stay as far away as possible from the terrorist label that it once held.[14]

Thus, the national unity government formed in 2008 had Hezbollah, along with its allies, form the opposition and wield enough authority for veto power. Till date, Hezbollah is considered a terrorist organisation by the United States, Canada, Israel, the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). However, the United Kingdom, as also the European Union and Australia consider Hezbollah's military arm as a terrorist organisation—not its political wing. Despite this, Hezbollah continues to play the role of a legitimate actor in Lebanon, and has been actively involved in Syria during the civil war, as well as in both Iraq and Syria in order to fight the forces of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the region.[15]

Suicide Terrorism in Lebanon

Hezbollah's employment of suicide terrorism was unique in the world. For the group, it was merely a means to achieve its two-fold goal of creating an authentic entity for Shiite identity and combating the Israeli

occupation. It intended to help the group achieve political goals, thereby marking one of the most prominent phases of suicide terrorism as a phenomenon. Suicide seemed like the ultimate weapon for Hezbollah, that was determined to "face force with equal or superior force"[16]. This meant that it understood the need for the use of unconventional methods in order to make up for the asymmetry against the Israeli troops in the conventional sphere. Suicide was, thus, the ultimate and legitimate means for the Shiite Lebanese to defend their land and identity from foreign occupation. Eventually, martyrdom became the end in itself as suicide operations had real coercive value in compelling the opponent to withdraw. It can be said that suicide operations were never designed to defeat the Israeli troops but to show determination and to further threaten them with future and continued punishment.[17]

The group's first suicide bombing was on the Israeli Headquarters (HQ) and intelligence centre in the southern city of Tyre on November 11, 1982 – also celebrated as Martyrs Day by Hezbollah. The group was also instrumental in introducing the concept of vehicle-borne suicide attacks while pursuing its agenda. Hezbollah's suicide attacks proved to be an assurance to the Shiite population that the organisation was a very determined actor in this struggle. The notion of self-sacrifice, which has remained prominent in the mythology of Shiite Islam since the death of Ali (the Prophet's son-in-law), was championed extensively by the group. Martyr videos and suicide testimonies were created and preserved by Hezbollah members in order to encourage recruitment within local communities. Apart from this, public speeches and interviews given by prominent members of the group were used to address the public and explain the need for suicide operations, which the group referred to as "martyrdom operations". Such self-sacrificial aspirations resonated across a large number of Lebanese Shiite Muslims, as 'martyrs' who died fighting the Western forces in Lebanon were commemorated through public rallies and other symbolic means.[18]

Thus, Hezbollah was an organisation created as a result of mobilisation of people who felt marginalised due to the structure and manner in which the state functioned. Further, with the arrival of

foreign military troops, the feeling of alienation also manifested in these people. Together, this formed a deadly combination for the creation of an organisation that was so determined towards its cause and its people that it eventually managed to even gain political expression. Hezbollah is no longer listed as a terrorist organisation and is a unique case of an illegitimate non-state actor gaining the status of a legitimate actor over a period of time due to its undeniable popularity and force. Even today, Hezbollah is considered to be a prominent actor in the West Asian region as it wields both political and military power.

Sri Lanka

One of the most prominent and long lasting suicide campaigns of the world is undoubtedly that of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). As an organisation, the LTTE functioned like a military establishment, with units based on differentiated special operational capabilities. Suicide terrorism was a major part of its campaign and was carried out by the elite component within the LTTE, the Black Tigers. 'Tamil Eelam' means 'independent Tamil state' and that is exactly what the LTTE stood for. The primary agenda was to establish an independent Tamil state in the northern and eastern regions of Sri Lanka, where most Tamils resided. In pursuit of this goal, the LTTE engaged in guerilla warfare as well as suicide attacks in order to tackle the Sri Lankan forces in these areas. Resentment amongst the Tamilians was widely felt across Sri Lanka and led to the formation of many local resistance groups and political parties fighting for the rights of this section of the Sri Lankan society.

The Sri Lankan civil war was a result of an ethnic divide between the Tamils and Sinhalese rooted in Sri Lanka's colonial past. Sri Lanka has been colonised by several powers starting with the Portuguese, the Dutch and, finally, the British, before it eventually gained independence.[19] During these various colonial rules, there was visible ethnic antagonism between the ethnic communities of Sri Lanka. While the Portuguese and Dutch put certain groups in an advantageous position, creating and encouraging religious intolerance,

the British followed the policy of divide and rule. The Sinhalese reaped the benefits of British educational reforms and economic development, while the Tamil population was enlarged in Sri Lanka due to the British bringing in Indian Tamils to work in the coffee plantations. As a result, the Sinhalese occupied sectors such as the civil services, state employment, private sectors and other high paying jobs. At the same time, the growth of plantations proved to be transformational for the Sri Lankan economy, rendering a lot of Tamil and Muslim entrepreneurs with a certain degree of affluence.[20]

With the end of the British colonial rule in 1948 and the drafting of Sri Lanka's new Constitution in 1972, a wave of Sinhalese nationalism took over in Sri Lanka. Right after independence, the government that was established post democratic elections was one of a Sinhalese majority. Further, the Constitution declared Buddhism as the favoured religion and Sinhalese was made the official language. This came as a blow to the Sri Lankan Tamils, who once enjoyed a superior position during the British rule and expected the same to continue. These decisions not only hurt Tamilian sentiments but further rendered them without the opportunities they once had in the fields of employment and education. It seemed as if a conscious effort was being made on behalf of the newly elected Sinhalese government of Sri Lanka to turn the tables. They wanted to make sure that the Sinhalese people received more powers and privileges. One such attempt was made by encouraging Sinhalese settlement on Tamil lands as a means of breaking Tamilian unity.[21]

It was in this backdrop that Vellupillai Prabhakaran came into prominence and eventually went on to form the LTTE. He actively participated in the prominent Tamil political parties and resistance movements over a period of time before coming up with his own version of a Tamil Eelam. He was a man of action and gave the Tamilian people the hope of a separate state where their identity would not be suppressed as it was in Sri Lanka. In this manner, the LTTE was formed based on an ethnic divide, resulting in a civil war which engulfed the state of Sri Lanka for over two decades.[22]

Prabhakaran was not only a man of action but also a man of vision. He understood the functional need for a military-like organisation in order to fight the Sri Lankan Army and convert Tamil territory into an independent state. Further, he also realised the need for different units within the military-like structure of the organisation. Each of the units had a specified and clearly defined role. The Black Tigers, or suicide squad of the LTTE, was no different. They were accorded the highest form of respect and honour as their role was considered the most noble.[23]

Suicide Terrorism in Sri Lanka

The LTTE's use of suicide terrorism was practical in nature as it was intended for carrying out targeted political assassinations or hitting at high risk targets that were otherwise hard to reach. The idea was to counter the Sri Lankan forces and raise the cost of war for the Sri Lankan forces confronting the LTTE. They intended to neutralise the asymmetry in warfare once again and influence the course of political negotiations with the government.

During the First Eelam War (1983-87), the LTTE carried out its first suicide attack. This was the infamous Captain Miller truck bombing incident which left an indelible impression in the minds of the security forces as also the LTTE fighters. However, the attack was more symbolic than anything else. Miller became a key figure in mobilising the Tigers and building a cult of martyrdom within the LTTE. Eventually, in the Second Eelam War (1990-94), suicide attacks were extensively used for assassinations, with significant successes in carrying out political assassinations. This included the death of the former Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, Sri Lankan Minister of Defence Ranjan Wijeratne, Commander of Naval Forces Clancy Fernando and Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa. Such missions were also launched against the Sri Lankan armed forces. The Third Eelam War (1995-2001) saw a total of 62 recorded suicide attacks, including 14 assassinations, together accounting for an estimated 722 fatalities. This marked a dramatic increase in suicide attacks

launched by the LTTE. Global events such as 9/11 and international pressure on terrorist organisations led to a ceasefire agreement and Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between the LTTE and Sri Lankan government. Finally, the Fourth Eelam War (2006-09) led to the military defeat of the LTTE by the Sri Lankan forces. Even during this period, the LTTE launched about 37 suicide attacks, with approximately 372 fatalities.[24]

Post 2009, having militarily defeated the LTTE, Sri Lanka was ready to embark on a journey of reconciliation and rehabilitation. The country had suffered tremendously during the civil war and hence, the government undertook a two-fold post conflict strategy which entailed (i) measures to rehabilitate and reintegrate the former LTTE combatants; and (ii) rebuilding the Tamil communities that were in the northern and eastern regions of Sri Lanka. This strategy has seen a fair success with the involvement and contribution of the private sector, community organisations, international organisations, NGOs, as well as private individuals from different segments of the society.[25]

Rehabilitation work included the deradicalisation of a large number of Tamil youth who were radicalised through the LTTE's "disinformation campaign" that had enabled it to gain a mass following among the Tamils in Sri Lanka. The deradicalisation programme adopted by Sri Lanka was based on the "Way Forward on Rehabilitation, Reinsertion, and Reintegration" (W-RRR) and is known to be one of the world's most effective programmes of this kind. As part of the programme, psycho-social support was extended to former combatants, along with other social, cultural, educational, spiritual and recreational rehabilitation. Emphasis was also laid on skills development so as to make the youth more employable and self-sufficient, thereby reintegrating them into mainstream society. The Sri Lankan Army recruited 100 young Tamil women and various other programmes were launched by the government in order to provide proper employment opportunities to those in need. Alongside rehabilitation and reintegration of individuals, major infrastructural projects were also undertaken by the government in

order to help develop the areas previously occupied by the Tamilians. This was done through aid from various countries and from certain sectors within the country.[26]

Despite these major initiatives taken by the government, it seems there remain several issues of contention, leaving the rehabilitated Tamils disgruntled and dissatisfied. This continues to be a challenge for the government. The LTTE may have been militarily defeated by the Sri Lankan forces, but it has a large support base outside the country that continues to propagate the LTTE ideology and highlight the inadequacies faced by the Tamils in Sri Lanka. The Tamil diaspora has always played, and continues to play, a critical role in the Sri Lankan Tamil cause by highlighting the plight of the Sri Lankan Tamils at the global level and also by raising considerable funds for the Tamil cause. There is a huge Sri Lankan diaspora that still believes in the idea of a separate Tamil state, and continues to spread propaganda and misinformation to this effect. This leaves Sri Lanka's government with the daunting task of not only ensuring peaceful rehabilitation, but further, constantly monitoring the re-radicalisation process or any fresh recruitment of its citizens through such campaigns. This calls for an effective monitoring mechanism to be put in place so as to not let history repeat itself.[27]

Thus, Sri Lanka saw the mobilisation of an ethnic community due to marginalisation through the Constitution of the newly independent country. The Tamilians found themselves economically marginalised, with lack of opportunities due to reservations and special privileges given to the majority Sinhalese. Even in the political sphere, the government was formed by the Sinhalese which only led to the further alienation of Tamilians in each and every sphere. Once again, alienation of a minority community resulted in the creation of an agenda by the deprived community so as to reclaim their land and rights. Prabhakaran was the most instrumental in garnering these sentiments and channelising them into an organisation, with the most long lasting suicide campaign ever.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan is a country that has seen massive civil unrest and military occupation over the decades. Although violence is common to Afghanistan, suicide terrorism only began in 2001. The number of suicide attacks that have taken place in Afghanistan has increased ever since, starting with a sharp rise in 2006. It can be said that Western military occupation and a collective sense of alienation among the Afghans against the occupiers brought Afghanistan constantly under a crisis of confidence.[28] Thus, suicide attacks soon became a strategy adopted by all elements in the Afghan society trying to resist foreign occupation. While Afghanistan is often considered as the launch pad of many terrorist organisations that continue to be active even today, the circumstances that enabled this must be fully understood.

During the years of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the primary agenda of the United States was to contain the spread of Communism. Pakistan became the frontline state as the US provided it equipment and financial aid to build a resistance movement against the Soviets. This resulted in the creation of *mujahideen* resistance groups based in Pakistan that received military and financial help from the CIA through Pakistan's ISI. Apart from curbing Communism, there were other selfish objectives that these groups were working towards at the behest of Pakistan.[29]

After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the USSR continued to fund the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, leading to a civil war between the Soviet backed government in Kabul and the *mujahideen* fighters who had fought against Soviet troops. These fighters were trained by staunch leaders like Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden and the withdrawal of the Soviet troops gave them a sense of victory and success, thus, further enhancing their confidence. It had begun to appear to them that they were the protectors of their land and the fate of Afghanistan was in their hands. Subsequently, with the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, the Najibullah government in Afghanistan[30] also collapsed, making way for the *mujahideen* to take over Kabul in April 1992, pushing Afghanistan into the second phase of the civil war.[31]

The collapse of the government in Kabul in 1992 was followed by a phase of internecine conflict involving the tribal warlords spread across the country. It was in this backdrop that the Afghan Taliban was formed under the leadership of Mullah Muhammad Omar. The Afghan Taliban was an organisation devoted to implementing *Sharia* law[32] and ending corruption among the *mujahideen* warlords. It was a predominantly Pashtun movement. Most Afghans in the beginning welcomed the Taliban as it gave them a ray of hope in a war stricken and lawless Afghanistan, where the Taliban seemed like the only stabilising factor. By 1996, the Taliban became a force to reckon with; so much so, that it made Osama bin Laden, who was looking for shelter, return to Afghanistan from his place of hiding in Sudan.[33]

Osama bin Laden worked together with Mullah Omar, although their mandates varied. Bin Laden had expertise in leadership, politicking skills, networking as well as access to funds which Mullah Omar stood to gain from. Omar's focus was solely directed towards the local rebellion within Afghanistan and the establishment of the Afghan Taliban. On the other hand, Bin Laden had a global mandate and his followers looked towards global *jihad* and protecting Islam, with an anti-Western stance. While the Taliban is said to have gained a lot of its ideological leanings from Al Qaeda, it maintained its separate political objectives. Pakistan, at this point, was aiming to establish a pro-Pakistan Taliban in power in Afghanistan, as part of its policy of seeking "strategic depth" in Afghanistan. This made the Afghan Taliban an effective player for Pakistan and the ISI supported Mullah Omar in pursuit of a Pakistan-influenced Taliban.[34]

The first suicide bombing in Afghanistan took place two days ahead of the historic terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in New York. On September 9, 2001, Ahmad Shah Masood was killed by Al Qaeda operatives who detonated themselves while posing as journalists asking him questions. Masood was a war hero from the time of the Soviet-Afghan War and was the leader of the Northern Alliance which was an anti-Taliban formation, and was being rooted by the US to establish its regime in Afghanistan.[35] The Northern Alliance was predominantly

made up of the remaining warlords in Afghanistan of Uzbek or Tajik origin, along with some Pashtuns like Hamid Karzai. The suicide attack in which Masood died was a strategic move directed by Al Qaeda. While the plan for 9/11 was set, Al Qaeda foresaw that the US would trace the incident back to Al Qaeda and, thus, arrive in Afghanistan. In this case, the Northern Alliance, with Masood as its leader, would have been instrumental in helping the US in driving the terror elements out of Afghanistan. The first suicide attack in Afghanistan could be, thus, linked to this understanding of Al Qaeda.[36]

Following 9/11, the US bolstered the Northern Alliance and sent troops into Afghanistan with an aim to target Al Qaeda and other terror entities. The Northern Alliance aided the US, and with precision air power and deployment of US Special Forces, the Western powers managed to systematically exert influence in most of Afghanistan. The Taliban regime was removed swiftly by the foreign troops deployed in Afghanistan, who at one point had managed to even corner Osama bin Laden, though he eventually escaped to Pakistan. This was part of Operation Enduring Freedom, causing Al Qaeda to resettle along Pakistan's northwestern border with Afghanistan, and Mullah Omar shifting to Quetta. Gen Musharraf, the then president of Pakistan, came under considerable international pressure and joined the bandwagon of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) launched by the US. In effect, this meant Pakistan had to denounce the groups that it had once created during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as terrorist organisations.[37]

Following a meeting under the UN auspices in Bonn in December 2001 with all representatives involved in Afghanistan, an interim government was set up, led by Hamid Karzai.[38] This was to enable an environment conducive to transition in Afghanistan. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)[39] was also agreed to be deployed as part of military efforts in order to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in its endeavours. In the next few years, military operations were launched in Afghanistan which saw the arrival of troops from other countries like Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Norway and the United Kingdom. Apart from this, the Marshall Plan was also

implemented as part of efforts towards reconstruction and nation-building.[40]

In 2004, Hamid Karzai was elected in the first democratic elections in Afghanistan. His government was regarded as weak and corrupt and was marred by inadequate international support and continued differences among ethnic Afghans within the system. By 2005-06, the US appeared confident of success and victory in the Afghan theatre, in spite of the increased intensity of suicide bombings and use of IEDs by the Taliban and a growing anti-US and anti-West sentiment among them. The 2006 NATO and US bombings further added to the confidence that US and NATO forces had in achieving success in Afghanistan. However, the spate of bombings had caused significant anti-West sentiments among the Afghans and, in reality, triggered the resurgence of the Taliban.[41]

Suicide Terrorism in Afghanistan

Afghanistan had not witnessed suicide attacks while the *mujahideen* fought against the Soviets. What changed in 2001 was the significant growth of Al Qaeda and its allies in the global *jihadi* movement that helped in imposing, and in a way, importing, suicide terrorism to Afghanistan.[42]

By 2005, the warlords of the 1990s returned to the scene in Afghanistan, in the backdrop of ineffective governance by Karzai, who was not very successful in dealing with them. Amidst this, the local population of Afghanistan was caught between the Western forces and the insurgents. Air strikes carried out by the Western forces caused significant civilian casualties. This not only led to the emergence of the Taliban and its various factions, but also encouraged them to adopt[43] newer tactics, including the use of suicide bombings and IEDs, causing heavy casualties. Only 14 suicide attacks were witnessed post US invasion between 2001-05. But, a sharp rise was seen in 2006, with 93 attacks that year. This increased the following year to 137 and 136 in 2007 and 2008 respectively. The steady increase in suicide attacks perpetrated by the Taliban was also due to the increased training of

Taliban soldiers by Al Qaeda operatives as well as the liberal funding available through poppy cultivation. By 2006, Afghanistan had become the supplier of 90 percent of the world's illicit opium. While Washington continued to address its victory, it was clear to the troops on the ground that the Taliban had extensive plans in mind. They were looking to extend their campaign.[44]

Before 2005, suicide bombing was not so common in Afghanistan. Originally, the Taliban was militantly anti-technology; however, newer factions of the Taliban, sometimes referred to as New Taliban or Neo-Taliban were tech-savvy and used the internet for recruitment and propaganda purposes. They connected with Al Qaeda's global agenda and were the first to help bring suicide terrorism to Afghanistan through Al Qaeda's ideological narrative in 2005. Significantly, the Afghan fighters, mostly Pashtuns, who initially appeared unwilling to accept use of suicide bombing as a tactic right away, being a concept alien to their culture, subsequently accepted it, and by 2005, suicide terrorism became the most commonly used method to take down targets. The suicide bombings in Iraq recorded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi of the Al Qaeda faction in Iraq in 2003, were also useful in convincing the Afghan militants of the effectiveness of the tactic. Zarqawi's propaganda videos consisted of suicide attacks, testimonies and executions that were dubbed into Pashtu for the Pashtuns. This clearly paid off as Mullah Omar, who had once been sceptical about suicide attacks, was forced to reverse his stance on the same. He devised an ideological framework that accepted and justified suicide bombing, granting it legitimacy in the Taliban culture. However, the suicide bombers in Afghanistan could not be compared to those in Iraq as the Pashtuns preferred to use suicide bombings against military and political targets, harming as few civilians as possible. The Neo-Taliban suicide attackers are known to have a poor operational record in comparison to Iraq, owing to the inherent reluctance that the Pashtuns had with respect to suicide. This does not take away from the fact that Afghanistan witnessed over 500 suicide attacks as of 2010, killing over 2,000 people.[45]

By 2014,[46] US troops began to withdraw which was seen as a prime opportunity for the Taliban to strike back. The year saw a massive hike in suicide attacks. [See Figs 6.1[47] and 6.2[48]] The Afghan Taliban took advantage of the situation and intensified their fight, causing more than 3,188 civilian deaths that year, three-fourths of which were due to the Taliban.[49] However, the targets of most Taliban suicide attacks were high-risk ones, including well secured US and other Western bases and troops. A lot of casualties among the Afghan National Army and the police also ensued. The US agreed to engage in continued military support to Afghanistan after 2014 and both sides mutually agreed to send back troops gradually. This was to ensure that the sudden vacuum in Afghanistan did not cause civil unrest once agan.

Fig 6.1: Graph Portraying Incidents of Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan from 2001-2017



Source: Global Terrorism Database (University of Maryland)

Fig 6.2: Graph Portraying Incidents of Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan in 2014

Total incidents = 187



Source: Global Terrorism Database (University of Maryland)

While suicide terrorism, in particular, only came to Afghanistan in 2001, it gained prominence thereafter due to several reasons. First, the *mujahideen* had been successful in overthrowing the Soviets and this gave them a boost of confidence to fight against the next superpower, the United States of America. Thus, the Al Qaeda and Taliban, along with other militant factions fighting the regime in Afghanistan, had successfully managed to penetrate the broader *jihadi* community, with expertise and training that enabled them to gain knowledge on suicide tactics from Al Qaeda.

Second, Osama bin Laden's narrative and propaganda mechanism helped spread an ideology that no longer spoke of protecting the land but of opposing the West in every possible manner. This led to justifying the use of suicide attacks or the attainment of martyrdom as perceived by the fighters. It made the Pashtuns break their traditional stance on suicide and accept it for the "greater good". Suicide bombing seemed to both Afghan militants and Al Qaeda as the most effective tactic in targeted killings. This strategic insight into the effectiveness of suicide bombing was also provided by other suicide terror outfits such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the LTTE, and, most importantly, by the

faction of Al Qaeda in Iraq that was simultaneously fighting a similar war. The incident of September 11, while shocking the world, was portrayed as one of the most heroic acts in the world of terror. The highly effective manner of conduct of the operations and the level and intensity of impact it created universally not only added credibility to such operations, with militants aspiring to achieve similar successes but also gave immense legitimacy to suicidal acts of terror. The long lasting psychological impact of suicide bombing was also realised in this manner, thereby making all elements of the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda a recognisable force to be dealt with. It gave them the visibility and image that no other previous guerilla tactic could.

Challenges and Vulnerabilities of the State

Afghanistan and Pakistan are countries that continue to face challenges in ensuring security with respect to suicide terrorism and are two of the main victims of the phenomenon. It is worthwhile to understand the vulnerabilities of the state and the conditions within the state that have enabled such an environment to persist till date.

Afghanistan continues to be a country that never got the chance to take its fate in its own hands, especially since 1979. This has exposed the country to the involvement of several actors, a frustrated local population and a deteriorating security situation. There are many factors arising out of the state's structure and functioning that have contributed further towards this declining trend and continued to impact the nation even after the withdrawal of most troops in 2014. As a result, terrorism continued to be on the rise in Afghanistan, with over 11,500 people having been killed or injured in the year 2016.[50] Another development that has taken shape since 2015 is the creation of the Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA), consisting of several Taliban splinter elements occupying the Eastern Nangarhar province. This entity is distinct from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and is known to be an Afghan version of the Islamic State. Known for its brutality and harsh conduct, the Islamic State of Afghanistan has attracted international attention, so much so the

US was compelled to use the Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB) to wipe out territories dominated by the ISA. This development, indeed, worsened the security situation in Afghanistan and also made the Taliban seem more legitimate, generating resentment towards the ISA due to its inhumane and brutal operational tactics.

In the years post 2014, the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) was to take charge of the security situation in Afghanistan after the US and NATO forces handed over responsibility. However, the ANSF did not fare well owing to the aggressive and professional military campaign conducted by the Taliban against it. Insecurity increased in the country since 2014, with civilian deaths rising and several territories falling under the Taliban. One of the major hindrances in the ANSF's effective functioning was the deep-rooted corruption prevalent in Afghan society which impacted its performance to a great extent. The military capabilities of the Taliban have been strong due to the sanctuaries held by it in Pakistan's tribal areas such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) as well as in Balochistan. Apart from acting as safe havens, these sanctuaries provided the Taliban sufficient advantages in terms of intelligence collection and organising military support.[51]

Pakistan's role in Afghanistan has been extremely crucial as it has always been an important contributor to the political and security situation in Afghanistan. The lens through which Pakistan views Afghanistan is influenced by its relationship with India. Pakistan considers Afghanistan part of its geostrategic interest and relevance due to its prolonged involvement in Afghanistan and the traditional ethnic linkages among the tribals dominating the border regions of both countries. Thus, in spite of being a nominal strategic ally of the US, receiving financial and military aid from the US as part of counter-terrorism assistance, Pakistan continues to extend support to anti-Afghanistan militant groups in an attempt to fulfill its strategic objectives. This "*reflects the persistent view of the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment that the jihadi groups are critical assets in preventing threats on Pakistan's western flank from an India-friendly*

regime in Kabul and in securing access to Central Asia's trade routes", as mentioned by Vanda Felbab-Brown, an American expert on internal and international organised crime.[52]

The most important factor in the Taliban's increasing support and strength in Afghanistan, however, remains the extremely weak and limited writ of the government and its failure in state-building efforts post the Taliban regime. Kabul's writ has been shrinking steadily, with influence over only half of the 407 districts up until 2017.[53] The government has been unable to deliver good governance and ensure stability or security within its borders. During his presidency from 2001-14, President Hamid Karzai failed to bring about economic development, ensure the rule of the law, and sustain economic and social development in Afghanistan. Corruption, nepotism, tribal discrimination, land theft and other illegal activities influenced the bureaucracy, especially the police and the judiciary, during his tenure. There did not exist any proper mechanism to grant justice or treat everyone equally and fairly. In this backdrop, the Taliban, with its harsh and stringent means of disbursing justice, earned credibility in the eyes of the public and was, thus, successful in forming a shadow government in Afghanistan. This made the Taliban all the more legitimate and powerful as it gained the acceptance of most Afghans who had no better alternative to the state. While improving governance and reducing corruption has been the main agenda for the subsequent governments in power in Afghanistan, not enough was done in terms of visible deliverables. The tangle of ethnic divisions or rifts and competing patronage networks within the Afghan security system complicate all such anti-corruption efforts.[54]

Economically too, Afghanistan found it challenging to cope in the years after 2014, with political instability and a volatile state of security prevailing. The agricultural sector that shapes a significant portion of Aghanistan's GDP, has remained underdeveloped due to the political and security transitions taking place in the country. The inability of the international community to ensure alternate crop cultivation replacing

poppy cultivation only further added to the woes of the Afghan people. These negativities have clearly overshadowed efforts by the international community to extend foreign aid since 2001 for assistance in nation-building in Afghanistan. On its part, at the international level too, Afghanistan seems to have forged ahead with economic cooperation and regional integration with its formal admission to the World Trade Orgnisation (WTO) in 2016 and joining the Chabahar port agreement among India, Iran and Afghanistan. However, these are initiatives that would show benefits in the long term. In the prevailing circumstances, at the national level, the core worrisome factors have been the extremely low agricultural yield, the fragile social fabric marred by multi-ethnic divisions and the mass scale unemployment that the Afghan society faces today. These have emerged as vulnerable aspects of the state, with the aimless youth, susceptible to mobilisation by elements such as the Afghan Taliban and other similar entities operating in Afghanistan today.[55]

In order to enable regional cooperation with Afghanistan, it is important that countries refrain from linking their strategic interests with assistance and aid to Afghanistan. At the same time, for any external assistance to produce results, there is a need for the country to earn its sovereignty first. This should be accompanied by strengthening checks and balances in order to ensure good governance and making the entire political and security system transparent. The government in Afghanistan must also proactively focus on ending corruption, encouraging service delivery, and generating employment—only then can it hope for the results of its international achievements to be felt.

Pakistan

Military operations in the tribal areas targeting the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda resulted in clearing away militants from Afghanistan who for years had found safe havens in Pakistan.[56] Pakistan used militant groups as part of its strategy to secure its regional and political interests from the time of the Soviet invasion. Subsequently, Pakistan used

these groups to further serve its purpose by using them against India. The continued utilisation of militant formations even after the Soviet withdrawal to serve its own purpose, went on to eventually destabilise Pakistan and its society, as the Af-Pak border became increasingly porous, with militants moving covertly from support bases in Pakistan for operations in Afghanistan.[57]

Pakistan, ever since its creation, has had a sensitive relationship with India, focussing on a "security-centric desire to hold its own against India".[58] Rampant militancy and violence has manifested in Pakistan for more than three decades now, but was only noticed globally post 9/11. Militant groups have been part of Pakistan's strategy of proxy wars and, therefore, have become an integral part of Pakistan's security strategy—both regionally and internationally. During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan was receiving aid from the CIA to foster the working of *mujahideen* groups, who also served the interests of Pakistan. These fighters became a crucial component of Pakistan's military and security policy. With the Soviet withdrawal, the effectiveness of such a strategy was realised, making the *mujahids* or *jihadis* an indisputable asset for Pakistan. The narrative of a *jihadi* was glorified in mainstream Pakistani society as well and introduced in the spheres of education and policy-making.

During the Soviet invasion and its withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan never faced a serious security threat from militancy. It posed as a strategic base as well as recruiting ground for militant organisations operating in Afghanistan. When the US entered Afghanistan in 2001 and the Global War on Terror (GWOT) was launched, most militant outfits were forced to flee and resettle along the Af-Pak border. Some took shelter in the tribal regions in Pakistan, which had already become a base for a number of Afghan militants. Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban were successful in using Pakistani soil not only for shelter but for operational planning and undertaking missions deep inside Afghanistan, targeting international troops stationed there. Pakistan's tribal belt—FATA, KPK and Balochistan provinces—were the main sources of human

and material assistance for such militant campaigns to flourish in Afghanistan. Further, the exponential increase in *madrassas* along the area enabled recruitment of young fighters to such organisations. In this manner, both Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban managed to ignite the fervour of *jihad* within Pakistan as well.[59]

Until 9/11, the agendas of both the state of Pakistan as well as the militant *jihadi* organisations were somewhat aligned, however, the launching of the GWOT after 9/11 forced Pakistan to take a contradictory step. President Musharraf, under immense international pressure and out of fear of international isolation, joined the GWOT bandwagon. This meant a drastic reduction in Pakistan's support to militancy, especially activities directed towards India as well as the denouncement of several militant elements as 'terrorists'. This did not go down well with the militant groups and Islamist radicals in Pakistan, especially Pakistan's decision on military intervention in South Waziristan Agency of FATA in 2002. The state's mandate was to obliterate all 'foreign' terrorists, a clever tactic which excluded the likes of Mullah Omar and his Taliban under this label. The military's target was, therefore, Al Qaeda operatives and not the Afghan Taliban or the Pakistani militant outfits. Essentially, the original Taliban was known to have helped Pakistan in pursuing its national security objectives against India and, hence, Musharraf wanted to shelter Taliban leaders while targeting Al Qaeda suspects. Among the large number of militants killed in these operations, none of the prominent Afghan Taliban names figured in the list.

Pakistan's overall strategy included planned military operations against militant groups and their hideouts in Pakistan while simultaneously pursuing peace deals which also saw cooperation between Pakistan and the US on operations in Afghanistan. However, while being seen as adhering to the needs and requirements of the US, Pakistan was playing its own 'double game'. This led to a situation where factions allied to the Pakistan government operated brazenly with the support and blessings of the army, whereas the hostile factions continued to be at war with the Pakistan Army.

In 2007, things changed significantly in Pakistan as a result of the operation by the army on Lal Masjid, a mosque propagating fundamentalist Islamic ideology directed against the Pakistani state. The mosque pursued an agenda aimed at creating a state based on *Sharia* law. The siege rendered approximately 100 people dead and created a fierce rift between most militant factions associated with the Lal Masjid (this included the Neo-Taliban). The siege was generally not acceptable to most militant outfits in Pakistan and the country came face to face with its militancy challenge that went well beyond foreign fighters. These militants gradually went on to align themselves under an umbrella organisation called the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which was anti-state in nature.[60]

Suicide Terrorism in Pakistan

The phase of suicide terrorism began in Pakistan in 2002,[61] following which each year saw a steady increase in the employment of the tactic. Suicide terrorism in Pakistan was aimed mainly against the state and security forces, as well as for targeted killings. The TTP was officially formed in 2007 and was backed by Al Qaeda in its suicide missions in Pakistan. The TTP and other Taliban factions trained suicide bombers to also operate in Afghanistan, targeting Western troops. By 2008, the number of suicide attacks in Pakistan had surpassed those in Iraq or Afghanistan. Most of these attacks took place in FATA till 2009. These were anti-state attacks by militants who were retaliating against the occupation of Afghanistan by the Western forces and the role of Pakistan in enabling the West in doing so.[62] At the same time, the anti-India outfits carried out attacks in the Kashmir Valley and elsewhere in India, which were perpetrated by groups such as the LeT and JeM. These were supported and encouraged by the Pakistani establishment and yet fell in line with the state agenda. The rise in incidents of suicide terrorism in Pakistan can be seen from Fig 6.3[63] wherein the majority of the attacks was carried out by the TTP.

Fig 6.3: Graph Portraying Incidents of Suicide Attacks in Pakistan from 2001-2017

Total incidents = 508



Source: Global Terrorism Database (University of Maryland)

Al Qaeda carried out the first suicide attack in Pakistan in 1995, after which it has collaborated and encouraged Pakistani *jihadi* groups in using the tactic to achieve their goals and striking their desired targets. In this manner, Al Qaeda managed to set the "trend" of suicide terrorism in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.[64] In fact, not just anti-state groups but even sectarian groups like the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) employed the tactic, becoming the first ever sectarian group to do so. What complemented Al Qaeda's encouragement of suicide bombing was the radical *madrassas* in Pakistan that were responsible for indoctrination of suicide bombers. Religion was used as a tool to aggravate sentiments and justify self-sacrifice. However, religion was never the sole driver of such a wide suicide campaign in Pakistan. There were other reasons which contributed towards this. The Western military operations near FATA and KPK supported by Pakistan, indeed, caused major civilian casualties. This left members of families that had suffered casualties in counter-terror operations by the military with a feeling of betrayal by their own state, and enmity towards the West. Thus, personal revenge is seen to be one of the primary reasons behind the voluntary recruitment of suicide bombers. In fact, US drone strikes have been known to accelerate the rate of

recruitment of suicide bombers by various militant organisations operating in the area.[65]

Apart from personal grievances, there was general disaffection among most Pakistanis because of their country's support to the West. This was not seen positively due to the extensive collateral damage that drone strikes caused, creating an inherent aversion towards Pakistan's support for the West among the masses. Recruiters of militant organisations would manipulate such grievances and channelise these sentiments to serve their agenda. Needless to say, the areas from where most of the suicide attackers originate are impoverished, economically deprived and poverty stricken. This is why false promises are made to most recruits, assuring them better prospects in their afterlife and an "easy ticket to paradise". Such communities have also inculcated a sense of prestige towards those who kill themselves in militant operations, attaching honour with the act of suicide terrorism. These are all contributing factors towards increased use of suicide terrorism in Pakistan and the growing hatred against the state amongst its wider (militant) population.

Terror entities planned and carried out a number of deadly suicide attacks targeting the Pakistani security forces over a period of time, leading to serious casualties and denting the morale of the security forces. Suicide bombers, thus, became a strategic asset to the militants who used them for physical destruction as well as psychological defiance against the state. While suicide terrorism was used by several militant organisations operating in the area, backed by Al Qaeda, it was in 2007 that the number of suicide attacks in Pakistan increased. This was due to the formation of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) which made the country realise the extent to which suicide terrorism can cause a dent in the psyche of a nation, with fear and chaos dominating the day-to-day lives of the people. Being an anti-state organisation, its attacks were spread across the country and its target areas went beyond the tribal areas of Pakistan. Most recruits for the TTP as suicide bombers were from among a cross-section of disoriented youth who were recruited by TTP commanders on the basis of promises, monetary rewards, prestige, honour, etc, all in the name of religion and righteousness.[66]

While Pakistan carried out military operations in its tribal areas in an effort to counter insurgency and terrorism post 9/11, the situation on the ground was not as simple as it appeared. The complication arose from the fact that Pakistan had once been responsible for creating these organisations and now had to treat them as an enemy. This not only led to a strong anti-US sentiment among the tribals of Pakistan who had suffered massive civilian losses due to the military operations; it further led to antagonism towards their own government which supported the US. Pakistan extended support to factions within the Taliban as a hedging policy against India in Afghanistan, and was soon exposed to the CIA and most of the world for its selective definitions of terrorism and their exploitation. While peace deals were signed, in reality, the number of training centres and the intensity of militancy in tribal Pakistan were only increasing, so much so that the TTP eventually emerged as an umbrella organisation under which anti-state militant factions operated.[67]

Suicide terrorism has been on the rise in Pakistan, with the TTP being responsible for most terror incidents. Attacks in public places came in for a lot of criticism as these led to massive civilian losses. Pakistan is, as of today, one of the worst hit victims of terrorism and insurgency as it reels under its own contradictory policies and vision of national security. From fomenting insurgency in pursuit of national interest to countering it, the country has found itself in the middle of a complex situation. While Pakistan's biggest worry was once its eastern border with India, it seems as though its problem of insurgency and security along its western borders has taken the entire focus now.

State's Vulnerabilities and Challenges

Pakistan's political theatre is dominated by the military and shown a fledgling trend. The army in Pakistan controls virtually every aspect of the state's functioning, whether it is the political leaders and parties or the judiciary, hindering the very basic principles of democracy. The army's domination is evident from the fact that President Musharraf managed to get away with his 'double game' at the time of the GWOT

agreements and this trend continues to thrive in Pakistan's political landscape even today, causing an unbalanced civil-military relationship.

Apart from the political and military domains of Pakistan, there are many other problems that exist within other spheres of the state. These have equally enabled the radicalisation and recruitment of individuals into terror outfits. The first of these is the education system of Pakistan which has been Islamised by law since the time of Gen Zia-ul-Haq. As a result, Islamic ideology permeates the thinking of a majority of the population, resulting in the creation and existence of a completely Islamised society. The freedom and elan with which radical Islamist leaders such as Hafiz Saeed continue their large scale public congregations unhindered is a reflection of the same. According to the Sustainable Development Policy Development Institute in Islamabad, *madrassas* as well as education material in government schools institutionalise hate, intolerance and a distorted world view. Further, Pakistan ranks 113 out of 120 countries in the Education Development Index and continues to provide budgetary support to education which is much lower than international standards. This has led to a population which is poorly educated and lacks general public awareness, and is easily susceptible to militant recruitment and indoctrination.[68]

Furthermore, Pakistan's poverty levels have increased from 18 percent in 1981 to 33 percent in 2017. Given its fast rising population, Pakistan has the potential to enjoy a demographic dividend which is only possible if the working population produces more than it consumes and is absorbed in the labour market. The economy of Pakistan, growing at 5 percent, generates less than a million jobs per year, in contrast to the 3 million entering the labour market annually. Thus, the youth are not gainfully employed, creating a massive threat to the law and order situation with increased levels of frustration, alienation, radicalisation and violence. Despite this, Pakistan has made no structural changes to improve its economy or generate employment for its people. The inherent problem in Pakistan remains the control of the army in all spheres of life and the manner in which it treats militant *jihadist* outfits as assets in its pursuit of national interest. The army's mentality of

Islamisation with respect to concepts such as security and war, have penetrated each and every section of the Pakistani society.[69]

Conclusion

Suicide terrorism as a tactic has definitely evolved manifold. From ethnic differences in Lebanon and Sri Lanka to religious ideology and extremism which took over the Af-Pak region, suicide seemed to resonate with each of these campaigns that believed it was the only means to their end. Initially, these suicide campaigns were limited to regional conflicts but soon the fight was no longer with a local enemy but with an ideology itself. While each suicide campaign stands distinctly unique from the other, there are some common features that can be found at its roots. Understanding these common features also gives an insight into how states become a fertile ground for such campaigns where people are pushed to believe that suicide will help further their goals.

The first of these features would be the alienation of individuals. The moment there is a sense of 'us' versus 'them', that is where a process of radicalisation is most likely to begin. In countries such as Sri Lanka and Lebanon, the Constitution itself marginalised certain communities, making them feel like lesser equals. This not only creates a sense of alienation within the community among its own countrymen, but further creates a feeling of disappointment and mistrust towards the state itself. In the case of Afghanistan, alienation was felt due to a Western force that had imposed itself on the country by invading it. The psychological impact of an invasion into a country can be immense on the locals who feel as though they are being seen with suspicion by their occupiers. This can then pave the way for not just alienation but immense hatred towards such a foreign force. In Pakistan as well, the locals started feeling betrayed by their own government that seemed to be working at the behest of the United States. This created not just an atmosphere of betrayal towards their own people but further, a resentment towards the West, which although had not occupied their territory, was conducting military operations to eliminate outfits

that they were responsible for creating in the first place. More often than not, the masses can be easily mobilised when such sentiments are widely prevalent among a large number of people who would like to take charge of the situation and work for the collective. This feeling of alienation and betrayal makes for one of the most dangerous ingredients of suicide terrorism. While it is impossible for a country to not have any marginalised communities, at the same time, it is pertinent to understand the level and intensity of the marginalisation so as to not let the situation get out of control.

In most countries that have seen the use of suicide terrorism, there is always a clearly defined enemy. However, this enemy is perceived by the suicide terror outfit as an "occupier".[70] Whether it be the Shiite Muslims of Lebanon, who realised that the prolonged Israeli intervention was turning out to be a protracted occupation of the country, or the Tamils of Sri Lanka, who felt their Eelam should be a separate entity which was being encroached upon by the Sinhalese, or the Afghans, who were constantly reeling under foreign occupation by the Western powers, or for that matter, the Pakistanis, who felt as though the United States was making them go against their own country. In each of these cases, there is a clear occupier who is resented by a large cross-section of people. It is not an unknown fact that a common enemy can bring together people in a fierce manner and that is exactly what the perceived occupier did for each of these campaigns. This enemy was not only hated by an entire community but fighting against it was seen as the noblest act because it was for the greater and collective good. Today, with the spread of extremist religious ideology, even though the Af-Pak region does not witness occupation and intervention on the scale it did at one stage, the Western forces have intervened in the matters of Muslim countries enough number of times for the narrative of the West trying to 'control' or 'interfere' in the matters of Muslim countries, to hold its ground even today.

Campaigns of suicide terrorism are successful only if there are enough number of people drawn towards the cause and willing to give up their lives. In some countries, the circumstances lead them to believe

that suicide terrorism is the right path to take. In line with the fact that a feeling of alienation pushes individuals to join such a campaign, it can be said that economic turmoil or the feeling of being 'underprivileged' is a powerful force in driving them to do so too. In Lebanon and Sri Lanka, the marginalised communities of Shiite Muslims and Tamils both felt that they were not being treated fairly and, thus, were pessimistic about any satisfactory economic prospects as most opportunities were taken away by the majority community. Further, political instability goes hand-in-hand with economic turmoil. Countries which are politically unstable are known to be breeding grounds for rogue elements due to dissatisfaction with the state and the lack of an alternative path. In such an environment, local resistance groups and activism are not uncommon and radical ideas gain momentum easily.

Finally, while states that have witnessed suicide terrorism try to tackle the problem, they often end up feeding the narrative of such outfits by causing civilian casualties as part of their operations and not really working towards the root causes of resentment among the people. The loss of loved ones during military operations or encounters can create heightened anger among the marginalised community, thereby making them more convinced about seeking revenge, even if they have to give up their lives for the same. This phenomenon is very aptly reflected in the Af-Pak region where most volunteers are seeking revenge for the loss of family members due to the drone strikes. This is a less talked about reason that has been creating more and more volunteers and recruits of suicide terrorism.

While Lebanon and Sri Lanka have been successful in suppressing suicide terrorism in their countries, it has not been an easy task and continues to call for effective monitoring and surveillance in order to ensure that history is not repeated. Suicide terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan remains a challenge to be tackled, with multiple actors involved and constantly shifting agendas being enforced by each of these actors. The Af-Pak region continues to be a major hub of terror and is rife with radical elements with a vicious ideology. It becomes crucial for these countries and all the international players involved

in the region to help in addressing the root causes of the problem and taking up a crystal ball approach towards countering terrorism. It must be understood that while terrorism cannot always be defeated, it can be managed. This management requires an appropriate combination of both hard and soft power that factors in the different domains of a state's functioning i.e. economic, political, social, religious, and education in order to effectively control the situation.

Notes

1. Lebanon: Constitutional Law and the Political Rights of Religious Communities. Available at: https://www.loc.gov/law/help/lebanon-constitutional-law.php. Last accessed on August 4, 2018.
2. Robert A. Pape and James K. Feldman, *Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010), pp. 194–215.
3. Jerold M. Post, *The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to Al-Qaeda* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 161-174.
4. Ibid.
5. Post, n. 3, pp. 161-173.
6. Eitan Azani, *Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God – From Revolution to Institutionalization* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), pp. 137-174.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Azani, n. 6, pp. 137-174.
10. Joseph Bahout, "The Unraveling of Lebanon's Taif Agreement: Limits of Sect-Based Power Sharing", *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, May 16, 2016. Available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/05/16/unraveling-of-lebanon-s-taif-agreement-limits-of-sect-based-power-sharing-pub-63571. Last accessed on May 10, 2018.
11. Ibid.
12. Judith Palmer Harik, *Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2005), pp. 163-175.
13. Post, n. 2, pp. 161-173.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Capt Daniel Helmer, "Hezbollah's Employment of Suicide Bombing During the 1980s – The Theological, Political and Operational Development of a New Tactic", *US Army Press*, July-August 2006. Available at: http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20060831_art012.pdf. Last accessed on May 10,2018.
17. Pape and Feldman, n. 2, pp. 194 – 215.
18. Ibid.
19. Although Sri Lanka was still part of the Commonwealth in 1948.
20. Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 45-75.
21. Pape and Feldman, n. 2, pp. 284-317.

22. Post, n.3, pp. 83-100.
23. Ibid.
24. Pape and Feldman, n.2, pp. 284-317.
25. Iromi Dharmawardhane, "Sri Lanka's Post Conflict Strategy: Restorative Justice for Rebels and Rebuilding of Conflict-affected Communities", *Perspectives on Terrorism,* Vol 7, Issue 6, December 2013, pp. 27-57.
26. Ibid.
27. Dharmawardhane, n. 25, pp. 27-57.
28. Pape and Feldman, n. 2, pp. 112-137.
29. Toby Dodge and Nicholas Redman, "Afghanistan To 2015 and Beyond", IISS, p. 34.
30. The government was led by the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan with President Mohammad Najibullah as its head and was forced to collapse in 1992.
31. Griff Witte, "Afghanistan War 2001-2014", *Britannica*. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/event/Afghanistan-War Last accessed on May 2, 2018.
32. *Sharia* law is Islam's legal system, derived from the Quran, and *fatwas*. It literally translates into "the clear, well-trodden path to water" and acts as a code for living for Muslims. *BBC*, May 7, 2014. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-27307249. Last accessed on May 4, 2018.
33. Witte, n. 31.
34. Pape and Feldman, n. 2, pp. 112-137.
35. Bin Laden understood the importance of killing Masood as he had planned the 9/11 attacks two days later which would naturally cause the US to question all terrorist groups in Afghanistan, seeking help from Masood and his Northern Alliance.
36. Dodge and Redman, n. 29.
37. Syed Saleem Shahzad, *Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban* (London: Pluto Press, 2015), pp. 1-10.
38. The Bonn Conference was under the UN auspices, and laid the foundation for the US and NATO backed state-building efforts in Afghanistan. Karzai was to head a 30-member administration for smooth transition of power in Afghanistan. Official Website: http://policymof.gov.af/bonn-2001/ Last accessed on May 5, 2018.
39. Under UN Security Council Resolution 1386.
40. Witte, n. 31.
41. Peter Bergen, "Hamid Karzai: Afghanistan's Bridge-Building President or just a Corrupt Pol?", *Washington Post*, September 15, 2016. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/hamid-karzai-afghanistans-bridge-building-president-or-just-a-corrupt-pol/2016/09/15/6d6a47a6-5804-11e6-9aee-8075993d73a2_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6dd4a611c9e8. Last accessed on May 6, 2018.
42. Jeffrey William Lewis, *The Business of Martyrdom: A History of Suicide Bombing* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2012), pp. 219-247.
43. The Taliban were not always a uniform entity. There were other anti-Afghan government elements whose agendas aligned to an extent with the Taliban and they worked together on certain levels. Lewis, Ibid.
44. Pape and Feldman, n. 2, pp. 112-137.
45. Lewis, n. 42, pp. 219-247.
46. President Barrack Obama's Afghan Policy
47. University of Maryland Global Terrorism Database: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2001&end_yearonly=2017&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&country=4&asmSelect1=&sAttack=1&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=

48. Ibid.
49. Kay Johnson, "Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan War Reach New High in 2014: U.N.", *Reuters*, December 19, 2014. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-casualties/civilian-deaths-in-afghanistan-war-reach-new-high-in-2014-u-n-idUSKBN0JX1ZS20141219. Last accessed on August 3, 2018.
50. Editorial, "Uncertain Times: On the Security Situation in Afghanistan", *The Hindu*, May 31, 2017. Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/uncertain-times/article18683938.ece. Last accessed on May 3, 2018.
51. Dodge and Redman, n. 29.
52. Vanda Felbab- Brown, "Afghanistan's Terrorism Resurgence: Al Qaida, ISIS, and Beyond", *Brookings*, April 27, 2017. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/afghanistans-terrorism-resurgence-al-qaida-isis-and-beyond/ Last accessed on May 6, 2018.
53. n. 50.
54. Felbab- Brown, n. 52.
55. Shoaib Ahmad Rahim, "Can Afghanistan's Economy Rebound in 2017?", *The Diplomat,* January 25, 2017. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/can-afghanistans-economy-rebound-in-2017/ Last accessed on May 7, 2018.
56. Along the northwestern border with Afghanistan aka tribal areas such as FATA and KPK.
57. Moeed Yusuf, *Pakistan's Counter Terrorism Challenge* (New Delhi: Foundation Books, 2014), pp. 1-45.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid., pp. 1-45.
60. Pape and Feldman, n. 2, pp. 138-166.
61. Except for an isolated attack in 1995.
62. Also according to UNAMA Report in 2007: Rohan Gunaratna, Khuram Iqbal, *Pakistan Terrorism Ground Zero* (London: Reaktion Books Ltd., 2011), p. 230.
63. University of Maryland Global Terrorism Database: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2001&end_yearonly=2017&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&country=153&asmSelect1=&sAttack=1&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
64. Gunaratna, et al., n. 62, pp. 229-247.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid., pp. 229-247.
67. Haider Mullick, "An Interview with Haider Mullick", *The Diplomat*, December 15, 2009. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2009/12/an-interview-with-haider-mullick/ Last accessed on May 8, 2018.
68. Tilak Devasher, *Pakistan: Courting the Abyss* (Delhi NCR: HarperCollins Publishers India, 2016), pp. 227-243.
69. Ibid., pp. 244-280.
70. Robert A. Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House Trade Paperback Edition, 2006), pp. 79-101.

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

7. Conclusion

While there has been a vast number of studies on counter-terrorism, one must also make an attempt at understanding terrorism, and suicide terrorism in particular, as it involves willing participants in pursuit of the 'greater good'. Thus, it is the deep-rooted ideology and the highly dominating belief systems that play a considerable role in influencing the mind of a terrorist. Hence, one must not regard terrorists (suicide terrorists, especially) as disillusioned actors, but rational actors who are fully aware of what they are doing and, further, willing to do so. It is, therefore, the ideology that needs to be fully understood first and then countered. Moreover, a transnational threat such as suicide terrorism needs to be confronted with a transnational solution or an effort in the same direction at a global scale. Terrorism can certainly not be completely eradicated, just like crime, but it can be coped with in a better manner. The 9/11 attacks were indeed a curtain raiser in terms of universal realisation of the nature of threat that terrorism poses, however, over a period of time, with organisations such as the ISIS and the phenomenon of lone wolf terrorism, it is time for counter-terror efforts to shift focus and accommodate the changing dynamics of the threat today.

The historical evolution of suicide terrorism provides insightful lessons on the use of the tactic, as has been seen in Chapter 2. While *Narodnaya Volya* of Imperial Russia was instrumental in assessing the practicality of the human and the bomb, the Japanese *Kamikaze* were the first to understand the overcoming of asymmetry in warfare through the use of systematic and organised suicide missions. While concepts such as 'martyrdom' and the symbolisms attached to suicide attacks evolved over time in these campaigns, these did not become the sole reason behind people resorting to such a tactic. Suicide was a tactic used in desperate times as a measure to achieve the goals that the employer of the tactic strived to achieve but was unsuccessful in

doing by other means. The members of *NarodnayaVolya* were united in defying the tsarist regime and in order to do so were even willing to give up their lives as a last resort, as they did not wish to live under such a regime. Therefore, the choice was either to live a life of oppression, or die fighting for a new way of life. The Japanese, on the other hand, were employed as an army or a state force to carry out the *Kamikaze* attacks as part of their duty towards the nation, leaving not much choice for them as they engaged in operations.

Moving on, both the PKK and the IRA demonstrated the crucial role of community support in the success of suicide terrorism. Without the public acceptance and legitimacy of an organisation willing to carry out suicide terrorism, sustaining a successful campaign could prove difficult. The Provisional IRA did not exactly employ suicide terrorism in its true form but was engaged in carrying out hunger strikes until death and further, carried out bomb explosions without claiming responsibility for them. What is of utmost importance in this campaign of terrorism, however, is the lack of support from the community towards the activities of the Provisional IRA, particularly when it came to the use of suicide – whether by hunger strikes or by carrying out explosions. This lack of support came from the fact that the general Irish community did not feel the need for a measure as desperate as self-sacrifice in order to counter the British. This can also be attributed to the absence of brutal repression by the British and the availability of alternative peaceful means, which led the Irish to a point of aversion from the self-sacrificial acts of the IRA.

A similar example of the lack of community support for suicide terrorism is that of the PKK in Turkey, an organisation that struggled to gain legitimacy in the eyes of its own people. Further, in order to establish the same, the PKK indulged in activities, killing many Kurds, the people it claimed to stand for. This led to the lack of acceptance of the PKK in Turkey by a large number of Kurds and, moreover, its use of suicide terrorism was looked down upon. While legitimacy and acceptance remain the primary objectives of such organisations, in

the secondary stage, they face the more challenging task of finding volunteers for carrying out such acts.

The next round of suicide terrorism was witnessed in West Asia owing to the various events that took place in the region in the second half of the 20th century. The Iranian Revolution was by far one of the most significant events at the time, when the Shiite sect of Islam began to be used as a tool to mobilise the people of Iran and from across the region as well. It was during this time that Ayatollah Khomeini used notions of martyrdom from historically rooted religious rituals and myths in order to promote self-sacrificial violence as a means to attain liberation. Further, with the Basij, there were numerous accounts and narratives of volunteers who had died, and this was used as inspiration for the others. Prior to this, suicide terrorism did not have much to do with religion and was more a result of the suppression or dominance of communities by a certain actor or power. However, with the Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War was itself interpreted on grounds of religion, and the initiation of a theocratic regime in Iran with Khomeini made this all the more possible. Religion has the characteristic of cutting across territorial boundaries and the potential of unifying people from different regions and walks of life, irrespective of their nationality, profession, etc. Iran demonstrated the power of religion in unifying the masses of people and coercing their opponent with the help of self-sacrificial violence, glorified as martyrdom and encouraged by the state leadership.

With the Iranian Revolution wreaking havoc in the region, Lebanon also saw a deadly campaign of suicide terrorism being used against an adversary. The Shiites of Lebanon having been alienated by their government and made to feel that they had not been given their due, were united in their resentment against the government. Further, they remained a cohesive entity in their resolve to counter the threat of Israel in the country. Once again, from within the branch of Shia Islam, tales of martyrdom and courage were used as narratives in the creation of militias in Lebanon, resulting in the emergence of Hezbollah. While innovation and experimentation formed part of the process of

evolution of suicide terrorism, it was the Hezbollah that was successful in bringing about a new kind of suicide attack, i.e. vehicle-borne suicide attacks targeted at Israeli security camps or personnel. Hezbollah managed to blend both the religious narratives and the glorification of martyrdom on religious terms with the usage of self-sacrificial violence in a systematic and organised manner to carry out its campaign of suicide terror. Further, it gained both legitimacy and acceptance in the eyes of not only its own people, the Shiites of Lebanon, but even the Lebanese government eventually. Hezbollah became an indispensable force for the government in countering the Israeli threat in Lebanon and, thus, was integrated into the political system in a parliamentary manner. Similar to Hezbollah was the military-structure of the LTTE, with Prabhakaran as its leader who is known to have drawn inspiration from Hezbollah in his employment of suicide attacks in the form of vehicle-borne attacks. Suicide terrorism was equated with martyrdom and those committing the act were treated in a similar manner any army would treat its martyrs. The LTTE, however, never associated religion with its cause.

Towards the end of the 1980s, the Palestinians began using suicide terrorism as part of the first *intifada* and, subsequently, the tactic was used more liberally during the second *intifada*. Once again, in the presence of a common sentiment of unification i.e. separate Palestinian statehood and disappointment towards the PLO that did not seem to be doing much, groups such as Hamas and PIJ gained more support, thus, adding credibility to their use of suicide terrorism. However, with the signing of a ceasefire agreement marking the end of the second *intifada*, the Palestinian suicide bombings came to a halt. Thus, with a peaceful solution in sight, the support for violence went down in the Palestinian case, even though a separate state of Palestine was not created. The ceasefire agreement marked the beginning of peace in the region, with both sides coming to a compromise.

It, thus, becomes clear that suicide terrorism was primarily employed owing to the practicality and effectiveness of the tactic by terror outfits as well as state actors. The use of religion in order to legitimise, and gain

support for, suicide terrorism has been a successful strategy for adding legitimacy to the act, especially in West Asia, and now in other regions of the world such as South Asia and Europe. However, it was not a prerequisite for the employment of suicide terrorism, as demonstrated by the LTTE. The most crucial aspect in the successful employment of suicide terrorism is acceptance and support by the community of people that the organisation stands for. Without such support and legitimacy in the eyes of the community, the basic foundation of the campaign of suicide terrorism cannot be laid. This critical support may mostly come about by virtue of the devotion of the community towards the organisation employing suicide terrorism, though such devotion can only be generated once the organisation has established legitimacy in the eyes of the community. Another major aspect is the form of repression used by the 'opponent', convincing the community that desperate and out of the normal measures need to be taken, thus, garnering support for self-sacrificial violence. However, in the absence of a similarly brutal force on the opposite side, there may not be such support for an extreme measure such as suicide terrorism.

The employment of suicide terrorism originates from the decision taken to this effect by the organisation itself. Most terror outfits stand to gain from resorting to this tactic as suicide terrorism has several advantages over other forms of terrorism, but this alone is not enough basis for use of the tactic. It is equally important for the organisation to wield enough power over its followers or members in order to instil support and aspiration towards suicide terrorism. This can only come about with the use of an appropriate narrative or 'cause' to justify such acts of violence. While this very cause lays the foundation of the organisation, uniting its members, it has been constantly evolving as well, as can be seen from the evolution of suicide terrorism. However, in the last four decades, there has been a distinct shift in the underlying cause of suicide terrorism.

Suicide terrorism has witnessed a marked transformation in its evolution from the 1980s onwards till date. While campaigns of suicide terrorism were mostly based on nationalist movements and

functioned as liberation movements from 1980-2000, the following two decades saw the use of suicide terrorism in a much more lethal and devastating manner. Further, over these two phases, terror outfits and organisations employing suicide terrorism have seen a significant shift in the application of suicide terrorism from nationalist liberation or resistance movements to becoming a transnational phenomenon. The foundation for this was laid in the events around 1979, leading up to the evolution of the concept of modern *jihad*. Further, the attacks of 9/11 proved to be instrumental in changing the very notion of terrorism in the 21st century. Al Qaeda, with Osama bin Laden as its leader, was successful in changing the nature of terrorism and demonstrating the lethal extent of religiously motivated acts of terror.

This transition from broad-based nationalist movements to ideologically and religiously motivated acts of terror is best explained with the case studies of the LTTE and Al Qaeda. While the former functioned like an army, with certain territories under its control and specialised units for different spheres of warfare such as land, air, sea, cyber domain, etc; the latter was more of a universal 'brotherhood' united in a religious ideology aimed to protect the community from the threats faced by it in any part of the world. However, the role of the leadership in both organisations was the most crucial aspect in their functioning and operational capabilities. Technically, ideology played a great role in both the above mentioned cases. The LTTE's ideology was that of protecting its homeland and its community from suppression by the majority population and, thus, a struggle for self-determination ensued. This sentiment helped ignite the fighting spirit among the Tamil Tigers who came forward in challenging the Sinhalese people and state virtually like an army. Members of the elite Black Tigers did not hesitate in giving up their lives for the Tamil cause, just as a soldier wouldn't hesitate in giving up his life in the line of duty. Al Qaeda, however, used ideology rooted in religion, which is far more complex and lethal as a tool for mobilisation. It used the power of narratives and misinterpretation of religious scriptures and preaching to portray global events in a provocative manner.

While suicide terrorism has evolved over the years, it is pertinent to understand its increased use in India. India has been a victim of state sponsored terrorism by Pakistan-based terror groups, the LeT and JeM. These groups have carried out several *fidayeen* attacks in India, mainly in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, targeting security establishments and state symbols. While this form of suicide terrorism is unique to the nature of suicide terrorism the world is facing today, it must be fully understood that these are not entirely 'non-state' actors in the true sense. Pakistan has engaged in proxy war with India in its mission to carry out *jihad* in Kashmir since the time of partition itself. Thus, groups such as the LeT and JeM serve the purpose of the national interest of Pakistan vis-à-vis India. The continued existence of these groups is evidence of the fact that the country from where they operate, provides an environment conducive to the same.

Thus, it becomes increasingly important to also understand the circumstances under which such terror outfits exist. In the case of Hezbollah or even the LeT and JeM, the host country has not taken active action against these terror outfits in an attempt to completely eliminate them. The case of Hezbollah is particularly interesting as the Lebanese, on several accounts, tried to disarm the militia, however, eventually realised the relevance and necessity of the organisation in countering the Israeli threat in the country as also other military threats in the region. It was an armed militia, designated as a terrorist organisation, which eventually found political expression in the country and integrated into the parliamentary system. Contrary to this is the case of the LTTE that was militarily defeated by the Sri Lankan armed forces after a long period of civil war in the country.

In Afghanistan and Pakistan, where terrorism is known to be 'harboured', the issue of suicide terrorism continues to intensify. Afghanistan continues to reel under political instability with Kabul's writ extending only to a few provinces, and intra-ethnic divisions and conflict between tribal warlords dominating the political landscape there. The presence of Western forces in Afghanistan, and a continuing anti-West narrative, have further added to the already prevailing

complex politico-security dynamics in the country. There exists a continued political instability which facilitates the militant outfits which continue to dominate the country. Pakistan, on the other hand, faces the problem of a dominant role of the military in the political functioning of the country, causing widespread resentment among the terror elements that it once created itself. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is a classic example of this phenomenon, making Pakistan a victim of suicide terrorism today.

It can, thus, be gauged that suicide terrorism is a complex interplay of various components that determine the success of such campaigns. A number of root causes and factors can be identified as responsible for campaigns of suicide terrorism throughout the evolution of the phenomenon. Essentially, suicide terrorism is the interplay of three main components:

- Strategic and calibrated employment of suicide terrorism by terror organisations using the tactic.
- Motivation/dedication of individuals committing the act.
- The nature of states (political and economic) where campaigns of suicide terror originate.

Each of these factors is equally important in the making of a successful campaign of suicide terrorism. Ever since the inception of the concept of suicide terrorism, each of these three factors has been present and played a significant role.

Changing Face of Suicide Terrorism

While 9/11 effectively brought to the fore the nature of the serious threat that the transnational form of terrorism poses, the situation has only worsened today. While Al Qaeda has often been quoted as the 'trendsetter' of suicide terrorism in the 21st century, the emergence of the Islamic State—a more brutal and radical terror organisation —created a distinct shift from Al Qaeda to the IS in as far as suicide terrorism is concerned. Osama bin Laden demonstrated to the world the critical role that a powerful leader can play in motivating and

integrating cadres through his *fatwas* that wielded influence and drew support from across the globe. Bin Laden managed to promote a sense of alienation from the broader society among his followers, systematically polarising them and taking advantage of their vulnerabilities through religious misinterpretation of Islam. In return, he promised to give his followers a sense of belonging within the community. The leader, thus, became the hero who was charismatic enough to draw people towards him and his cause. He was the flag bearer of an ideology that people believed in because of his persona and wisdom. His serene demeanour, accompanied by the soft and calibrated manner of speech delivery was all attuned to appeal to the target audience. The abrupt decline that Al Qaeda witnessed after his death is proof enough of the fact that the binding force of Al Qaeda was its leader, whose absence marked the beginning of the end of the organisation.

This process changed with the Islamic State wherein the leader was replaced by the ideology itself. To a great extent, the ideologies of both Al Qaeda and the IS were similar as the IS emerged from a faction of Al Qaeda. However, their methods differed, defining the distinction between the two. Just as the leader was once looked up to as in the case of Al Qaeda, the ideology became the charismatic 'hero' for the members of the IS. The ideology in itself became strong enough to wield power and influence over its followers, providing a forceful and conscientious message to unify its followers, drawing them together into a coherent organisation. This is best illustrated through the functioning of the IS and homegrown terrorism or lone wolf attacks carried out in its name. The IS has been instrumental in portraying the unique power of ideology that has the ability to empower self-radicalised or self-taught individuals to carry out attacks without any direct command or assistance from a terrorist organisation or its commanders.

The attacks of 9/11 warranted urgent reforms in the security sphere and counter-terror policies the world over, but today, with the changed dynamics of the threat matrix, these measures do not seem to be adequately serving the purpose. As terrorism has come to be increasingly associated with ideological and psychological warfare, it

cannot be countered through reactionary counter-terror measures or aggressive military/security efforts alone. The two critical elements of ideology and psychology also need to be factored in while framing counter-terror policies in the days ahead. Thus, a preventive approach based on both these aspects needs to be adopted in framing policies aimed at preventing human beings from becoming terrorists in the first place. This approach is extremely critical in formulating any policy on counter-terrorism primarily because once individuals get radicalised, it becomes extremely difficult and challenging to stop them from acting on their beliefs and convictions, especially if they choose to act on their own. While 9/11 demonstrated to the world not only the lethality of transnational terrorism but also that of suicide terrorism, most counter-terror efforts treat the latter as a subset of the former.

In order to understand the measures taken to counter suicide terrorism, one must look into the strategies adopted by countries to counter terrorism in general.

United States of America

While terrorism became a major universal phenomenon after the 9/11 attacks, it called for action at the global level to counter the new threat. There was a realisation that terrorism was not only confined to certain countries or regions, but had a far wider reach and scope, thus, warranting the need for factoring in this critical aspect while formulating measures to counter or prevent such acts. Following the attacks of 9/11, the United States of America launched the Global War on Terror (GWOT) with US President George W. Bush creating a worldwide coalition of over 136 countries and 46 multilateral organisations to counter international terrorism.[1] The coalition members were to help one another with military assistance and other forms of aid in order to destroy the presence of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and help the country recover from the influence of the Taliban by putting in place an interim government and targeting militant elements. While the GWOT was an extensive military campaign, it also focussed on the seizure of the financial assets of the terrorists as well as blocking their channels of

fund-raising. Further, law enforcement in the US was regulated, along with the tightening of homeland security, in an attempt to protect, and prevent terrorist incidents in, America. This included stringent security measures throughout the country, especially airline security measures. Humanitarian assistance was extended to those in need in Afghanistan and efforts were made to tackle the growing illicit drug menace there which has always been a major source of funding for the Taliban. Further, the US-led invasions, along with coalition forces, in Afghanistan and Iraq shortly after the 9/11 attacks were part of the GWOT.

In the last couple of years, the United States and most Western countries have realised that the strategy on the fight against terrorism needs to be reexamined, as it cannot simply be a military answer, and there is a need to understand the implications of radicalisation and effectively aim to counter the ideology responsible for radicalisation. Thus, the Obama Administration extended the counter-terror strategy from the Global War on Terror to Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). The GWOT received a lot of criticism for the irony of its terminology itself, and, thus, a shift to focussing on a slightly more sensitive and appropriately termed strategy has been welcomed. CVE does not aim to just counter terrorism, it aims also to counter violent extremism in its true sense. The difference between the two is crucial to understand. While terrorism is an extreme form of political violence, violent extremism is more of an ideological concept.

Violent extremism is the ideological foundation for terror outfits today, and CVE aims to counter the propaganda of terrorists, apart from their violence through a multi-dimensional, multi-stakeholder approach via community networks and governmental–non-governmental collaboration. This extension of counter-terror efforts towards CVE also denotes the emphasis that counter-terror strategies have started putting on factors such as ideology and narrative that hold terror outfits together today. CVE further aims to use the communicative tools that the terrorists themselves use in order to propagate a counter-ideology or counter-narrative. According to the US government, CVE comprises

"efforts focused on preventing all forms of ideologically based extremist violence, to include prevention of successful recruitment into terrorist groups. It is distinct from disruptive actions which focus on stopping acts of terrorism by those who have already subscribed to violence."[2]

Alex P. Schmid rightly points out,

> The concept of Countering Violent Extremism reflects awareness of the fact that many terrorists are homegrown, i.e. embedded in diasporas and other sub-cultures within our societies. While the violence-prone extremists themselves might well be beyond the reach of dialogue and persuasion, their non-violent social surrounding is not and must be engaged with. Without a responsive constituency extremists cannot survive for long. Those constituencies also need to play a role in countering violent extremism in our societies if they want to avoid the risk of being associated with it.[3]

United Kingdom

This shifting focus of governments and institutions from terrorist violence to terrorist ideology and propaganda has been seen in most parts of the world. The United Kingdom passed the UK Terrorism Act 2000. Prior to this, terrorism measures in the UK comprised mostly a series of temporary steps used as emergency measures. Subsequently, the UK has seen a series of counter-terrorism measures such as the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001, Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, Terrorism Act 2006, Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 and Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015.[4] While the 9/11 attacks spurred reforms in counter-terror initiatives all over the world, the UK felt a serious blow from terrorism in 2005 with the four suicide bombings occurring in London on July 7. The perpetrators were homegrown terrorists who managed to target the public transportation system of London, leading to a much required 'wake-up call' for all those in Britain dealing with counter-terror efforts.

In the immediate aftermath of the July 7 bombings, a series of changes were introduced in Britain's anti-terror planning. The most

significant of these was increased intelligence sharing, data gathering, including digital data, and more integrated coordination among all three intelligence services of the UK—MI5, MI6 and GCHQ. The British security services also increased their presence throughout the country. Coordination and communication between different departments of the transportation services as well as preparation and training for a quick response in emergency situations were also initiated. Another significant effort undertaken by the British government post 7/7 bombings was in the direction of building and maintaining relations with the Muslim community.[5]

Subsequently, in 2007, the Prevent Strategy became an essential component of the UK's policy towards combating violent extremism which aimed to "Win Hearts and Minds", as the title of the government's action plan suggested. It aimed at preventing individuals from falling prey to terrorism through not only policies implemented by the security establishment but also through societal reforms and awareness building. It laid out a framework for the Department of Communities and Local Government to enable local awareness and further facilitate the building of stronger communities, not only resilient to violent extremism but also capable enough of challenging and undermining any form of extremism. The idea was for the British government to work closely together with mainstream Muslim organisations in order to tackle violent extremism with an aim to counter its ideology and prevent it from gaining support.[6] However, this programme came in for a lot of criticism as it alienated the Muslim communities all the more and failed in preventing some major attacks in the UK such as the Manchester arena bombing on May 22, 2017 and other lone wolf incidents.

The UK did not witness any major terrorist attack after the 7/7 bombings for about a decade, indicating the effectiveness of its counter-terror and preventive measures. While the country's threat level remained high since 2014—the year the Islamic State was created and following the attacks witnessed in Europe—it was not until 2017 that Britain witnessed its first lone wolf attack, carried out by the ISIS.[7] In

the first of incidents that year, the perpetrator, Khalid Masood, drove a car into pedestrians on London's Westminster Bridge, killing four and stabbing a police officer to death on March 22, 2017. The next incident took place when a suicide bomber blew himself up near Manchester Arena in the UK on May 22 after a concert, killing 22 people and injuring over 100. Though the Islamic State once again claimed responsibility for the attack, the perpetrator had been linked to several other *jihadi* organisations across three continents. His involvement with the Islamic State is still not clear.[8]

The UK's comprehensive Counter-Terrorist Strategy called CONTEST was implemented in 2003 to meet this challenge. The strategy comprised four main pillars—pursue, prevent, protect and prepare[9]—and was further supported by the Terrorism Act 2000, and formed the legal basis for prosecuting and banning terrorist organisations. Further, CONTEST contains within it the Prevent Strategy which essentially has three objectives: responding to extremist ideology, building relations with civil society groups and providing support to prevent radicalisation.[10] This includes online radicalisation and prison radicalisation as well. Moreover, the current British government has set up a Commission for Countering Extremism which has received a lot of criticism owing to its divisive counter-extremism policies. This remains a huge challenge faced by many of the EU countries as well, wherein the measures for countering extremism often face flak from citizens for being too invasive of privacy and human rights.[11]

One of the biggest threats to the United Kingdom and the European Union at large continues to be from the Islamic State, with an increased number of lone wolf attacks in the past year and an even greater radicalisation among the youth than before.[12] Not only does it pose a threat due to its propaganda widely influencing homegrown terrorism in the region, it is equally challenging to monitor and scrutinise the foreign fighters who have returned from Iraq and Syria and some who will continue to return through different routes, as the IS is on the backfoot on its home turf. Other countries within the EU that have faced a major threat from homegrown terrorism and the

returning foreign fighters from the Islamic State, are Belgium, France and Germany. Their main concern is to counter extremist narratives and propaganda that has seemed to appeal to a large number of their citizens, leading to either lone wolf attacks or coordinated attacks across their cities.

Belgium

In March 2016, Belgium's capital city, Brussels witnessed twin blasts at Zavantem airport and Maelbeek metro station, located astonishingly close to the EU Headquarters, one of the most pristine symbols of the city. The perpetrators were known to be affiliated with the Islamic State and hailed from a district in Brussels known as Molenbeek, a ghetto predominantly consisting of a large number of Belgian Muslims, living in isolation amidst poverty and unemployment. The district is, thus, known to be a breeding ground for criminal activities as well as possible radicalisation and recruitment into extremist organisations. Molenbeek had come to notice even earlier, as many terrorists are known to seek refuge here, including one of the terrorists responsible for the Madrid bombings in 2004, a gunman who shot four people at Brussels' Jewish museum in 2014 and a man who wielded an AK-47 on the Amsterdam-Paris train in 2015.[13] Terror suspects and perpetrators are known to have been shielded and protected in Molenbeek out of the sense of "brotherhood" that the district enforces, especially among Belgian Muslims.[14]

Neighbourhoods such as Molenbeek are the result of migration of workers in the 1960s to European countries from Turkey, Morocco, Egypt, Libya and other countries, as they provided a source of cheap labour and, in return, found for themselves a better livelihood abroad. Over the years, generations of these migrants have continued to live in countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands, some having moved up economically and socially, integrating into both the European system and society, while others were rendered unemployed, isolated and marginalised. "Statistics related to the skill levels, income and employment of

Belgian Muslims indicate the inability of their integration into the mainstream, thereby remaining ghettoized and alienated further with laws banning Islamic headscarves and face veils. Immigrants inhabiting districts such as Molenbeek are bound to each other because of how different they are from the general population. They have created a world of their own, integrating among themselves based on their unique cultural and religious identity, in a country where they constantly feel like 'outsiders'."[15] This not only remains a problem in Belgium, but in most European countries, including the United Kingdom. A major reason behind the growing number of incidents of homegrown terrorism and lone wolf attacks ever since the rise of the Islamic State is only proof of the same.

Belgium has taken steps to counter extremism as well as ensure integration of its citizens, in an attempt to eradicate any form of marginalisation or ghettoisation. However, what such attacks also reveal is the need for more stringent and effective surveillance and monitoring mechanisms to be put in place as well as coordination of security personnel, along with effective intelligence sharing. While "Belgium has produced the greatest number of Western foreign fighters per capita in Iraq and Syria"[16], its major challenge today, in the wake of the Islamic State having lost most of its territory, is the returning foreign fighters and those who have escaped to different countries to evade detection with the aim of eventually returning to their country of origin at a later stage. There is also need to factor in the large number of those who were radicalised and planned to go to Iraq/Syria to join the IS at one stage but couldn't do so either due to the decline of the IS or the challenges in making the move. Such people continue to live in their respective countries and harbour strong anti-state sentiments which poses a threat internally.

In terms of legislative actions, Belgium has passed legislation criminalising terrorism, and in December 2003, the Terrorist Offences Act was enabled which translated the EU Framework Decision on terrorism of June 2002 into Belgian law. Belgium's counter-terrorism policies have always focussed on the underlying causes of terrorism,

however in the wake of the attacks of 2016, some stringent steps were taken to address the menace of terrorism. Belgium's counter-terrorism legislation has been criticised for doing "too little too late" [17]. Especially with the 2016 attacks, the shortcomings of Belgium's counter-terror policy came to light, ranging from "lack of capacity, fragmentation of both the regulatory environment and the information flow, and an imbalance between prevention and repression"[18].

According to Belgium's Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, "Belgium believes that the fight against terrorism must not be allowed to infringe human rights, fundamental freedoms or international humanitarian law" and has, thus, been extremely cautious in treading around the word "terrorism". In 2015, a task force was established in Belgium to create a national counter-terrorism and counter-extremism strategy, while the Criminal Investigation Department of the country acts as its civilian intelligence service, cooperating with local and federal police in an effort to prevent both terrorism and crime.[19]

The major concern for Belgium at present remains the fighters who have returned and those who have been radicalised but were unable to join the fight in Iraq and Syria. The Belgian response to foreign terrorist fighters has evolved over the years and seems to be a lot more systematic, comprehensive and coordinated today, reflecting a broader shift in the Belgian counter-terrorism policy from a narrow approach based on law enforcement and intelligence gathering towards a more comprehensive approach, combining repression and enhanced prevention. Returnee foreign fighters are now arrested on arrival in Belgium, regardless of gender, and are kept in detention. Belgium has also laid emphasis on working towards preventing radicalisation and disengagement, and coordination of services at the prevention, security and policy levels with a greater scope for information gathering and sharing. Having said that, Belgium's counter-terrorism policy is still in the making and will have to constantly evolve and adapt to the changing dynamics of the threat.[20]

France

The Charlie Hebdo attacks in 2015 caused three days of terror in the city of Paris. The office of the French magazine, *Charlie Hebdo*, which had portrayed satires on notions of Islam was attacked by two gunmen. After the attack, the perpetrators were on the run and attacked a grocery store and a suburb area within the city: 17 people were killed in total and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) claimed responsibility for the attack. This attack was a huge blow to the French security and intelligence agencies. A series of attacks in recent years has taken place in France, including the attack on a celebratory crowd in Nice on Bastille Day in 2016. Another attack witnessed by France was that by a gunman who hijacked a car in the city of Carcassonne claiming to be a "soldier of Daesh", killing two people while holding others hostage. Just as in Belgium, France has been made to confront the threat from violent extremism and started a campaign called "Stop Jihadism" in 2015. This campaign aimed at educating French citizens on how to prevent a terrorist attack by identifying and reporting suspects and what to do in the event of a terror attack. The campaign which included online resources also helped institute changes in the education sector of the country in an attempt to prevent radicalisation, including prison radicalisation, and led to the anti-terror law of 2014.

A new counter-terrorism Bill was proposed by the French Parliament in 2017 in order to facilitate the implementation of emergency security measures and set up a new anti-terrorism task force for enhanced coordination between domestic and foreign intelligence services. Further, the French counter-terrorism unit "*Grouped' Intervention de la Gendarmie Nationale*" (GIGN) is responsible for counter-terrorist operations and is due to gain additional resources as France attempts to strengthen its counter-terrorism paraphernalia. The French government took a decision to set up deradicalisation centres in the country and 12 of these were opened in 2016, working to rehabilitate individuals who may potentially be on the path to radicalisation. These deradicalisation programmes have also had major setbacks in their operations. Counter-terrorism, thus, remains one of

the primary foreign policy goals of the country, keeping a close eye on returnee fighters and online radicalisation. France is known to have become the largest source of foreign fighters to Iraq and Syria, with approximately 2,000 French nationals having travelled to join *jihadist* groups by May 2016, and approximately 9,000 individuals radicalised and currently residing within the country.

India

India has been facing terrorism since the 1970s in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, as well as its eastern states. In the south, the threat emanating from the LTTE in Sri Lanka posed a major challenge to the security forces for a long time. Besides this, the rest of India has also witnessed some major incidents of terrorism. As far as suicide terrorism is concerned, the main threat that India faces emanates from Pakistan and terrorism in Kashmir. Separatist elements along with Pakistan sponsored and ISI-orchestrated terror groups are known to aid proxy elements in Kashmir. Owing to insurgency in the region, India has implemented Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, granting Jammu and Kashmir an autonomous status as well as its own Constitution. Along with this, the much debated Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) was also applied in Jammu and Kashmir in 1990 and remains in effect till date with the aim of taking charge of the insurgency, whenever required. However, this is a state law which is only applicable in certain areas in India. The country has several central and state laws in place aimed at dealing with specific problems in different states.[21]

At the national level, laws pertaining to terrorism in India have been constantly emerging with the changing security dynamics in the country. While the Indian Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure (1973) have provisions for acts of terrorism, it was in 1985 that the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) came about in the wake of the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984. The law was allegedly misused and only remained in force till 1995 after which the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) was enacted in 2002, after the Indian

Parliament came under attack by a group of JeM terrorists in 2001. While POTA also faced criticism and contained too broad a definition of a 'terrorist act', it was repealed in 2004. However, currently the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act is the primary anti-terrorism law in India which was enacted by the Parliament in 1967, and has been amended several times since then, including in 2004, following the repeal of POTA, and in 2008, following the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai. It was also amended later in 2013.[22]

The operational depth and penetration by Pakistan-based terror groups in India is a serious cause of concern which is highlighted by the terrorist attack on Red Fort in Delhi in December 2000 by the LeT, followed by the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 by the JeM, and the 26/11 attack carried out in November 2008 in Mumbai by the LeT. The 26/11 attacks called for several reforms and measures to be put in place in order to prevent such attacks in the future and preserve the country's security and integrity.

Immediately after the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, the Maharashtra government considered a large number of measures. Since the perpetrators of the attacks reached Mumbai via the sea, coastal security was one of the main concerns in the aftermath of the attack. There was a radical overhaul of the coastal defence apparatus, which included provision of radio frequency identity cards and smart cards to the fishermen, and increased surveillance along the coastline area through the use of drones and radars. The outermost tier of the coast is guarded by the Indian Navy which saw the establishment of the Ocean Sentinels or *Sagar Prahari Bal* with high speed intercept vehicles, helicopters and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). The intermediate tier of coastal security has been assigned to the coast guard and the innermost to the marine police. Each of these institutions has been given a considerable raise in their budgets post 26/11 and India even got its first harbour defence systems wherein "with a multitude of coastal surveillance radars, high-power underwater sensors and diver detection sonars, these systems are capable of detecting, identifying, tracking and generating a warning for both surface and under water

threats."[23] Further, in Maharashtra, the government has adopted several other measures such as upgrading the police force with the introduction of modern technology, advanced training, sophisticated gadgetary and weapons besides ensuring effective coordination among all the agencies.[24]

Effective intelligence sharing was another major agenda for India's security agencies as the manner and conduct of the terror attack brought to the fore the weaknesses in India's security management systems. Thus, the Intelligence Bureau (IB) of India reorganised its Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) for greater intelligence sharing among all the security agencies of the country at the Centre. Further, Subsidiary Multi-Agency Centres (SMACs) at 30 locations across India were also established, feeding intelligence to the MAC at the Centre through secured online connectivity.[25] In addition , a National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) was planned to be established in the aftermath of the 26/11 attacks with the aim of connecting databases of core security agencies of the Government of India to collect comprehensive patterns of intelligence that can be readily accessed by intelligence agencies. The absence of such an integrated intelligence data sharing mechanism on real-time basis has been considered one of the reasons for the lack of detection of David Coleman Headley's movements within India from 2006 to 2009 when he mapped the various locations that were targeted during the 26/11 attacks. While NATGRID can easily become a national asset with "State-of-the-Art technologies, including Big Data Analytics and Artificial Intelligence on the lines of the United States of America", it has still not been made fully functional. It is expected that NATGRID will become fully operational by March 2019, enabling data sharing among 22 intelligence and security agencies in India.[26]

While India has been a victim of suicide terrorism in the form of *fidayeen* attacks, at the same time, it is not completely safe from the threat of the Islamic State (IS) either. In the year 2016, at least 16 people from the Indian state of Kerala went missing, feared by their family and friends to have fled to Iraq and Syria to join the IS. They were later traced in Afghanistan where they had travelled in separate

groups through different countries bordering Afghanistan. Each of these individuals was well educated and belonged to well to do families, with a decent economic background. The group also included women, some of whom went missing with minor children as well. This was a new phenomenon as it marked a shift from the traditionally poor and underprivileged category who were known to join the IS to a group of highly educated and wealthy lot willing to join the IS. Kerala has become a target for radical Islamist ideology mostly through social media, according to the intelligence agencies.[27] In October 2016, six youngsters from Kerala were arrested by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) for having links with the IS . They were known to have been plotting terror attacks across various locations in south India, and since then, over 50 people have been arrested on similar grounds, while 25 have been confirmed to have joined the Islamic State in Afghanistan.[28] Thus, radicalisation has become the new challenge that India faces today, particularly cyber radicalisation i.e. the process of radicalisation online which can be either self-taught or with the help of communication platforms online.

India has also seen a number of deradicalisation programmes put in place in order to prevent radicalisation and recruitment of individuals into groups such as the IS. The Maharashtra government has adopted a deradicalisation programme, which focusses on engaging the minority communities through activities such as the 'National Cadet Corps' and 'Bharat Scouts and Guides' as mandatory programme in minority schools. Another major move by India in this direction has been its desire to modernise Islamic education in the country and it has turned to Malaysia for the same, adopting the policies that Malaysian schools have embraced within the Islamic education system.[29] At the same time, India's Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) is responsible for reacting to computer security incidents as and when they occur. Along with this, CERT-In is also liable to report on vulnerabilities and promote effective IT security practices throughout the country. It was established in 2004 and is under the purview of the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology.[30]

According to a report drafted by the Anti-Terrorism Squad of the Mumbai Police led by its director general in 2016, which presented a counter-strategy to the IS threat in India, a plan was prepared to bring the youth of minority communities into the mainstream through engaging them in sectors such as education, sports, urban planning, law and order, skill development, women and child welfare, social justice, and health. This plan also includes teaching of religious texts as well as the merits of democracies through Urdu text-books. The police force has also been instructed to stay vigilant and look out for possible signs of communal tension within minority communities.[31] While such efforts are made with good intent, they can often antagonise the minorities further. The targeting of minority communities through deradicalisation programmes signals the assumption that most minority communities are either at risk, if not already, of being radicalised. This, then, defeats the purpose behind establishing such programmes.

India is a unique country when it comes to the threat from radicalisation as Islamist extremism is not the only form of violent extremism that India faces. The broad range of extremist ideologies and elements that exist within the country, make it hard for India to fully follow the Western model of CVE, which focusses more on the immigrant as well as Muslim communities. Thus, India needs to carefully aim at a CVE strategy that is suited to its challenges equally and uniformly, by empowering communities and civil society, creating counter-narratives and addressing the root causes of terrorism.[32]

United Nations and Counter-Terrorism

As terrorism has increasingly become a transnational threat, the transnational efforts to curb it are manifold. Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) has become one of the most primary concerns of the United Nations. The UN Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee as of 2014, in its Resolution 2178, has expressed concerns about Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) and, thus, considers CVE as a crucial aspect in which member states can engage with the relevant local communities and non-governmental organisations in order

to help build counter-narratives and develop strategies to counter terrorism. The CVE strategy in India includes empowering the youth, families and women besides religious, cultural and education leaders, and all other concerned groups of civil society, in order to promote social inclusion and cohesion.[33]

The resolution goes on to state that military action, law enforcement measures and intelligence operations by themselves are no solution to countering terrorism, and, thus, increased efforts to address the underlying factors of terrorism such as prevention of radicalisation, recruitment, financial support, etc are needed, with the cooperation of all member states.[34] Thus, the Security Council recognises the need to complement repressive measures with awareness of the grievances that may be exploited by terrorists to recruit individuals. The UN General Assembly also comprises the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy which is central to the concept of CVE. This strategy was adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2006 and continues to guide the counter-terrorism framework of the UN and all its member states.[35] It broadly aims to condemn terrorism and urges member states to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, prevent and combat terrorism and build the states' capacities to do so with the strengthened role of the UN, and ensure respect for human rights and rule of law for all as the fundamental basis for the fight against terrorism.

This UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy is observed and followed by all UN members. In order to implement the global strategy among the member states of the UN, the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) was established by the secretary general in 2005, endorsed by the General Assembly, and further adopted by consensus in 2006. Its mandate is to strengthen the coordination and coherence of counter-terror efforts of the UN system and also help member states to implement the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy with the necessary policy support and knowledge of the strategy, along with technical assistance. The task force is assisted in its functioning through working groups and other projects related to counter-terrorism.[36]

The following were the four main pillars of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy's Plan of Action:

- The first pillar of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy is implemented by countering the appeal of terrorism, preventing and resolving conflicts, fostering dialogue and understanding, and promoting economic and social development.
- The second pillar deals with activities of law enforcement, border control, prevention and response to attacks by means of weapons of mass destruction, combating the financing of terrorism, and protecting vulnerable targets, critical infrastructures and the internet and all other such activities.
- The third pillar is responsible for the facilitation of the integrated implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and enhancing the implementation of legal and international instruments, as well as providing legal assistance and enhancing the capacity of criminal justice officials and law enforcement officers.
- The last pillar of the strategy aims at the protection of the victims of terrorism through training and capacity building for law enforcement officials on human rights, the rule of law and the prevention of terrorism apart from other support related activities for the victims.[37]

Efforts at the Multilateral Level

Apart from the UN, several other multilateral fora have taken up counter-terrorism efforts as a key aspect of their relationships. While it is true that there is no widely accepted definition of terrorism in the world today, terrorism continues to be a threat to each and every country. However, each nation has its own perception of the threat of terrorism and, therefore, its own way of dealing with it. This is why there is still a lot of scope for a comprehensive transnational counter-terror strategy. The European Union has begun to increase intelligence sharing and data collection as well as undertake the Counter-Extremism Project at both international and national levels. Likewise, the United States

has shifted from its GWOT to CVE and, thus, while engaging in foreign military operations, it has also increasingly stressed on building counter-narratives and working towards countering violent extremism.

India has made a significant contribution in terms of making counter-terrorism a truly international effort with its proposal on the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT). The proposal was first put forward in 1996 but it was only in 2007 that a draft agreeable to most countries emerged.[38] Some of the main features of the CCIT proposal are to have a universal definition of terrorism agreed upon by all members of the United Nations General Assembly, adopting it into their respective criminal laws. Further, it calls for a ban on all terror groups, including their access to funds and safe havens. The CCIT also calls for prosecution of all terrorists under special laws. Lastly, the CCIT proposes to make cross-border terrorism an extraditable offence globally, with member states having to amend their domestic laws in order to incorporate the same. The proposal urges all member states of the UN General Assembly to sign it in an effort to make counter-terrorism a transnational initiative.[39] However, till date, a final consensus has not emerged on the CCIT. This is mainly because of the disagreement among certain nations on the definition of terrorism, the concerns about international humanitarian laws as well as concerns regarding the fact that the convention might restrict the rights of self-determination of certain groups in different parts of the world.[40] India is still hopeful that the CCIT will be adopted as the threat of international terrorism continues to haunt the world.

Dealing with the Threat of Radicalisation

It is clear that terror organisations today thrive on their ideologies, and the ability of such ideologies to appeal to a larger audience. While ideological indoctrination or beliefs are not features that one can easily identify among individuals, it becomes increasingly hard to detect and monitor terrorists today, especially those who are self-taught and decide to act alone. Suicide terrorism makes it easier for individuals to act on their own as no formal training is required to escape from the scene

of the attack. All that is required is the resolve to carry out a suicide attack, and plan and prepare for the attack based on readily available information on the internet or from tutorials on bomb-making, etc., made available by terror entities through secure channels online. In the wake of these changing circumstances and the lethal threat of suicide terrorism faced by the world today, it becomes imperative to counter terrorism not only in a reactive manner but with an increased focus on a preventive approach towards countering it. Thus, the stage at which individuals are radicalised or indoctrinated is the most crucial and efforts should be made to identify them at this crucial phase with the aim of taking effective corrective measures to the extent possible.

While most counter-terror initiatives aim to tackle the spread of violent extremism as well as radicalisation, both online and offline, it is imperative to understand what each of these terms means in order to effectively address them. Radicalisation is broadly understood as a process whereby individuals or groups develop a mindset that can increase the risk of their engaging in violent extremism or terrorism, given the right circumstances.

The European Commission defines radicalisation as the phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism. Bajpai and Kaushik, in a holistic manner define radicalisation as "the process whereby an individual abandons societal standards and accepts the ideas, opinions and values that seek to challenge the existent societal norms and replace them with norms that would ordinarily be deemed unacceptable in a society that seeks to promulgate rational thoughts, humanity and scientific temperament". This definition explains the very essence of radicalisation which is instrumental in propagating violent extremism and needs to be countered.[41]

Radicalisation essentially stems from the desire to uproot the existing system through extreme methods, including violent extremism and terrorism. *Political radicalisation,* therefore, refers to a mindset or process of developing a mindset that uses extreme methods to uproot the existing political system and replace it with different

political institutions, in line with those of the radicalised individuals' or communities' beliefs. *Religious radicalisation,* on the other hand, works in the same manner, however, to uproot the existing religious and cultural norms and systems to those of the radicalised faith and belief system. Today, the line between religious and political terrorist movements is next to none. Religiously motivated terror outfits that are gaining momentum, also have a political agenda. More often than not, religion is the thread used to bind the terrorists towards the cause and sustain their commitment and dedication towards it. One can easily say that today, religious radicalisation is being used for political radicalisation.

In countering violent extremism, programmes aimed at anti-radicalisation, deradicalisation and counter-radicalisation are adopted wherein these terms are often used interchangeably. However, each of these programmes is slightly different from one another and must be understood completely. The target audience for anti-radicalisation programmes comprises those who are not yet radicalised but run the potential risk of being radicalised by falling into the trap of violent extremist messages. Thus, this programme aims at countering the distribution of extremist propaganda and messages among vulnerable or targeted communities. Counter-radicalisation initiatives, on the other hand, are aimed towards those individuals who are already in the process of being radicalised but have not become fully radicalised or acted upon their ideology. Lastly, deradicalisation refers to the process wherein an individual who has already been radicalised is confronted with an interventionist approach to reverse the radicalisation process that has already taken place.[42] Together, all these initiatives fall under the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programme and, thus, require the involvement of civil society, security and law enforcement agencies, local communities and warrant general societal awareness.

The EXIT programme adopted by countries like Norway and Germany, the Saudi struggle against violent extremism, Singapore's strategy of engagement with minorities, and the UK's Prevent Strategy are all major examples of efforts made by countries towards

countering and preventing the spread of violent extremism. EXIT programmes aim to support the youth who wish to disengage from radical and extremist groups. The key players in such programmes are local governments, assisted by civil society to help enable a deradicalisation strategy.

It is interesting to look into the steps taken by Saudi Arabia in this context. In Saudi Arabia, fighting violent extremism has been seen as a "war on ideas", which treats terrorists or radicalised individuals as "victims" of a false ideology and deals with them accordingly through the use of counter-narratives. Along with this, the Saudi government has worked towards promoting judicious interpretations of various religious doctrines. There is also an extensive involvement of prominent Islamic preachers in this process. The same has been done in Singapore in order to engage with the minority communities and denounce extremist ideologies with the help of religious leaders so as to promote moderate interpretations of religion. The Prevent Strategy of the UK also focusses on preventing radicalisation, targeting people at risk of joining extremist organisations. It seeks to garner support from the police as well as professionals in other fields such as religion, education and medicine so as to enable them to refer any suspicions about people who may be likely to turn towards extremism.[43] Such programmes, however, often come under criticism for alienating or being insensitive towards the communities they tend to target such as Muslim communities or minorities.

What Next?

The historical trend in suicide terrorism the world over indicates that irrespective of the desire of the suicide attacker to fight for land or religion or any other objective, suicide attack remains the most prominent weapon in the toolkit of violent non-state actors for achieving their goals. In essence, there is a firm realisation among perpetrators of suicide attacks and those directing them that such attacks tend to generate significantly large numbers of casualties per attack than other uses of force by terrorist groups, insurgents, etc. The level of accuracy,

penetration towards the target and the extent of damage caused remain the critical factors favouring such form of attacks. Moreover, the lessons learnt and the tactics deployed over the years would continue to enable innovation and improvisation in the conduct of suicide attacks in the future. Therefore, having proven its credibility, based on an assured impact on the target and creating a permanent and long-term impact on the society, suicide terrorism is here to stay as a potent weapon to be used by desperate groups/elements in their zeal to achieve their goals in the years to come.

In the ultimate sense, suicide terrorism is an outcome of a clash of ideologies. This is mainly because the suicide terrorist is of the opinion that he/she is doing the right thing or striving for a 'greater good' which the rest of the society is unable to see or realise. Thus, altruism is of utmost concern here, despite the fact that several suicide terrorists do not commit the act out of a sense of selflessness or a higher moral ground but most do, or are made to look as if they do. The best comparison to explain this phenomenon would be that between a criminal and a suicide terrorist. While the criminal is clearly conscious and aware of his/her wrongdoing (in most cases) in committing the crime, a suicide terrorist views himself/herself as coming from a morally and ethically high ground and fighting for a good cause for which he/she is willing to go to any extent to self-sacrifice.

In a world that is evolving at a rapid pace, where globalisation and interdependence form the core values of any modern society, people have become accustomed to being associated with multiple nationalities, cultures, traditions and values. Greater exposure to religious, ethnic, cultural or racial diversity can have positive or negative effects depending on how a particular society is set to handle diversity within its local confines, as well as on a global scale. This creates a complex mesh of affiliations in a modern society with multiple loyalties professed by people, particularly immigrants, to a particular country. This would require deep understanding of the trends in society and population groups and identifying the negative influence creators in order to deal with them well in advance.

While security and intelligence agencies the world over often tend to deal with such issues at a macro level through policy decisions and broader initiatives, with suicide terrorism likely to become increasingly restricted to a very few actors and the so-called 'lone wolf' in the future, there is serious need for dealing with the issue on a micro scale as well. This would require understanding the pulse and sensitivities of communities through the collection of intelligence at the grassroots level by interacting with members of the community, including through peer engagement. There is need to strengthen self-awareness and empower internal voices and forces which support and respect diversity. There is also need for intra-faith and intra-community conversation to assert the need for accepting those who hold different perspectives even within the same cultural or religious group.

Further, access to the internet and the easy availability of numerous online platforms make it all the more convenient for people to familiarise themselves with a vast trove of information while also expressing their views and opinions on issues such as nationality, patriotism, political discourse, etc. The internet essentially creates a global and egalitarian society online which has several advantages but is also challenging, if not impossible, to fully monitor. It is this element of disguise and obscurity associated with communication through the internet which has enabled terror entities to effectively disseminate their ideology and thought processes, including those related to suicide terrorism, which do not even require the individual to join an organisation while being equally lethal in performing 'alone'. Social media platforms have transformed traditional methods of communication by allowing the interactive sharing of information created and controlled by individuals, groups, organisations, and governments on a real-time basis. The power and ability of the internet to cause an impact is so immense that psychologists often fear that the large quantity of information available online on the subject of suicide terrorism can influence suicidal behaviour, both negatively and positively.

It then becomes clear that in order to deal with transnational suicide terrorism, it is very important to have a multi-pronged

approach towards countering it. While a transnational threat such as suicide terrorism must definitely be dealt with based on a transnational counter-terrorism approach, it must, at the same time, also focus on the ideology of such organisations, and aim to counter them. Some critical measures that can help in effectively dealing with suicide terrorism are: a thorough understanding of the concepts of radicalisation and their root causes among counter-terror operatives and members of security establishments; effective sharing of intelligence; strengthening of the role and investigative capability of security and law enforcement agencies; spreading awareness and ensuring preparedness during the event of a terrorist incident; promoting the benefits of democratic values; building counter-narratives targeted at violent extremism, along with setting up of effective CVE programmes for counter-radicalisation and deradicalisation.

Governments also need to devise policies to deal with social, religious and ethnic issues in a calibrated manner so as to not adversely impact the societal balance. Inter-religious education as part of the broader inter-cultural awareness building, aims to build understanding, tolerance and social coherence to adequately address the issue of integrating people of different religious backgrounds.

Besides these practical measures that can be adopted to deal with the issue, there is also need for a proactive approach at the global level towards dealing with illegal financial transactions and raising of funds for terror activities. Efforts also need to be made by countries to work jointly to thwart covert movement of arms and weapons besides illegal financial transactions for use by terror entities. Most significantly, there is need for countries to come together to condemn nations that provide safe havens to terrorists and terrorist organisations, thus, promoting terrorism, including suicide terrorism. Thus, a more integrated global approach encompassing the wide paradigm of issues associated with suicide terrorism would be a critical contributor towards dealing with this global menace.

Notes

1. US Department of State Website: https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/wh/6947.htm. Last accessed on May 7, 2018.
2. Maya Mirchandani, "Countering Violent Extremism: Lessons for India", *ORF Online*. Available at: https://www.orfonline.org/research/countering-violent-extremism-lessons-india/Last accessed on May 3, 2018.
3. Alex P. Schmid, "Countering Violent Extremism: A Promising Response to Terrorism", International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, *The Hague*, June 12, 2012. Available at: https://icct.nl/publication/countering-violent-extremism-a-promising-response-to-terrorism/ Last accessed on April 10, 2018
4. Maria Norris, "Fifteen Years on from 9/11, How the UK Bypassed Justice to Become a Counter-Terrorism State", *New Statesman*, September 11, 2016. Available at: https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2016/09/fifteen-years-911-how-uk-bypassed-justice-become-counter-terrorism-state. Last accessed on April 11, 2018.
5. Cadciani Dominic, Gordon Corera, Tom Edwards, Nick Triggle, "7 July Bombings: 15 Changes to Anti-Terror Planning", *BBC News*, July 7, 2015. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-33388286. Last accessed on April 12, 2018
6. Department for Communities and Local Government, London, "Preventing Violent Extremism – Winning Hearts and Minds". PDF available at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070506201536/http://www.communities.gov.uk/pub/401/PreventingviolentextremismWinningheartsandminds_id1509401.pdf. Last accessed on April 12, 2018.
7. Ellie Cambridge, "Terrorist Revealed: Who was Khalid Masood? Westminster Attack Terrorist who Drove into Pedestrians in London and Murdered PC Keith Palmer in 2017", *The Sun*, March 22, 2018. Available at: https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/3152290/khalid-masood-westminster-attack-terrorist-2017/Last accessed on April 11, 2018.
8. Amanda Devlin and David Hughes, "Killer Unmasked: Who was Salman Abedi? Manchester Bombing Terrorist Whose Brother Hashem Faces Arrest in the UK", *The Sun*, March 27, 2018. Available at: https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/3626664/salman-abedi-manchester-bombing-terror-attacker-latest/Last accessed on April 10, 2018.
9. CONTEST, The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism: Annual Report for 2015. (Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, London, July 2016.) PDF available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/539683/55469_Cm_9310_Web_Accessible_v0.11.pdf. Last accessed on April 11, 2018.
10. Counter Extremism Project, "United Kingdom: Extremism and Counter-Extremism", 2018. Available at: https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/united-kingdom. Last accessed on April 13, 2018.
11. Natalie Hanman, "Explainer: Terrorism Legislation", *The Guardian*, January 22, 2009. Available at:https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/libertycentral/2009/jan/22/explainer-terrorism-legislation. Last accessed on April 10, 2018.
12. James Crisp, "More Lonewolf Terror Attacks 'Very Likely' Warns Europol Crime Agency", *Telegraph*, June 30, 2018. Available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2018/06/20/lone-wolf-terror-attacks-likely-warns-europol-crime-agency/ Last accessed on July 20, 2018.
13. In August 2015, a man opened fire on a train from Amsterdam to Paris until he was caught by American soldiers aboard the train. Two people were injured in the attack that could easily

have turned into a carnage. Matthieu Suc, "Attack in the Thalys: I Raised my Head and Saw a Guy with an AK-47", *Le Monde*, August 24, 2015. Available at: http://www.lemonde.fr/police-justice/article/2015/08/22/un-attentat-sanglant-evite-dans-le-thalys_4733478_1653578.html. Last accessed on April 11, 2018.

14. Fearus O'Sullivan, "How a Brussels Neighbourhood Became a Breeding Ground for Terror", Citylab, November 17, 2015, http://www.citylab.com/housing/2015/11/how-a-brussels-neighborhood-became-a-breeding-ground-for-terror/416367/
15. Radhika Halder, "Brussels Bombings: Identifying Potential Causes", *In Focus* (opinion piece) published by the Centre for Air Power Studies. Available at: http://capsindia.org/files/documents/CAPS_Infocus_RH_00.pdf. Last accessed on May 2, 2018.
16. n. 10.
17. Thomas Renard and Rick Coolsaet, "Reassessing Belgium's 'Failed' Counterterrorism Policy", *Lawfare Blog*, March 22, 2018. Available at: https://www.lawfareblog.com/reassessing-belgiums-failed-counterterrorism-policy. Last accessed on August 12, 2018.
18. Ibid.
19. n. 10.
20. n. 17.
21. Srijoni Sen, Rukmini Das, Raadhika Gupta, Vrinda Bhandari, "Anti-Terror Law in India: A Study of Statutes and Judgments, 2001-2014", Centre for Legal Policy. Available at: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/551ea026e4b0adba21a8f9df/t/5575b428e4b08898ef56bc60/1433777192655/150531_Vidhi+Terrorism+Report_Final.pdf. Last accessed on May 3, 2018.
22. Ibid.
23. Sanchari Pal, "What Has Changed: Nine Years After 26/11 Attack, Is Mumbai Safe?", *The Better India*, November 27, 2017. Available at: https://www.thebetterindia.com/122367/nine-years-2611-mumbai-attack-indian-cities-safety/ Last accessed on May 6, 2018.
24. PTI, "Mumbai Police Upgrade Response Mechanism Post 26/11 Attack", *The Indian Express*, November 26, 2017. Available at: http://indianexpress.com/article/cities/mumbai/mumbai-police-upgrade-response-mechanism-post-26-11-attack-4955312/ Last accessed on May 7, 2018.
25. n. 23.
26. Kamaljit Kaur Sandhu, "10 Years Post Mumbai 26/11 Terror Attack, National Intelligence Grid Yet to Take Off", *India Today*, March 16, 2018. Available at: https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/10-years-post-mumbai-26-11-terror-attack-national-intelligence-grid-yet-to-take-off-1190616-2018-03-16. Last accessed on May 6, 2018.
27. Ramesh Babu, "16 Kerala Muslim Youth Missing, Relatives Fear they Went to Iraq, Syria", *Hindustan Times*, July 8, 2016. Available at: https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/6-kerala-muslim-youth-missing-relatives-fear-they-went-to-iraq-syria/story-HvtpIuAgojEGuzPqp5TdAN.html. Last accessed on May 7, 2018.
28. Shaju Philip, "Four Among Kerala Group that Joined Islamic State Killed", *The Indian Express*, March 31, 2018. Available at: http://indianexpress.com/article/india/four-among-kerala-group-that-joined-islamic-state-killed-5117761/Last accessed on May 2, 2018.
29. Dipanjan Roy Chaudhary, "India Approaches Malaysia for an Anti-Radicalisation Islamic Education System", *The Economic Times*, July 26, 2016. Available at: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/services/education/india-approaches-malaysia-for-an-anti-radicalisation-islamic-education-system/articleshow/53388777.cms. Last accessed on May 5, 2018.
30. Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology website. Available at: http://meity.gov.in/

content/icert. Last accessed on August 3, 2018.
31. Sharad Vyas, "IS Threat: Maharashtra Rolls out Deradicalisation Plan", *The Hindu*, February 4, 2016. Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/islamic-state-threat-maharashtra-rolls-out-deradicalisation-plan/article8189391.ece. Last accessed on May 6, 2018.
32. n. 2.
33. Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, "Countering Violent Extremism". Available at: https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/focus-areas/countering-violent-extremism/ Last accessed on May 4, 2018.
34. UN Resolution, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2178%20%282014%29.
35. UN General Assembly official website: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/60/288.
36. UN Office of Counter-Terrorism: https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/about-task-force.
37. UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy.
38. "UAE's Definition of Terror Paves Way for CCIT Acceptance by OIC", *Yahoo News*, August 17, 2015. Available at: https://in.news.yahoo.com/uaes-definition-terror-paves-way-ccit-acceptance-oic-153545426.html?guccounter=1. Last accessed on May 7, 2018.
39. "What is the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism?", *Live Mint*, September 28, 2016. Available at: https://www.livemint.com/Politics/Ee84kLhbyP5NJ9mFnMzkKO/Will-Sushmas-speech-at-the-UNGA-give-fresh-push-to-antiter.html. Last accessed on May 6, 2018.
40. Suhasini Haider, "Delhi Hopes UN will Push Global Terror Convention", *The Hindu*, July 3, 2016. Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Delhi-hopes-UN-will-push-global-terror-convention/article14467324.ece. Last accessed on May 5, 2018.
41. GS Bajpai and A. Kaushik, "Thwarting Radicalization in India: Lacunae in Policy Initiatives", June 30, 2017, *Social Crimonol* 5: 166. DOI: 10.4172/2375-4435.1000166. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3172700.
42. Ibid.
43. "Reality Check: What is the Prevent Strategy?", *BBC News,* June 4, 2017. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/election-2017-40151991. Last accessed on May 6, 2018.

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

Index

9/11 attacks, 3, 10, 12, 13, 16, 19, 51, 62, 70, 76, 104, 109, 136, 157, 164, 168, 177, 178, 182, 191, 196, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202
26/11 Attacks, 14, 19, 81, 210, 211
Afghanistan, 51, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 70, 81, 99, 100, 101, 102, 107, 109, 110, 112, 117, 118, 122, 123, 128, 131, 132, 133, 136, 139, 141, 142, 143, 151, 166-176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 182, 184, 186, 197, 200, 201, 211, 212
Africa, 2, 94
AK-47s, 14, 136
Al-Adnani, Abu Mohammad, 65
Al Baghdadi, Abu Bakr, 64
Al-Qaddafi, Muammar, 39
Al Qaeda, 3, 13, 14, 51, 56, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 70, 74, 75, 80, 85-114, 123, 129, 130, 133, 136, 139, 140, 151, 167, 168, 169, 170, 172, 173, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 196, 198, 199, 200, 208
Al-Sadr, Mohammad Bakr, 41
Al-Sadr, Musa, 39, 40, 41, 152
Al Zarqawi, Abu Musab, 64, 101, 110, 123, 170
Al Zawahiri, Ayman, 64, 101, 110
Analysing Suicide Terrorism Through Anti-India Terror Groups: Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad, 117-147
  MDI or Jamaat ud Dawa (JuD), 125-147
  state of Pakistan, 118-125
Analysing Suicide Terrorism through Case Studies: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Al Qaeda, 85-114
  Al Qaeda, 99-111
  Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, 86-99
  LTTE and Al Qaeda, concluding assessment in realm of suicide terrorism, 112-114
Arafat,Yasser, 47, 48, 49, 50
Asia, 2, 35, 43, 50, 55, 59, 86, 94, 101, 103, 134, 138, 140, 144, 193, 195
Australia, 93, 159, 168
Azhar, Maulana Masood, 15, 140, 167, 168, 204
Aziz, Abdul, 100, 128
Azzam, Abdullah, 59, 60, 62, 100, 104, 123, 126, 128, 133, 166

Balochistan, 131, 174, 177
Bangladesh, 121, 138, 139, 144
Barak, Ehud, 48
Beirut, 40, 42, 153, 155
Belgium, 138, 205, 206, 207, 208
Bhutan, 90
Bhutto, Benazir, 124
Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali, 121
Black Tigers, 92, 95, 96, 97, 113, 161, 163, 196
Bosnia, 102, 103, 138
Britain, 30, 33, 50, 202, 203
Brussels, 16, 17, 78, 205
Buddhism, 29, 88, 162
Burma, 94, 103, 134
Bush, George W, 12, 126, 200
Byman, Daniel, 17

Canada, 93, 159, 168
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 42, 106, 123, 166, 177, 182
China, 134
Christians, 38, 151, 152, 154, 156
Clinton, Bill, 49
Colombo, 90
Communism, 2, 58, 100, 166
Conclusion, 191-222
  Belgium, 205-207
  changing face of suicide terrorism, 198200
  dealing with threat of radicalisation, 216-219
  efforts at multilateral level, 215-216
  France, 208-209
  India, 209-213
  United Kingdom202-205
  United Nations and counter-terrorism, 213-215
  United States of America, 200-202

Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), 201, 213, 214, 216, 218, 222

Dimensions of the Phenomenon, 55-83
conclusion, 82-83
homegrown terrorism, 76-78
lone wolf terrorism, new feature of Islamic State, 79-80
other motivations, 80-82
Robert Pape's nationalist theory of suicide terrorism, 60-62
suicide terrorism from individual's point of view, 71-76
suicide terrorism from organisation's point of view, 67-71
suicide terrorism in 1980s, 56-60
suicide terrorism in 21st century, 62-66
Duraiappa, Alfred, 89
Durkheim, Emile, 8, 9

East Pakistan (later Bangladesh), 121
Egypt, 44, 101, 104, 205
European Union (EU) (Europe), 16, 17, 24, 64, 78, 94, 138, 195, 203, 204, 205, 206
Evaluating the Vulnerabilities of States Dealing with Suicide Terrorism, 151-187
Afghanistan, 166-176
conclusion, 184-187
Lebanon, 151-161
Pakistan, 176-184
Sri Lanka, 161-165

Fahmideh, Mohammad Hosein, 38
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 4
Fierke, K.M, 11
France, 94, 138, 168, 205, 208, 209

Gandhi, Indira, 209
Gandhi, Rajiv, 91, 92, 95, 163
Gaza, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49
Gemayel, Amin, 155
Germany, 2, 93, 168, 205, 218
Guru, Afzal, 141, 142, 143

Hamas, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 61, 129, 172, 194
Harkat ul Mujahideen (HuM), 139
Headley, David Coleman, 211
Herzegovina, 103, 138
Hezbollah, 3, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 49, 51, 55, 56, 57, 61, 74, 86, 109, 151, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 172, 193, 194, 197
Himachal Pradesh, 15
Hoffman, Bruce, 6
Hussein, Saddam, 34, 36, 37, 39, 41

India, 5, 14, 15, 16, 87, 91, 92, 117-147, 163, 174, 176, 177, 178, 179, 182, 197, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 216
Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF), 91, 92
Indonesia, 94, 139
Intelligence Bureau (IB), 211
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), 58, 59, 101, 122, 125, 128, 134, 135, 136, 137, 139, 142, 166, 167, 209
Iqbal, Zafar, 125, 127
Iran, 34, 35, 36, 40, 41, 57, 59, 132, 154, 157, 158, 176, 193
Iraq, 14, 34, 35, 36, 41, 62, 63, 64, 65, 70, 78, 101, 103, 109, 110, 112, 131, 132, 159, 170, 173, 179, 193, 201, 204, 206, 207, 209, 211
Ireland, 30, 32, 33
Irish Republican Army (IRA), 30, 31, 32, 33, 50, 71, 192
Islam, 12, 13, 36, 37, 105, 107, 108, 120, 121, 122, 123, 125, 126, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 139, 143, 156, 160, 167, 193, 199, 208
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 65, 101, 130, 159, 191
Israel, 39, 40, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 63, 103, 152, 153, 155, 157, 158, 159, 193
Italy, 2, 94

Jaffna, 89, 90, 91, 93
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), 15, 16, 117, 118, 124, 125, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 179, 197, 210
Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), 117, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 133, 134, 136, 137, 138, 139, 141
Japan, 28, 29, 50, 94
Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), 15, 16, 118, 137, 139, 197, 209
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), 137
Jerusalem, 44
Jihad, 36, 41, 43, 45, 46, 51, 56, 57, 59, 60, 65, 101, 102, 103, 105, 108, 110, 111, 113, 117, 122, 123, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 137, 138, 139, 140, 146, 167, 178, 196, 197

Jinnah, Mohammad Ali, 119, 120
Jongman, Albert, 6

Kabul, 100, 142, 166, 167, 175
Karachi, 144
Kasab, Ajmal, 80, 146
Kashmir, 103, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 128, 134, 135, 136, 137, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 179, 197, 209
Kenya, 104, 109
Kerala, 211, 212
Khan, Ayub (Gen), 120, 121
Khan, Liaquat Ali, 120
Kandahar, 140
Karzai, Hamid, 168, 169, 175
Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 46, 51, 57, 59, 153, 193
Kurdistan, 34, 71
Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), 34, 35, 50, 71, 192
Kuwait, 43, 60, 102

Laden, Osama bin, 13, 51, 59, 62, 64, 100, 101, 102, 103, 106, 110, 112, 123, 133, 143, 166, 167, 168, 172, 196, 198
Lahore, 125, 126, 128
Lakhvi, Zaqiur Rehman, 125
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), 14, 117, 118, 124, 125, 126, 128, 129, 130, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 140, 145, 146, 151, 179, 197, 210
Lebanon, 12, 35, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 49, 56, 86, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 184, 185, 186, 193, 194
Lewis, Jeffrey William, 23, 32
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 3, 44, 51, 56, 57, 61, 74, 85, 86, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 112, 113, 151, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 172, 194, 195, 196, 197, 209
Libya, 39, 205
London, 13, 14, 17, 142, 144, 202

Madrid, 47, 205
Maharashtra, 210, 211, 212
Malaysia, 94, 212
Maldives, 138
Marxism, 2
Masood, Ahmad Shah, 167
Masood, Khalid, 204
Moscow, 27
Mujahideen, 51, 58, 59, 101, 102, 117, 119, 121, 122, 123, 133, 134, 138, 139, 166, 167, 169, 172, 177
Mukti Bahini, 121
Mumbai, 14, 81, 136, 210, 213
Musharraf, Pervez, 144, 168, 178, 182
Muslim, 13, 17, 34, 45, 46, 58, 63, 64, 78, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 112, 117, 119, 122, 129, 130, 131, 134, 138, 139, 154, 156, 162, 185, 203, 213, 219
Myanmar, 139

Narodnaya Volya, 2, 23, 50, 191
National Investigation Agency (NIA), 212
Nepal, 134, 138, 139, 144
New York, 12, 62, 104, 109, 167

Obama, Barack, 201
Ocalan, Abdullah, 34, 35
Omar, Mullah Muhammad, 167, 168, 170, 178
Origins of Suicide Terrorism: A Historical Overview, 23-52
  conclusion, 50-52
  imperial Japan, 28-30
  imperial Russia, 23-28
  Lebanon, 38-43
  Palestinian suicide bombing, 44-50
  provisional Irish Republican Army, 30-33
  Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka, 44
  West Asia, 35-38
  Worker's Party of Kurdistan, 34-35

Pakistan, 14, 15, 16, 58, 59, 81, 99, 100, 101, 108, 110, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 124, 125, 128, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 142, 143, 144, 146, 147, 151, 166, 167, 168, 173, 174, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 186, 197, 198, 209, 210
Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), 136, 138, 140, 146
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), 3, 39, 40, 45, 46, 47, 153, 194
Pape, Robert, 10, 60-62, 74
Paris, 16, 17, 205, 208
Pathankot, 15, 16, 142, 143
Pennsylvania, 12
Pentagon, 12
Philippines, 103, 138

Pisacane, Carlo, 2
Prabhakaran, Vellupillai, 44, 51, 86, 89, 90, 91, 95, 96, 98, 99, 112, 162, 163, 165, 194
Premadasa, Ranasinghe, 92, 163
Prevention of Terrorist Activities (POTA), 5, 209, 210
Prophet Mohammad, 36, 105
Punjab, 15, 122, 143

Quran, 129, 132, 133

Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur, 121
Rapoport, David, 1
Robespierre, Maximilien, 1
Russia, 2, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 41, 50, 55, 191

Saeed, Hafiz Mohammad, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 133, 134, 136, 137, 183
Sageman, Marc, 77, 78
Saudi Arabia, 58, 60, 102, 103, 104, 107, 110, 117, 122, 123, 128, 130, 131, 132, 133, 219
Schmid, Alex, 6
Schweitzer, Yoram, 11
Sheikh, Ahmad Omar, 144
Shia, 57, 130, 131, 139, 152, 153, 154, 158, 193
Shiite, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 51, 56, 59, 110, 132, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 159, 160, 185, 186, 193
Singapore, 94, 219
Singh, Maharaja Hari, 119
Singh, V P, 91
Somalia, 102, 103, 104, 107, 139
South Africa, 94
Soviet Union, 51, 58, 59, 60, 94, 100, 101, 102, 117, 122, 123, 125, 131, 133, 139, 166, 167, 168, 176, 177
Sri Lanka, 44, 57, 74, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 138, 139, 151, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 184, 185, 186, 209
Stolypin, Peter, 28
Sunni, 38, 57, 104, 110, 130, 131, 132, 133, 152, 154, 155
Switzerland, 93
Syria, 34, 40, 64, 65, 78, 101, 110, 138, 139, 153, 157, 158, 159, 173, 204, 206, 207, 209, 211

Tadao, Hayashi, 29
Taliban, 61, 68, 81, 109, 139, 140, 141, 143, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 181, 182, 198, 200, 201
Tajikistan, 103, 138
Tanzania, 104, 109
Tehran, 41, 153
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), 140, 179, 181, 182, 198
Terrorism, (*passim* throughout text)
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA), 5, 209
Turkey, 34, 35, 50, 94, 139, 192, 205

Ukraine, 94
Understanding Definitions, 1-19
  26/11 Mumbai attacks, November 26, 2008, 14-15
  7/7 London bombings, July 7, 2005, 13-14
  9/11 attacks, September 11, 2001, 12-13
  defining terrorism, 5-7
  definitions of terrorism, 3-5
  lone wolf terrorism, new major threat, 17-19
  Paris and Brussels attacks, 2015-16, 16-17
  Pathankot and Uri, 2016, 15-16
  suicide terrorism today, 12
  suicide terrorism, 8-12
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 100, 166
United Kingdom, (UK), 4, 13, 14, 93, 137, 138, 202, 203, 204, 219
United Nations (UN), 5, 158, 168, 213, 214, 215, 216
United States (US) (USA), 4, 12, 13, 14, 42, 45, 49, 62, 63, 63, 64, 70, 93, 100, 102, 103, 104, 106, 109, 110, 122, 123, 136, 138, 143, 144, 158, 166, 167, 168, 169, 171, 174, 177, 178, 180, 182, 200, 201
Uri, 15, 16

Washington D C, 170
World Trade Centre, 12, 62, 104, 109
World War I, 2, 3
World War II, 2, 28

Zia-ul-Haq, Muhammad, 59, 121, 122, 123, 124, 133, 183